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Abstract 
Most studies on regime support focus on performance, or policy outputs, as the 
principal causal variable. This study challenges this conventional wisdom by focusing on 
two countries where performance and support do not match. Chile is the economic envy of 
every country in the region, yet support has been surprisingly anemic since the return of 
democracy in the early 1990s. By contrast, Venezuela managed to maintain extremely high 
levels of support during the reign of Hugo Chávez despite severe failures of governance in 
areas such as economic management, employment, and public security. Resolution of these 
paradoxes requires turning away from policy decisions and focusing instead on how those 
decisions are made. Taking inspiration from democratic theory and social psychology, I 
argue that extensive opportunities for direct participation in the political process engenders 
in citizens strong feelings of efficacy, a sense of control over the course of politics. Such 
sentiments increase support both directly and by softening the impact of performance 
failures. I use a mixed-methods approach to test this theory. Quantitative analysis of survey 
data confirms the relationships between efficacy, performance, and support. I then show, 
through both quantitative and qualitative techniques, that participatory programs such as 
the communal councils in Venezuela have a key role in preserving the legitimacy of that 
 vii 
regime, especially in light of the hegemonic and authoritarian practices of chavismo at the 
national level. Finally, I use experimental data, survey data, and a qualitative analysis of a 
nascent participatory program in one of Chile’s municipalities to demonstrate that a lack 
of participatory access lies at the heart of that country’s relatively weak regime support. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The impetus for this project came in the spring of 2006, while taking refuge from a cloud 
of tear gas in a metro station in Santiago, Chile. The street above had been clear for some time, 
but the noxious remnants of the state’s response to a student protest march, one of many that spring, 
were still very much in evidence. The wave of protests had taken nearly everyone by surprise. 
Aptly summarizing the conventional wisdom that still held on the eve of the protests, political 
scientist Kenneth M. Roberts stated that “the mass social mobilizations of the 1960s, early 1970s 
and mid-1980s have been conspicuous by their absence…there is little indication that they are 
looming on the horizon for years to come” (1998, p. 157). Despite lingering worries about 
inequality and atavistic institutions which had survived the transition away from military rule, most 
observers viewed Chile as one of Latin America’s great success stories, both economically and 
politically. The eruption of a major wave of contentious politics (which turned out to be merely 
the first of many such waves to come) demonstrated that a significant portion of the Chilean 
population did not share this view. How could deep-seated discontent continue to fester, and 
eventually explode into the streets, within an economic and political system that was (and is) the 
envy of the region? 
This contradiction rests on the assumption that all regimes need do in order to ensure the 
support of their citizens is tend to their material needs, or at least provide an environment in which 
citizens can easily provide for themselves. It is a common assumption, both in popular discourse 
and in academic literature on regime support and legitimacy. Studies of these topics have, in recent 
years, privileged the quality of governance as the source of legitimacy almost to the exclusion of 
any other potential sources (Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975; Hardin, 2000; Mainwaring, 
Scully, & Vargas Cullell, 2010; Miller & Listhaug, 1999; Newton & Norris, 2000; Rogowski, 
1974). While studies may include any number of ancillary variables, be they institutional, 
behavioral, cultural, and so forth, such factors usually exert their influence based upon the 
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utilitarian logic of rational self-interest, and are viewed as interesting because they enable or 
hamper a regime’s provision of economic goods to its citizens. 
The idea that a political system which routinely fails to provide desired goods and services, 
whether through incompetence or malice, would gradually lose its legitimacy is intuitively 
appealing and perfectly reasonable. It is also completely inadequate. Figure 1.1 below presents 
average levels of regime support (as measured by two commonly used indicators, satisfaction with 
democracy and perceived level of democracy), and the relatively objective performance index used 
by Mainwaring et. al. 
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Figure 1.1: Satisfaction with democracy and perceived level of democracy by performance 
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Both graphs show that, while there is clearly a relationship between support and 
performance, there is a great deal of unexplained variation, as can be seen by a number of cases 
lying far above or below the regression line. For both indicators, Chile is the most extreme outlier 
(except Honduras for perceived level of democracy), but it is not the only one. While regime 
support in Chile has remained anemic (Angell, 2010; Madrid, Hunter, & Weyland, 2010; 
Mainwaring et al., 2010) despite inarguably strong economic performance (Angell, 2010; Posner, 
1999, 2004), Venezuela presents an opposite, mirror-image of the Chilean case. Under the populist 
regime of Hugo Chávez Frías, the quality of governance has been abysmal by nearly any standard 
(Corrales, 2010; Mainwaring et al., 2010, p. 39), and yet the Bolivarian state is viewed by its 
citizens as more legitimate than the majority of its regional neighbors (Americas Barometer, 2012; 
Canache, 2007; Latinobarómetro, 2007). Just as Chile is an extreme “underperformer” in the 
graphs above, Venezuela is an extreme overachiever; it is the largest outlier above the line for 
satisfaction with democracy, and the second-largest of perceived level of democracy (after 
Uruguay). 
Ironically, the Venezuelan and Chilean paradoxes are exactly the sort of puzzle which the 
concept of regime support was intended to resolve. Easton (1975) saw support as a potential 
explanation for why equivalent economic or social troubles produced only mild disruptions in 
some polities but full-blown political crises in others. Various analysts sought to explain this sort 
of enduring support, but the drift towards performance-centric theoretical frameworks, encouraged 
by the ascendency of rational choice in political science, abrogated this line of analysis. Utilitarian 
conceptions of support cannot resolve this sort of paradox; if regime support is assumed to be 
largely or entirely a product of economic success, there can be no explanation of variable popular 
responses to economic failure. 
1.1: THE ARGUMENT: BRINING PROCEDURES BACK IN  
The purpose of this research is to account for the paradoxes described above by “bringing 
inputs back in.” Classical and participatory democratic theorists (e.g. Barber, 1984; Pateman, 
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1970; Rousseau, 2002) have long argued that the process of self-governance has intrinsic value to 
individuals, regardless what policies such processes eventually produce. Psychological theories of 
organizational and procedural justice have also recognized the power of intrinsic procedural 
characteristics in shaping organizational attitudes, developing a bi-dimensional framework of 
organizational support that takes both procedures and outcomes into account (Folger & 
Cropanzano, 2001; Lind, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992; Thibaut & 
Walker, 1975; van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2001). Although political theory and social psychology 
have very different epistemological foundations, on the topic of support they converge on a 
common proposition: that citizen autonomy is a critical (and neglected) source of systemic support. 
The term autonomy is used here as in democratic theory, meaning “self-governance”, i.e. that 
decision making authority is granted to those who are governed by said decisions, rather than 
separation or independence from another authority, as it is used in common parlance.  Citizens are 
kinder in their evaluations of regime institutions if they feel they have a meaningful say in how 
those institutions decide and implement policy.  
Although citizen autonomy is a plausible explanation for the support paradox in Chile, it 
seems somewhat inadequate to account for the paradox in Venezuela without some elaboration. 
Governance problems are so acute in Venezuela that it is unlikely that any variable could overrule 
the impact of shortages, endemic violent crime and runaway inflation. However psychological 
theory suggests that citizen autonomy can also account for the failure of these very real economic 
grievances to manifest in a mass withdrawal of support. Psychological research has repeatedly 
found that perceptions of control dramatically alter responses to external stimuli. Specifically, an 
individual who believes that he or she can substantially influence the course of a given process can 
be expected to respond to negative outcomes with more tolerance and less anxiety than an 
individual who feels at the mercy of forces beyond his or her control. In other words, feelings of 
autonomy increase support both directly and by ameliorating the deleterious effect of bad policy, 
forestalling erosions of legitimacy that might otherwise lead economic plights to devolve into full-
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blown regime crises. In the language of quantitative modeling, perceptions of autonomy moderate 
the relationship between performance and regime support. 
Citizen autonomy is a promising solution to the paradox because it varies concomitantly 
with the stated priorities and philosophies of each regime. While Chile has focused on political 
stability and economic development since its return to democracy, often by intentionally insulating 
policymakers from popular pressure, Bolivarian Venezuela has emphasized the creation of 
channels for the direct participation of ordinary citizens in politics. A sense of empowerment and 
political inclusion is one of the chavista movement’s most important promises to its militants, and 
the primary source of its claim to popular legitimacy. 
By incorporating the presence or absence of institutionally guaranteed participatory 
opportunities, it is possible to fully specify a theory of support that can explain cross-national 
variation, with clear connections between national level and individual level variables. I find that 
the provision of opportunities for direct participation in the policymaking process is an important 
source of widespread perceptions of citizen autonomy. Moreover this relationship apparently holds 
even for tightly circumscribed participatory opportunities occurring in a context of creeping 
authoritarianism and discredited representative mechanisms, as prevail in contemporary 
Venezuela. Figure 1.2 summarizes this theoretical framework. 
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Figure 1.2: Theoretical framework 
  
1.2: WHY AUTONOMY MATTERS: THE INTERACTIVE STRUCTURE OF REGIME SUPPORT 
The cases studied in this research show the importance of adopting an interactive model of 
regime support which does not ignore questions of procedural justice. No theoretical framework 
without these modifications fits well in both Chile and Venezuela. The durability of legitimacy in 
Venezuela despite the erosion of representative democracy, especially when considered 
simultaneously with the impeccable democratic credentials and anemic support of Chile, requires 
a reevaluation of what makes democratic politics desirable. This research suggests that many 
individuals disagree with the primacy of liberal conceptions of democracy that reign in academia, 
which see elections and political competition as the sine qua non of democracy. Venezuela and 
Chile provide significant caveats to that belief. Chile shows that representative democracy cannot 
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alone ensure legitimacy if it fails to enforce some measure of popular sovereignty by binding elites 
to the popular well. Bolivarian Venezuela shows that, in a political context where competitive 
multiparty politics have been discredited, large swathes of the citizenry will happily surrender their 
ability to hold elites accountable in exchange for direct participation in politics, even if that 
participation is tightly circumscribed to the level of the barrio. 
The primary concern of this work, beyond explaining support patterns in the cases of 
interest, is to evaluate claims about why democracy matters.  Normative democratic theories rest 
upon competing claims regarding human nature, and particularly on some conceived ideal typical 
relationship between the citizen and the state that is a product of that nature. Specifically, the 
existence of “the political man” is at issue here (Lipset, 1963): are human beings inherently 
inclined towards politics, as classical democratic theory holds (Aristotle, 1959; Pateman, 1970; 
Rousseau, 2002), or do citizens yearn for their polities to simply protect their interests, provide 
their services and leave them in peace (Downs, 1957; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001, 2002; 
Sartori, 1987)? One cannot directly evaluate these sorts of assumptions, but by drawing out their 
implications into clear hypotheses, empirical analysis can be brought to bear on these otherwise 
intractable debates.  
The findings presented here are unambiguous: opportunities for direct engagement with 
the political system have strong positive impacts on those citizens who live under regimes which 
grant them. Nowhere in this work do I argue that utilitarian concerns are absent from the minds of 
most individuals, but the prominence of such questions in setting the tone of state-society relations 
is somewhat illusory. Quantitative scholars are often accused of ignoring context, and such charges 
would be more than fair when applied to rational choice, economistic arguments for how states 
build support. While performance may act as a causal variable, the impact of participatory access 
is both causal and contextual. It shapes not only support itself, but how other factors contribute to 
the process. Citizens who, through direct access to the political system, come to feel a sense of 
control over their fates, act in much the way that classical democratic theory predicts. They become 
more conscientious, more responsible, and less prone to panic or anger when confronted with 
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economic or social problems. States can claim legitimacy entirely based upon competent 
governance, but such support appears quite tentative, revocable and (thanks to globalization) 
disturbingly dependent upon forces outside of the regime’s control.  This research demonstrates 
that a utilitarian evaluative mode is contingent upon the absence of substantive popular 
sovereignty. Where citizens feel that the state can be made to bend to their collective will, the 
rationalist approach to legitimacy fails. 
1.3: REBUTTING ELITISM: LEGITIMACY AND THE RESURGENCE OF POPULISM IN LATIN 
AMERICA 
The findings have some clear practical implications, some hopeful, others more troubling. 
Discussion of these implications must be somewhat limited, as they require positing support not 
as a dependent variable, as it is treated in all chapters here, but as an explanatory variable of 
something else. Nevertheless, some effects of support, especially in light of the theoretical 
framework developed here and the case studies to which it is applied, are apparent enough to 
mention at some length. Specifically, the findings I present here have some very clear implications 
regarding regime stability and breakdown. 
Many of the more prominent works on regime support concern their impact on systemic 
stability and regime survival (e.g. Crozier et al., 1975; Easton, 1975; Pharr, Putnam, & Dalton, 
2000). However as the dire predictions of these authors failed to materialize, with imperfect 
democratic regimes in the industrial world limping along relatively untroubled by their citizens’ 
waning confidence, many began to question the relevance of support altogether. Theories which 
gave an important causal role in regime transition to mass actors, such as those based upon class 
conflict (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Bellin, 2000; Boix, 2006; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & 
Stephens, 1992) or cultural values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) seem to have fallen out of favor, 
especially in Latin American studies. Instead, attention has turned to the importance of powerful 
political actors and elites; scholars embracing this view have come to view the actions of the 
powerful as a more promising explanation for regime trends (e.g. Higley & Burton, 2006; 
Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2013; McFaul, 2002; Schmitter & O'Donnell, 1986). Within this line 
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of inquiry, the opinions and attitudes of the public are largely irrelevant to the question of regime 
stability; social and political elites determine the institutional structure of the state.  
While the corrosive effect of weak support on regime stability may well have been 
overblown, it would be a mistake to overcorrect and dismiss it entirely. Even if one accepts that 
elite agency is the most direct factor which determines whether regimes stand or fall, their strategic 
maneuvering does not occur in a vacuum. The foundational text of the elite transition paradigm in 
Latin American studies, O’Donnell and Schmitter’s Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (1986), 
is instructive here. While its theoretical narrative is entirely focused upon a tiny fraction of the 
population, not just elites but regime insiders, one needn’t look too deeply to see a role for mass 
actors in the story. All theories which involve a considerable role for the agency of actors must 
still acknowledge the contextually determined incentives and constraints under which these actors 
operate. Even elite theorists who are dismissive of the public as an actor in its own right 
acknowledge that “…public opinion is one of the most valuable resources which actors can 
employ” (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2013, p. 12). When crises occur, bringing elites who wish 
to save a regime and those who wish to bring about its end into direct combat, the presence or 
absence of regime support can provide one side or the other a powerful weapon. The fall of 
representative democracy in Venezuela is a fairly unambiguous example of this. Although a series 
of economic crises weakened the elitist puntofijismo regime, the repeated flouting of popular 
preferences, exacerbated by long-simmering resentments over the regime’s elitist and hierarchical 
style of rule, put the final nail in the regime’s coffin. Hugo Chávez was undoubtedly a canny 
politician, but his fabled charisma owed much to the illegitimacy of his opponents. It has been 
noted that charisma is, in part, simply the ability to make oneself a tabula rasa on to which 
individuals can project their hopes and expectations (e.g. Panizza, 2005). Chávez would not have 
been able to so thoroughly unmake the ancién regime, nor to construct one so completely matching 
his own vision, without such a deep well of anger and resentment from which to draw.  
Most social science theories operate only in a subset of contexts, under conditions which 
may or may not be fully understood or explored. Even if one concedes that most regime transitions 
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are determined at the elite level, Venezuela is a glaring exception to this. The attitudes of the 
populace, especially widespread antipathy towards puntofijismo, cannot be ignored in this 
instance; the role of public opinion in general and regime support in particular is so clear that no 
theory which ignores them need be taken seriously.  
In other words, regimes may differ considerably in their vulnerability to their populaces’ 
displeasure, and those who use public opinion to fell one regime may well find themselves 
uniquely dependent upon cultivating the same force to protect their own. While it may be that 
democracies and certain types of authoritarian regimes are not responsive to citizen discontent, 
populist regimes are acutely dependent upon the enthusiastic support of ordinary citizens for 
survival. Populist regimes tend to be, by their very nature, giants with feet of clay. Without wading 
into the morass that is the conceptual debate over defining populism, one relatively uncontroversial 
characteristic of such movements is a strong anti-systemic bent. Populists tend to embrace the 
notion of creative destruction, seeking to uproot institutions sooner and build replacements later 
(if at all).  
Given this tendency, as well as the affinity of such regimes for self-inflicted economic 
wounds, shaky foundations are the norm, which leaves populists few mechanisms which they can 
use to anchor themselves. Strong popular support therefore tends to be of critical importance for 
such movements to survive. Even those movements which do eventually build institutions, as the 
Bolivarian movement has, tend to do so around the task of mobilizing support in times of crises or 
vulnerability. Legitimacy may be neither necessary nor sufficient for regime survival in many 
contexts, but when a populist loses it, his or her days are numbered. This drive is reflected in 
support statistics; nearly all top-ranking states in terms of support are led by populists (LAPOP 
2012). 
The theoretical framework I develop, and its direct application to a populist context in 
Venezuela, both provide clear insight into one way in which populists maintain legitimacy. 
Populists tend to be poor economic performers, and they often ignore or actively subvert 
representative and liberal institutions. In this analysis, I show how non-representative mechanisms 
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for political incorporation, especially direct and participatory programs, provide an alternative 
procedural way for populists to meet their commitments to their bases and thus ensure their 
survival. Left populism seems to be making a comeback in Latin America after going out of 
fashion for some time. Populism of both left and right varieties has also seen something of a 
renaissance in the United States and Europe as well. In light of this proliferation, theories which 
can explain how these regimes build support and thus ensure their survival are of clear relevance. 
1.4: SIMMERING DISCONTENT: REGIME SUPPORT AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 
Even in liberal democracies like Chile, where low support appears not to be a terminal 
malady, one need only count the demonstrations to see its relevance. Stability is not a binary 
variable; it presents in shades of degree, and when taken as such the importance of legitimacy is 
much more readily apparent. An enormous body of scholarship exists demonstrating the link 
between dissatisfaction with democracy as practiced and contentious and even anti-systemic 
political behavior (Crow, 2010; Klosko, Muller, & Opp, 1987; Lichbach, 1995; Madsen, 1987; 
McAdam & Tarrow, 2010; Muller & Opp, 1986; Opp, Burow-Auffarth, & Heinrichs, 1981; 
Rhodes-Purdy, 2012; Tarrow, 2000). Since the original march of los pingüinos in 2006, waves of 
protests have crested in Chile, one after another, with almost no respite. While none of these 
movements has ever come close to threatening the survival of democracy, the disruptions of day 
to day life, injuries, arrests, property damage, and other negative externalities of contention have 
become cause for concern.  
The Bachelet government in Chile is currently employing a “kitchen sink” approach to this 
issue, attempting to placate disaffected citizens (and especially students) with both public goods 
and institutional reform. My findings have clear implications for this strategy: specifically they 
indicate that it is a mistake. Chile’s anti-majoritarian and conservative constitution makes change 
difficult, and thus requires all political weight be directed to the heart of the support crisis. Not 
only are procedural justice concerns the root cause of disaffection, but my findings suggest that 
economic grievances could also be ameliorated through institutional reform alone. Even if no 
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reform to taxation or education funding changed, increased systemic responsiveness and 
opportunities for participation would weaken the negative impact of these issues on legitimacy. 
1.5: RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODS AND CASE SELECTION 
The two primary theoretical contributions of this study are the emphasis on direct 
participation and the interactive relationship between performance, process and regime support. I 
test hypotheses based on these insights using a multi-method research design, employing statistical 
analysis, an experiment, and a comparison of the two cases of interest. Results of large-N statistical 
analyses are presented in Chapter 4. These analyses test both the direct impact of citizen autonomy 
on support and its moderating effect on the support-performance relationship. I also test whether 
perceptions of autonomy are, on average, higher in those countries with extensive opportunities 
for direct participation.  
The limited number of second-level units of analysis and the possibility of conjunctural 
causal pathways limits the reliability of statistical examination of my argument at the regime-level. 
Therefore in Chapters 5 and 6, I present case studies of Venezuela and Chile respectively to further 
support this portion of the argument. The case study portion of this study does not directly follow 
either a most similar or most different systems design; Chile and Venezuela share a common 
political and cultural history as former Spanish colonies, but differ radically in any number of 
additional characteristics. Their joint inclusion serves two primary purposes. First, even imperfect 
case comparisons which could not reliably “prove” true hypotheses can help rule out false ones 
(Cohen & Nagel, 1934, ch. 9; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, ch. 1). Arguments based on policy issues of 
great concern to the popular sectors (e.g. poverty reduction) and substantive representation are 
both ruled out by comparing these two cases in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. Second, each case 
can independently provide a “road test” of the theory developed and tested in earlier sections. One 
of the most valid critiques of quantitative analysis is that it often deals with a fairly high level of 
abstraction, and thus the relationships between variables which it establishes may be “valid” but 
are so far removed from the real world as to be of limited value when understanding outcomes in 
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real world cases. To guard against this, I apply the theoretical insights developed in Chapter 3 and 
tested in Chapter 4 to the cases of interest, starting with Venezuela in Chapter 5 and moving on to 
Chile in Chapter 6. 
The study of Venezuela examines the complex role of participatory programs in a populist, 
semi-authoritarian regime; I find that these programs were absolutely crucial for the regime’s 
legitimacy during the reign of Chávez, especially given the countervailing pressures and 
constraints under which the Bolivarian regime operates. I use a statistical analysis specifically 
tailored to the Venezuelan context, supplemented with interview data, to show that engagement 
with the participatory programs has the predicted impact on perceptions of citizen autonomy to 
support this argument. The fact that such direct participation exists alongside debased liberal and 
representative institutions at the national level, and in fact exists in part to excuse these violations 
of democratic norms, sheds considerable light on what citizens actually expect from and value in 
politics. 
Chile presents a more difficult analytical puzzle. It is “the dog that did not bark”, where 
high quality governance has not had its widely assumed legitimating effect. However beyond that 
it is difficult to attribute low support in Chile specifically to the absence of participatory 
opportunities; any number of absent factors could potentially be at work. To overcome this, I use 
two primary approaches: a statistical deconstruction of party-system antipathy, which runs very 
deep in Chile, and experimental research, buttressed by qualitative analysis of a real-world 
example of the experimental treatment. Using public opinion data from the Center for Public 
Studies (CEP), I find that regime support in Chile is inextricably linked to confidence (or lack of 
same) in the country’s political parties and party system. I further find that discontent with parties 
is driven by a lack of faith in their willingness and ability to enable citizen participation in politics, 
rather than their representative role. Finally, I use an experiment to demonstrate that participatory 
opportunities improve evaluations of the sponsoring entity, especially among those who are 
dissatisfied with policy choices. Although these results do conform to the predictions of my theory, 
a small experiment conducted among a student population has limited external validity. 
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Fortunately a participatory program in Providencia municipality allows for a real-world test of 
dynamics suggested by experimental and statistical analysis. I find that tense relationships between 
the municipality and civil society organizations became much more amicable due to the program, 
which follows what theory would predict quite closely.   
1.6: GOING FORWARD: STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT 
The development of the theoretical framework utilized here will proceed over the next two 
chapters. In Chapter 2, I turn first to conceptual issues regarding the exact definition of regime 
support; this is not a trivial matter, as many terms (often with conflicting definitions from author 
to author) have been employed which might be reasonably considered instances or specific 
subtypes of “support” and it is absolutely crucial to be very specific about the dependent variable 
before proceeding further. Additionally, I find that disagreements over conceptualization closely 
mirror the debate over causal factors, with two groups becoming clear with some sorting of the 
literature: those works emphasizing outcomes and those emphasizing intrinsic characteristics of 
regime processes. I then review the body of theory that highlights outcomes; I find that such 
variables are important but incapable of shedding light on the question of interest here. Indeed the 
research puzzle I seek to solve has its basis in this inadequacy. I then turn in Chapter 3 to procedural 
theories of support, finally arriving at citizen autonomy (and its regime-level antecedent, 
participatory opportunities) as the most likely source of the discrepancies in Chile and Venezuela. 
The remaining chapters involve empirical testing of the hypotheses developed in these two 
chapters. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptualizations and Existing Explanations of Regime Support1 
2.1: ASSENT OR APPROVAL: CONCEPTUALIZING REGIME SUPPORT 
Debates concerning explanations for regime support are generally not over a simple choice 
of including or excluding this or that variable, but rather arise from fundamental differences in 
conceptualization. In other words, what shapes support tends to depend on how one defines it. The 
literature on the subject is a confusing mélange of definitions, with little consistency from one 
work to another, even among works which use the same term. However it is possible to organize 
conceptualizations of support into two broad categories. The resultant conceptual schema is 
important to note because it largely mirrors (indeed it is in part responsible for) the divide between 
procedural and performance variables will be reflected in the analytical framework I develop in 
this chapter and in Chapter 3. 
Before proceeding with examination of what the term “regime support” means, it is 
important to note what it does not mean. Specifically there is a common misconception, 
particularly when the accurate but unhelpful term “support for democracy” is used in lieu of the 
more precise “regime support” that the term refers to evaluations of democracy as an ideal, rather 
than as practiced. This is a particularly common instance of a wider problem which frequently 
crops up in the support literature: that of separating the various objects to which support attitudes 
may pertain. Easton (1975) was the first author who attempted to systematically organize empirical 
objects into a schema of support. He arranged political community, political regime, and political 
leaders along a continuum, running from “diffuse” to “specific” based upon the relative 
abstractness of the object. Klingemann (1999) elaborated on this schema, adding political ideals 
and specific policies, and empirically verified the distinct existence of each object using 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).  An adaptation of Klingemann’s graph of these objects, 
similar to that used by Crow (2007), is presented in Figure 2.1. 
  
                                                 
1 Portions of this chapter have been accepted for publication in Comparative Politics (Rhodes-Purdy) 
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Figure 2.1: Objects of “support”, from diffuse to specific 
 
A thorough parsing of the various levels which may or not be included in such a schema is 
beyond the scope of this work. However two points on this topic must be noted. First, while some 
(perhaps most) authors would disagree (e.g. Inglehart, 2003; Linde & Ekman, 2003; Sarsfield & 
Echegaray, 2005), I reserve the term “support” to refer to an attitude directed at objects at least as 
concrete as the political regime. To further ensure conceptual clarity, I avoid using the term 
“support for democracy” altogether, in favor of the term regime support, with the understanding 
that the domain of this research is restricted to democracies. The word support has strong empirical 
connotations; it implies the existence of a very real object being held up or buttressed by the 
subject. One can speak of commitment to or pride in political community, or of belief in or 
preference for democratic ideals, but to use the term support for these sentiments is inappropriate 
because the intension of the term (which includes concreteness) not only does not fit with the 
characteristics of these objects but in fact does fit with closely related but empirically and 
theoretically distinct objects (see Sartori, 1984). This is a recipe for confusion; especially should 
one wish to conduct an analysis involving multiple objects, which brings us to the second point.  
 18 
The preceding discussion is relevant primarily because different conceptualizations of 
regime support, among other characteristics, tend to emphasize their affinity for different 
immediately proximate objects on the scale of abstractness used by Easton, Klingemann and 
others. While there is sufficient empirical evidence to be confident that objects are evaluated 
separately by citizens (Booth & Seligson, 2009; Klingemann, 1999), attitudes towards different 
objects may well impact one another. Additionally, evaluations of different objects may share a 
common attitudinal “mode”, or type of support. For example, political leaders and specific policies 
which they enact may be evaluated separately, but both evaluations will be made largely on 
instrumental grounds, i.e. the extent to which each satisfies individual needs and preferences. 
Conversely, political ideals (like democracy) are evaluated largely on moral, normative grounds 
(Klingemann, 1999, p. 54).  
Unlike the separation of objects, a challenge which is largely at the periphery of analysis 
and consists mostly of getting such difficulties “out of the way” of the main argument with sound 
measurement strategies, the issue of attitudinal mode gets to the heart of conceptualizing support. 
The political regime stands at the midpoint of Easton’s continuum, demarcating (and blurring) the 
border between abstract and concrete objects. The rules and institutions which collectively 
comprise the democratic state are in part a reflection of various philosophical and moral notions 
about the distribution of political power. Regimes determine which leaders are granted access to 
power and how such leaders are retained or removed, which can have a significant impact on the 
extent to which various social groups benefit or suffer from state policy. It therefore is reasonable 
to assume that both instrumental and moral evaluations are relevant for determining regime 
support. 
Which of these modes has the greater causal force (and under which sets of circumstances) 
is at the root of the most profound debates over the sources of support, and this divide can be used 
to roughly bifurcate conceptual work on the subject. These two groups can be considered 
constitutive dimensions of support, meaning that these two concepts (which are probably not 
observable or measureable separately from support) jointly form the umbrella concept. A list of 
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characteristics belonging to each dimension, which I label “assent” and “approval”, is presented 
in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Characteristics of approval and attachment 
  Approval Assent 
Related terms and  
concepts 
Confidence, 
rational legitimacy 
Legitimacy,  
loyalty, allegiance 
Citizen orientation Private Public 
Basis of evaluation Instrumental/utilitarian Moral/psychological 
Nature of low support Dissatisfaction Alienation 
Important related  
object of support 
Political leaders, 
specific policies 
Regime principles, 
democratic ideals 
Class of causal variables Outputs Throughputs/Inputs 
 
Assent and approval are not perfect terms, but they have the advantage of being 
infrequently used in the existing literature, therefore avoiding the confusion that some more 
commonly employed words might engender. I turn first to those conceptions of regime support 
that might be included under the assent dimension. 
2.1.1: Assent 
The oldest works on those attitudes that can be included under the umbrella of regime 
support tended to assume a relationship between citizen (or subject) and state that was much deeper 
and more enduring than the quid-pro-quo utilitarianism of later works. Among the earliest of these 
were Weber’s classic works on legitimacy (Weber, 1978). Although he defined the state based 
upon on violence and coercion, he also emphasized the importance of the widespread belief that 
the state’s monopoly on force was normatively accepted. Early analyses from the nascent subfield 
of public opinion hewed closely to this understanding of how citizens evaluated their regimes when 
developing the concept of political allegiance (and its negation, alienation) (Almond & Verba, 
1963; Gamson, 1968; Lane, 1962, ch. 10). These works differed a great deal in details, but they 
agreed that one’s acceptance or rejection of the state was based primarily on moral, psychological 
or emotional considerations.  
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A few key implications can be gleaned from the preceding discussion. The term assent, 
which implies both acceptance of the regime and an emotional basis of that acceptance (having its 
origins in the Latin verb meaning “to feel”), captures the core of this dimension of support. It is 
emotional, psychological, and moral, rather than instrumental or utilitarian. Indeed this dimension 
assigns little importance to what is actually done under the aegis of a given regime, exclusively 
focusing upon the inherent qualities of the procedures and institutions of the state. Regimes are 
evaluated based upon their adherence to abstract principles or political ideals, as implied by 
Weber’s concept of legal authority. The exact standard by which these inherent characteristics are 
assumed to be judged is a source of considerable debate; there is no consensus on this subject, 
which is likely one of the reasons why this area of the literature, though originating well before 
the more outcome-oriented works which I discuss presently, is so underdeveloped. Easton and 
Dennis held that support and other regime attitudes were likely the result of early childhood 
socialization (Easton & Dennis, 1967, 1969); the normative value of a regime was inculcated 
during childhood, along with other moral precepts. This is somewhat similar to Weber’s concept 
of traditional authority, where a regime was valued because it had existed since time out of mind. 
In other words, the original psychological works on support treated it more like a fixed personality 
trait than an attitude, which might vary over time as circumstances changed. 
However most works on the subject assumed that some independent set of standards were 
being applied when citizens evaluated their regimes (Almond & Verba, 1963; Gamson, 1968; 
Lane, 1962). The importance of belief in political ideals (the next most abstract object after the 
regime) is clear here. Discovering the source of support requires a clear notion of the standards of 
evaluation. The literature on conceptions of democracy attempted to identify such standards by 
specifying characteristics of democracy which citizens might value (Collier & Levitsky, 1997; 
Crow, 2007, 2010; Diamond, 1996). However such analyses have been consistently hampered by 
the extreme difficulty of classifying survey respondents as this or that type of democrat. This often 
requires making herculean assumptions about the political knowledge of citizens. For example, 
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this literature makes an unstated assumption that citizens are aware of alternative conceptions and 
consciously compare existing regime practices to those ideals.  
Behavioralist and political psychological works would contest this assumption, arguing 
that unconscious emotional and psychological needs are often in play, which may only be vaguely 
understood by citizens. For example, an alienated individual may well be responding to a lack of 
institutional allowance for her active participation (Almond & Verba, 1963; Gamson, 1968; Lane, 
1962), but having never been exposed to alternative democratic forms which allow citizens a more 
active role, she cannot be reasonably expected to cite participatory opportunities as a critical (and 
absent) aspect of democracy. Additionally, asking respondents to identify specific characteristics 
of democratic subtypes leads to biased findings in favor of outcome-oriented definitions. 
Respondents who believe in political equality and popular control over economic policies may cite 
high prices as a sign of democratic failure, not because they define democracy in terms of prices 
or inflation, but because high prices are the manifestation of the gulf between democracy as 
practiced and their preferred ideal conceptions (Schaffer, 2010).  
Given this confusion and lack of clarity, it is perhaps unsurprising that scholars have turned 
away from the morass altogether in search of less contentious sets of standards. While normative 
debates raged on, a more utilitarian approach to regime support, which makes very clear and 
uncontroversial assumptions about individual preferences, has gained prominence. 
2.1.2: Approval 
The ascendency of rational choice in political science had an impact on conceptions of 
support, just as it had everywhere else in the discipline. With it came new ideas about how citizens 
evaluated their political systems, which were far removed from Weberian notions of a normative 
basis for legitimacy. Rogowski (1974) coined the term “rational legitimacy” to describe this new 
notion, arguing that citizens were much more influenced by materialistic and utilitarian concerns 
than previous authors had recognized. This implied that support was likely far less resilient than 
early authors had assumed, because it responds to a rapidly changing political environment. Within 
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a rationalist framework, regime evaluations are almost fickle compared to what earlier works 
focused on the assent dimension held. 
 To the extent that rational support can be durable, it does so through the related concept 
of confidence. Confidence is also sometimes called trust, but this is inappropriate as the kind of 
recurring face-to-face interactions that are needed to develop real trust cannot occur between 
citizens and political leaders, much less faceless institutions (Hardin, 2000). Confidence then is 
generally assumed to be a kind of aggregate assessment; that is, a belief in the ability of the political 
regime to produce leaders who are competent and who will act in the best interest of citizens 
(Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990; Hardin, 2000, 2002; Lipset & Schneider, 1983). While patterns of 
good or poor performance may be recognized and thus fortify support at the regime level, the 
underlying logic is still that of instrumental rationality. 
2.1.3: What matters more? Assessing the dimensionality of support 
The current state of the literature is a seemingly irreconcilable conflict between the two 
constituent dimensions of support. A great deal of work has been done within each conception 
(although virtually all recent work favors approval), but very little has been done to bridge the gap 
between the two. This raises the obvious question: which dimension should be given primacy? The 
clear answer, conceptually speaking, is neither, at least not on an a priori basis. Although 
theoretically interesting, it would be extremely difficult to measure these two dimensions 
separately from the more general variable which they constitute. It is relatively simple to measure 
the minimalist concept of support, but getting at the gradations of meaning inherent in assent and 
approval would risk repeating the errors of the conceptions of democracy literature; namely, it 
would attempt to measure fine distinctions based on highly abstract theoretical concerns with 
quantitative survey analysis, which is ill-suited for the purpose. Furthermore, whatever may or 
may not be possible in theory, currently available cross-national surveys only allow one to measure 
the minimalist support concept, not its constitutive dimensions. 
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However it is possible to evaluate the relative importance of each dimension even if they 
cannot be independently measured. The discussion of each dimension earlier had clear 
implications for the variables most likely to shape support. If assent is more important, one would 
expect procedural variables to have the greatest impact. On the other hand, advocates of approval 
would predict that variables concerned with the quality of policy produced by a given regime 
would be the most important. In other words, by evaluating different theoretical narratives 
empirically we can gain insight not only into the causes of support but also into its inherent nature. 
Figure 2.2 shows this schema.  
Figure 2.2: Constitutive dimensions of support 
 
The most important point of this conceptual discussion for the task at hand is that it 
provides a clear schema for organizing the literature on support. It can be difficult in practice to 
declare this or that work as a “performance” argument; this will become readily apparent when 
discussing institutional approaches to support, which would appear to be procedural but which are, 
in fact, output oriented. What matters is not whether or not procedural or output variables are 
included, but rather which is the proximate cause of support, and what is the underlying logic of 
the argument. As I will show, institutionally grounded arguments can still favor the approval 
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dimension if they focus not on intrinsic characteristics but on the policy impacts of institutional 
variants. 
With this in mind, a second important implication of the preceding discussion needs to be 
underlined: the paradoxes that form the basis of this work are paradoxes if and only if one assumes 
that the approval dimension is dominant. If assent is the more powerful determinant of support, 
and if approval shapes support only weakly or not at all, then the incongruence between 
performance and support ceases to be a paradox. 
2.2: PERFORMANCE ÜBER ALLES: RATIONAL LEGITIMACY AND UTILITARIAN SUPPORT 
Performance is, broadly speaking, the quality of governance and policy produced under a 
given regime. It is theoretically distinct from the performance of political actors, but difficult to 
untangle in practice. Since “the regime” really does not do anything independently of those to 
whom it grants positions of power, these factors are difficult to separate. A regime is an aggregate: 
if incompetent leaders repeatedly gain power under the rules of a given regime, individuals will 
turn against those rules. This is an especially difficult distinction to make in the case of Venezuela, 
which until very recently had only one ruler under the existing regime: Hugo Chávez. In that case, 
I argue that regime performance and the performance of political leaders were one and the same 
until Chávez’s death. However in most cases these are separate objects and are treated as such. 
2.2.1: The theoretical basis of performance arguments 
Sorting works on support into those based on performance and those based on procedure 
seems straightforward, but can in practice be rather complicated. For example, many analyses 
include institutional variables (such as parliamentary vs. presidential, electoral systems, etc.), and 
thus appear to be arguments based upon process. However upon closer inspection, the impact of 
these institutions is not directly on support but on patterns of winners and losers; whether one 
benefits or not is, in these cases, the driving force behind support. Democratic theory can provide 
clarity here. Pateman (1970) divides democratic theory into two families: classical and 
contemporary. The primary assumption that divides these two schools of thought rests in their 
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beliefs about the utility of democratic participation: classical theory held that such participation 
had intrinsic value to those who participated, whereas contemporary theory viewed democracy as 
a means to an end, to be praised only for the outcomes it produced, such as stability, the protection 
of civil liberties, and so forth. This closely aligns with David Held’s (2007) theoretical schema, 
wherein democratic variants were divided into instrumental and developmental families. The latter 
group was so named because of the positive impact democratic politics were thought to have on 
the psychological and moral development of participants. 
Performance arguments can therefore be identified not by those variables which they 
include but by their embrace of instrumental conceptions of democracy. Such conceptions 
originate in liberal theory, which holds that democracy is desirable only to the extent to which it 
effectively promotes and protects individual rights and facilitates the pursuit of private interests 
(Hobbes, 1985; Locke, 2003; Madison, 1952). A strong suspicion of politics (especially mass 
politics) underlies this body of theory. The communitarian and public-oriented assumptions of 
“classical” democratic theory were explicitly rejected by proponents of liberalism in favor of 
“delimit[ing] the sphere of politics carefully [and] unleash[ing] individual energies in civil society” 
(Held, 2007, p. 48). This is not to say that liberals were not concerned with the impact of political 
institutions; to the contrary, the structure of democratic regimes was a topic of great concern. 
However liberalism values institutions for different reasons than classical democratic theory. To 
liberals, institutions of democracy are preferable only because they constrain the excesses of both 
elites and masses (Madison, 1952).  
While the need to protect individual rights necessitates some form of democracy within a 
liberal framework, the fear of excessive government interference in the private pursuit of citizens 
is not allayed simply because a government is democratic. Indeed, a central contradiction of 
liberalism arises from the necessity of some form of popular sovereignty and the fear that the 
sovereign people will attempt to deprive some individuals of those rights which democracy is 
meant to defend (Adams, 2000; de Tocqueville, 1990). As a result of this inner conflict proponents 
of such philosophies strongly support the right of the people to choose their leaders, but they tend 
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to be far less sanguine about granting an expansive political role to the masses, with their short-
term demands and lack of policy expertise. Excessive involvement of the ordinary citizens in 
politics is viewed as unnecessary at best and potentially even threatening to systemic stability 
(Crozier et al., 1975; Huntington, 1965; Schumpeter, 2008).  
Later theorists took the normative assumptions of instrumentalism and adapted them into 
empirical assumptions; these works became the direct (if not always explicit) inspiration for 
performance-based theories of regime support. Specifically, they took the proposition that 
excessive mass participation in politics was normatively undesirable and went a step further, 
arguing that  it was also empirically impossible due to the apathy of average citizens (Michels, 
2001; Mosca, 1939; Sartori, 1984). These authors assumed that most people were not and would 
never be concerned with politics, and would therefore rationally and voluntarily limit their political 
participation to that which is necessary for the pursuit of their private interests (Crow, 2007, 2010; 
Downs, 1957; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001, 2002). Within this paradigm, participation is 
viewed as a cost or an expense, something rational individuals are expected to avoid if possible.  
In short, individuals should prefer those regimes that maximize the quality of governance 
while minimizing the need for active input. The insights of the instrumentalist school have clear 
implications for the study of regime support, because it deduces strong hypotheses about regime 
preferences based on those philosophical and normative assumptions its progenitors developed 
about human nature. Specifically, it argues for a rational, self-interested view of democratic 
citizens, who care little about how decisions are made unless those procedures have some 
predictable consequences for which policies are eventually chosen. Any and all concern for 
institutions is filtered through policy outputs. 
2.2.2: Empirical predictions of performance-centric theories 
Two important implications of output-centric theories arise from the preceding discussion. 
These implications can be distilled into a simple flow chart; this chart is presented in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: Relationship chart for performance-oriented explanations of support 
 
 
First, they posit a fairly direct, sequential relationship between evaluations of policy, 
political leaders, and regime institutions in turn. That is, evaluations of policy output are the basis 
by which political leaders are judged, and the prevalence of high-performing political actors over 
time is the primary source of regime support (Finkel, Muller, & Seligson, 1989; Muller, 1970; 
Muller & Williams, 1980; Newton & Norris, 2000). Performance arguments, taking inspiration 
from instrumental views of democracy, assume the causal primacy of the approval dimension, 
focusing on objects on the concrete side of the support continuum.  
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Second, to the extent that throughput-oriented variables are included in such models, they 
matter only because they impact policy outputs. One of the most influential works on support, 
Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki’s study of democratic malaise in the Trilateral nations, focused 
on changing state-society relations and their impact on declining support (1975). Their analyses 
were inspired by Huntington’s work on institutionalization, in which he argued that political 
breakdown was often due to excessive participation which existing political institutions could not 
manage or control (Huntington, 1965). Taking this proposition as the key assumption of their 
theoretical framework, the authors argued that this inability of state institutions to cope with 
increasing demands from society was leading to poor quality governance, and thus low support. 
Not all analyses which include institutional reactions to popular participation shared this 
pessimistic view. Robert Putnam’s work on social capital (Putnam, 1993, 1995) provided a 
rationale for a relationship between participation, institutional reactions to participation, and 
support that was directly opposed to that argued by Huntington and his coauthors. Specifically, a 
highly participatory citizenry, according to Putnam, actually facilitated quality governance through 
effective and disciplined demand-making (Putnam, 1993). Putnam later linked this argument 
directly to regime support, arguing that declining legitimacy was the result of depleted social 
capital, which inhibited the kind of civic engagement necessary for good governance (Hardin, 
2000; Newton & Norris, 2000; Pharr et al., 2000) .  
A final group of institutional theories of support ignores the macroeconomic effects of 
specific institutions, instead focusing on how specific institutional variants structure patterns of 
support within polities. These works assume that “winners”, i.e. those social groups which benefit 
from government policy, can be institutionally determined. Furthermore, institutions can either 
exacerbate or lessen the pain that those who are not unambiguous beneficiaries of government 
polities suffer (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Norris, 1999a). For example, following Lijphart’s 
(1984) work on consensual and majoritarian democratic subtypes, Anderson and Guillory (1997) 
argue that citizens who are part of the political majority are more satisfied, but minority status has 
a much more severe negative impact on support in majoritarian democracies than in those closer 
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to the consensual end of Lijphart’s continuum. Norris (1999a), operating on essentially the same 
logic, conducted a similar analysis but also included party and electoral systems and state structure 
(federal vs. unitary), with a directly opposing finding to Anderson and Guillory that majoritarian 
institutions actually encouraged slightly higher levels of support. 
Although these works make radically different arguments about which variables matter, 
sometimes finding effects of the same variable in completely different directions, they all have one 
thing in common. Despite their inclusion of institutional variables, none of these works can be 
categorized as “procedural”; they are simply elaborate performance arguments. Here the 
importance of the earlier conceptual discussion becomes clear. The type of variables included is 
only part of the picture: the underlying theoretical logic and causal mechanisms are equally crucial 
for understanding theories of support. In this case, talk of winners and losers and of crises of 
governability clearly link these works to the approval dimension. These analysts make competing 
claims about how institutions shape performance; all agree that performance is the direct predictor 
of regime support.  
2.2.3: The inadequacy of performance arguments 
I do not deny that performance issues can negatively impact regime support. Regimes that 
continually fail to meet the needs and expectations of their citizenry cannot expect to indefinitely 
maintain their loyalty. Long-term deprivation under democratic regimes may even turn people off 
to democracy as an ideal (Sarsfield & Echegaray, 2005). That said, this exclusive focus on outputs 
provides an incomplete picture at best. Theoretically, utilitarian arguments cannot shed light on 
the puzzle which Easton sought to solve via the concept of diffuse support: namely, they cannot 
explain why similar declines in the quality of governance produce political crises in some contexts 
yet only minor disturbances in others.  
This is a fatal flaw for a study such as this, which focuses on cases where support and 
performance are severely mismatched. A brief presentation of descriptive statistics from the 2012 
LAPOP survey is sufficient to demonstrate just how large the gap between support and 
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performance is in these two countries. Table 2.2 shows each country’s rank on the latent index of 
support used in this thesis (see the statistical model in the Chapter Four for details), as well as two 
single-indicator measures of support: satisfaction with democracy and perceived level of 
democracy. 
Table 2.2: Regime Support Ranks by Country 
Indicator Chile Venezuela 
Regime Support 10 5 
Level of Democracy 13 2 
Satisfaction with Democracy 15 7 
Average 13 5 
 
Regardless of which indicator is used, Venezuela consistently outranks Chile (and most of 
Latin America) in terms of regime support. Chile is in the lower half of Latin American countries 
on all indicators, and nearly last on one. The ranking for perceived level of democracy is 
particularly shocking, given that it is completely at odds with “objective” measures of democracy 
provided by international databases; Venezuela is the second most democratic state in the region 
according to its own citizens, but is among the least democratic according to outside observers. 
All of these support rankings have nearly the opposite values that the performance rankings of 
each case would predict. These are presented in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: Performance Rankings by Country 
Indicator Chile Venezuela 
Freedom House Score 3 18 
Rule of Law 1 18 
Control of Corruption 2 16 
GDP Growth 1 17 
Inflation 2 17 
Formal Sector Jobs 1 11 
Poverty Reduction 1 6 
Homicides 1 17 
Average 1 14 
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The difference between objective performance and subjective support is twelve ranks for 
Chile and nine ranks for Venezuela. The discrepancy is large enough to rule out any ambiguity: if 
regime performance does in fact cause support, then virtually all of the common macro-level 
factors which are used to evaluate governance are useless. 
2.2.4: Pocketbook issues and alternative performance arguments 
The preceding discussion, and the support/performance paradox which it established, is 
based upon one major assumption that bears examining: that citizens evaluate regime performance 
on the basis of the health of the national economy. While sociotropic factors like those described 
above almost certainly have an important impact on performance evaluations (Dettrey, 2013; 
Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981), they are not the only factor. In fact the rationalist perspective that 
privileges governance as the primary explanation for support also emphasizes the importance of 
“pocketbook” economic concerns (Downs, 1957; Lewis-Beck, 1985). Even in poorly governed 
countries, some groups may be spared the pain of their regime’s failures. These fortunate groups 
may make aggregate levels of support higher than they would otherwise be in societies with the 
same average performance levels. 
Lending support to the possibility that intra-national variation in benefits derived from 
macro-level regime performance may be driving the support paradoxes of interest here is the fact 
that support in Chile is patterned around social class. Chile not only ranks first in Latin America 
for poverty reduction, it ranks near the top worldwide (Mainwaring et al., 2010). The middle class 
in Chile is where dissatisfaction is most intense, and unsurprisingly they benefit the least from 
government policy. They carry significant tax burdens but receive few benefits from the 
government, although they certainly benefit from Chile’s strong economy. Quantitative analysis 
bears out the prediction that Chile’s middle classes are significantly more dissatisfied with the 
regime than poorer and richer chilenos. The results of a regression analysis, with support as the 
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dependent variable and socio-economic status as the predictor with a non-linear relationship to 
support2, are presented in Figure 2.4. 
Figure 2.4: Support by Socioeconomic Status in Chile 
Effect of SES on Support Predicted Value of Support by SES 
 
 
Source: CEP. 
As the graphs above show, the very poor in Chile are relatively content with the way 
democracy functions. The impact of SES on support declines as one moves towards higher social 
strata, reaching a nadir among the middle sectors. It then rises dramatically among the wealthiest 
citizens. 
Venezuela also displays the potential for micro-level explanation, given the emphasis of 
the Bolivarian regime’s rhetorical embrace of socialism and its commitment to the advancement 
of the poor. Indeed, while an unmitigated failure in nearly every area, the one exception to this 
trend can be found in issues related to poverty. Specifically, Venezuela’s reduction of poverty rates 
is well above the regional median. Additionally, the regime seems to have made significant 
progress on one of the region’s most intractable challenges: inequality. Although there has not 
been a great deal of research on this topic, inequality does seem to drive regime dissatisfaction, at 
least in some circumstances (Anderson & Singer, 2008). Inequality data are presented in Table 
2.4. 
                                                 
2 Support = γ0 + γ1SES + γ1SES2 + γ1SES4. This model was chosen based on comparison of the Bayesian AIC 
statistics of various quadratic models. 
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Table 2.4: Inequality Levels and Change by Country 
Case 
GINI 
Index 
Difference from 
Regional 
Average 
Change Since 
Transition3 
Chile 51.8 0.9 -3.19 
Venezuela 44.8 -7.3 -2.46 
Difference 7.0 8.2 -0.7 
These data suggest a possible alternative explanation within a performance-centric 
framework, namely that strong performance within one social sector drives support despite 
overwhelming failure in the others. Specifically, malaise in Chile might be the result of a neglected 
middle class; euphoria in Venezuela may be due to the economic coddling of the popular sectors.  
Neither possibility holds up to close scrutiny, however. The comparison with Chile rules 
out poverty reduction as a viable explanation, because what Venezuela does well, Chile does 
better. Contrary to commonly held assumptions (Posner, 1999, 2004), the material interests of the 
lower classes have not been sacrificed to the Chilean neoliberal model; indeed the means-tested 
welfare state which successive center-left governments have expanded halved poverty and reduced 
extreme poverty by two-thirds over the first six years of Concertación rule (Oppenheim, 2007, p. 
257), and it has stayed low ever since. Chile not only ranks first in Latin America for poverty 
reduction, it ranks near the top worldwide (Mainwaring et al., 2010). Whatever improvements in 
the material conditions of the poor chavismo may have engendered in Venezuela (and these should 
not be overstated (Corrales, 2010)), they cannot compare to the advancement of the poor in Chile. 
Moreover Chile has actually reduced its inequality slightly more than Venezuela has over the 
course of each regime’s respective rule (although Chile had much more room for improvement, 
given its sky-high inequality at the end of the Pinochet regime). Finally, poverty reduction may be 
an important metric for the poor, but it is not the only policy area which matters, and other factors 
which critically impact the lives of poor citizens are some of Venezuela’s most egregious failures. 
Inflation is rampant (the informal exchange rate has increased 630 percent since research for this 
                                                 
3 Change since transition refers to the sum change in inequality during the reign of the current regime, which begins 
in 1990 for Chile and 1999 for Venezuela. From World Development Indicators. 
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article began in 2012), shortages of basic goods are ever more widespread, and violent crime is 
completely out of control. While these ills touch all social sectors, inflation and crime 
disproportionately harm the poor. In sum, of four metrics of considerable concern to the popular 
sectors, Venezuela is slightly above average on poverty reduction, has had modest success in 
reducing inequality, and rests at the regional nadir on inflation and crime. On all other indicators, 
Chile is a resounding success and Venezuela is an unmitigated disaster.  
The plight of the middle sectors survives cursory analysis in slightly better condition, but 
still cannot explain support dynamics in Chile without significant elaboration. Although the 
Chilean middle sectors certainly suffer from a number of economic problems (particularly the 
insecurity bred by Chile’s stingy social safety net and pressures for conspicuous consumption and 
easy credit), they have benefited greatly from the country’s macroeconomic successes. The 
Chilean middle class enjoys some of the highest standards of living when compared with their 
regional contemporaries. I discuss these dynamics in greater detail in the Chilean case study, but 
without some aggravating factor, it is not at all clear why relatively moderate economic grievances 
among middle class chilenos would lead to such profound discontent. Whatever its general effects, 
policy performance is woefully insufficient to explain patterns of support in the cases of interest 
here, even when the possibility of micro-level variation is taken into account. Performance may 
have an effect, but clearly some other factor is also in play, overriding (or, as I will argue presently, 
actively weakening) this relationship. 
2.3: THE NEGLECTED APPROACH: PROCEDURAL EXPLANATIONS OF REGIME SUPPORT 
The hegemony of output-oriented explanations of regime support fails to account for the 
fact that individuals can value the way in which decisions are made, not merely the quality of the 
decisions themselves. In economics this is referred to as procedural utility (Frey, Benz, & Stutzer, 
2004). However unlike performance, where the basic metrics for evaluating success and failure 
are relatively uncontroversial, it is not immediately clear by which standards procedures are 
judged. 
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 The comparison of interest here only muddies the waters further, because the most obvious 
answers do not match the cases. When looking for procedural variables in representative 
democracies, one might expect that the quality of representation would be a major source of regime 
support. There is considerable talk in Chile about a “crisis of representation,” and the possibility 
that problems in this area may be responsible for anemic regime support has been acknowledged 
(Posner, 1999). The quality of representation is primarily a function of the citizenry’s ability to 
choose elites who actively defend their interests, and to punish representatives who fail to do so 
effectively (Plotke, 1997; Urbinati & Warren, 2008)4. Two mechanisms enhance the ability of 
citizens to enforce accountability: free and fair electoral competition, and a broad array of political 
choices (i.e. parties that offer policy platforms which span most of the spectrum of preferences in 
a given society). Two objections to representation-centered explanations of support can be made 
immediately. First, such arguments share the mediated effect of procedures that troubled 
performance-centered theories: procedures only matter because they shape patterns of winners and 
losers (Norris, 1999a, p. 219). Viewed this way, representation appears to be more of a modified 
performance argument, relying on intra-national distribution of quality governance rather than any 
intrinsic characteristics of representative procedures and institutions.   
Second, the case comparison presented here rules out any such explanation. Recalling the 
earlier discussion of performance and poverty, no sectoral deviations from national performance 
trends can readily explain the paradoxes of interest here. And even if they could, representative 
institutions could not be given the credit. As Venezuela’s Freedom House score (see Table 2.3) 
indicates, those aspects of democracy most prized by liberals are far more robust in Chile. 
Elections in Chile are free and fair, with a large selection of parties from which voters may choose, 
ranging from Communist and socialist to militantly neoliberal. It is difficult to argue that 
Venezuela, with the electoral hegemony of the PSUV and its lack of strong opposition parties, 
                                                 
4 There is also a descriptive dimension to representation (Urbinati & Warren, 2008), which may have an 
impact on support in certain contexts (Madrid & Rhodes-Purdy, 2016). Due to the rarity of elites who come from 
disadvantaged groups in Latin America, I focus on the substantive (interest-oriented) dimension of representation 
here. Descriptive notions of representation are addressed in more detail in the case study of Venezuela in Chapter 5. 
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provides higher quality representation than the Chilean system. Whether or not Venezuela even 
qualifies as democratic any longer is a topic of heated debate5. 
2.4: TOWARDS A PROCEDURAL THEORY OF REGIME SUPPORT 
The preceding discussion clearly shows that output-oriented arguments, including those 
which include procedural variation but only as predictors of policy outputs, are insufficient to 
explain patterns of support in Venezuela and Chile. The logical conclusion is that the assent 
dimension of support is likely the underlying cause of these puzzling cases, and therefore it makes 
sense to shift focus away from those variables most closely associated with approval and turn to 
procedural characteristics that might directly shape legitimacy. It should however be noted that 
nothing in the preceding discussion challenged the general relationship between performance and 
support. Nothing presented here could be used to argue that governance should not matter, from a 
logical or theoretical standpoint, but merely that in these two cases it seems performance does not 
matter, at least not in the simple linear fashion predicted by economistic rational choice. I point 
this out because, as I turn to procedural arguments in the following chapter, it raises the bar by 
which alternative theories must be evaluated. It is not enough for an alternative theory to find some 
procedural variable which can positively impact support; the divergences observed in Chile and 
especially Venezuela are far too severe to be explained away by some countervailing relationship. 
A fully specified theory of support must, to be fully applicable to the cases of interest, propose 
both structural and contextual variables. That is to say, a good theory will explain under which 
circumstances government performance either does or does not strongly impact support. 
With this in mind, I turn to the examination of intrinsic characteristics of political 
procedures and their relationships with regime support. This process begins with an apparent 
contradiction which resulted from the brief discussion of representation presented earlier (a subject 
to which I return in Chapter 3, after specifying an alternative mechanism through which 
representation may have an impact on legitimacy). If some intrinsic aspect of democratic 
                                                 
5 Given events since the death of Chávez, this debate can probably be considered settled. 
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institutions is driving the divergence between support and performance observed in Chile and 
Venezuela, how is it that the ambiguously democratic case is more legitimate in the eyes of its 
citizens? In the following section, I continue to use democratic theory, combined with insights 
form psychology, to search for alternative procedural variables.  
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Chapter 3: Participatory opportunities, efficacy, and regime support6 
Chapter 2 laid out the conceptual framework of support, and demonstrated that all 
explanations of the Chilean and Venezuelan paradoxes which privilege the approval dimension 
were suspect. In this chapter, I turn to a theoretical examination of the role of assent. The notion 
that the procedural concerns which epitomize the assent dimension of support are important is not 
novel, but theoretical work on the topic is far less developed than that which concerns approval. 
The concept of procedural justice, an umbrella term which might encompass any and all the 
potential variables which could impact assent, has yet to be rigorously examined for ways in which 
it may relate to support and legitimacy (Levi, Sacks, & Tyler, 2009, p. 257). 
3.1 WHAT IS DEMOCRACY FOR? PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
Perhaps one reason why so many explanations of support, even those which include 
institutional variables, give priority to the approval dimension is because the standard of evaluation 
is so much clearer than for procedural arguments. That individuals care about their material well-
being, and that they come to view regimes which fail to provide for it as illegitimate, are not very 
controversial hypotheses. And although it is not nearly as irrefutable that citizens care a great deal 
about the protection of civil rights and liberties (especially those of other people), the purpose of 
democracy as elucidated by liberals is nevertheless straightforward and unambiguous. But what, 
if any, expectations, desires, or preferences do citizens have that are intrinsic to the processes and 
procedures of democratic rule? Conceptual (Collier & Levitsky, 1997) and public opinion (Crow, 
2007, 2010; von Mettenheim, 1990, 1995) work on conceptions of democracy has attempted to 
address this question, but the democratic subtypes they tend to focus upon (e.g. liberal, electoral, 
substantive, or egalitarian) lack a firm a priori theoretical basis. There are no convincing 
theoretical reasons why these and only these subtypes might matter to citizens, as opposed to 
                                                 
6 Portions of this chapter have been accepted for publication in Comparative Politics (Rhodes-Purdy). 
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theorists and analysts. In other words, there has been insufficient attention paid to what emotional 
and psychological needs might be met by certain aspects of democratic politics. 
In this chapter, I look to two bodies of theory which have long meditated on that very 
question. First, I turn to normative democratic theory, particularly its participatory or “classical” 
variant, as elucidated by Rousseau, Mill, and later Pateman and Barber. These theorists (and others 
like them) posited an altogether different purpose for democracy than liberals and those scholars 
inspired by them. Indeed both Pateman (1970) and Held (2007) saw this fundamental disagreement 
over the purpose of democracy as the critical cleavage in democratic theory, dividing it into two 
broad subcategories. Pateman divides them into “participatory” and “representative” variants,  
while Held refers to them as “developmental” and “protective” (2007, p. 35). Held’s terminology 
is meant to apply only to liberal democracy, but participatory democracy clearly shares many 
assumptions of the developmental camp. Riker (1988), a partisan of liberalism, uses the terms 
“populism” and “liberalism”, which more or less overlap with Held’s terms. In the following 
discussion, I use the terms developmental and instrumental, because they match the underlying 
assumptions which unify each school, rather than the preferred institutional arrangements which 
flow from those assumptions. All of the performance-oriented theories of support described in 
Chapter 2 can be considered instrumental because they assume that democracy “…serves a purely 
protective function…it ensure[s] that the private interest of each citizen [is] protected…” 
(Pateman, 1970, p. 20). Theorists in this group hold that democracy has no value of its own, but 
only to the extent to which it preserves something else of value.  
3.1.1: Developmental democratic theory 
The developmental strain of democratic theory has a fundamentally different 
understanding of democracy’s purpose. Developmental theorists “stress the intrinsic value of 
political participation for the development of citizens as human beings…” (Held, 2007, p. 35, 
emphasis in original). They argue that human beings have an inherent yearning for “union and 
communion [with other human beings]…” (Barber, 1984, p. 112) which cannot be satisfied by the 
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atomizing individualism of liberalism. Political behavior is seen, not as a chore to be engaged in 
only when necessary to defend or advance some other interest as in liberalism and other 
protectionist variants, but as essential for the “education of an entire people to the point where 
their intellectual, emotional, and moral capacities have reached their full potential…” (Davis, 
1964, pp. 40-41). There are two specific mechanisms through which democratic action can 
positively impact participants. The first, and least important for my purposes, is that direct political 
engagement morally ennobles citizens; through their role in the construction and pursuit of the 
common good, they rise above their base self-interests and become more responsible and righteous 
through self-rule (Mill, 2009, p. 41; Rousseau, 2002, pp. 163-167). Through the participatory 
system the citizen “…has to take into account wider matters than his own immediate private 
interests…he is forced to deliberate according to his sense of justice” (Pateman, 1970, p. 25). 
While this line of reasoning has clear, interesting, and has potentially testable empirical 
implications, it is unnecessary for the argument I propose here. My argument does not rely on any 
actual improvement in the ability of individuals to act as citizens7, but only on citizens’ perceptions 
of the political role which the regime assigns to them. Such an argument would be just another 
mediated argument in favor of performance, albeit one springing from an entirely different logical 
font than those previously discussed. As I have repeatedly shown such mediated theories are not 
helpful for the question at hand, and I will therefore move on to the second mechanism which 
developmental theory suggests. 
Democracy may well improve the moral character of its participants, but its direct 
psychological impacts are of far greater interest here. Developmental theorists have, in addition to 
moral considerations, emphasized “…how the social order affects the structure of human 
personality” (Plamenatz, 1963, p. 440). The ingrained passivity cited so frequently by Schumpeter 
and his contemporaries is a part of human nature which is neither exogenous nor intractable; to the 
                                                 
7 My framework does not rely on actual participation; however it is reasonable to assume that the impacts of 
participatory opportunities will be greater among those who do participate. I utilize this logic, and the hypotheses it 
implies, in my analyses of the communal councils in Venezuela. 
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contrary it is the product of an infantilizing political system which consigns citizens to an entirely 
passive role in which “Politics has become what politicians do; what citizens do (when they do 
anything) is vote for the politicians” (Barber, 1984, p. 148). The docility of citizens in modern 
democracies is actually a deviation from human nature, and an acute one at that, but not an 
incurable one. Political regimes which allow for and encourage the active participation of citizens 
in self-rule can correct this departure from human nature, reversing the docility inculcated by 
authority and creating a new kind of citizen, one who is psychologically and emotionally ready 
and able to shape his or her own fate. 
Although the high aspirations which abound in normative democratic theory can make this 
line of reasoning seem quite fanciful, it has considerable backing in the more empirically grounded 
discipline of social psychology. The debate between developmental and instrumental democratic 
theories originates in a fundamentally different set of assumptions about fundamental drives, needs 
and desires of human beings (all of which can be grouped under the less precise term “human 
nature”). Various strains of psychology have grappled with similar issues. Shifting between 
disciplines creates a considerable risk of false equivalency, but the concept of autonomy provides 
a sturdy bridge between democratic and psychological theory. It acts as a sort of Rosetta Stone, 
whereby similar strains of reasoning in each discipline can be translated into the language of the 
other through this shared concept. Autonomy here does not mean “freedom from” something, as 
it does in common parlance, but rather refers to its etymologically original definition of “self-law”, 
or self-governing. It refers to the ability of an entity to control and shape its environment. Insights 
from psychology enhance this theoretical discussion in two ways. First, they provide much more 
firm grounding in empirical reality, giving some real-world credibility to the assumptions of 
democratic theory, which is more concerned with normative debates than explanation of empirical 
relationships. Second, the psychological literature has drawn out the implications of autonomy and 
its psychological necessity much more thoroughly than has democratic theory. These insights 
suggest a more complex, interactive causal structure of regime support. 
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3.1.2: The psychology of popular sovereignty: citizen autonomy and regime support 
The psychological impact of an individual’s real and perceived ability to shape his or her 
own behavior and environment has been a major question in social psychology for decades. Angyal 
(1941, pp. 32-38) argued that autonomy was the primary drive of all organisms, which were 
constantly in conflict with the heteronomous regulations which would, in the absence of self-
governance, inevitably be imposed by the environment. White (1959) and DeCharms (1968), 
working in the field of motivational psychology, applied this logic more directly to human 
behavior. Both researchers argued that the basic biological drives (see Hull, 1943) which were 
then thought to motivate virtually all behavior failed to explain a great deal of activity among both 
humans and other intelligent animals. White argued that competence, “the capacity to interact 
effectively with [the] environment” (1959, p. 297), was an important and analytically neglected 
psychological need which could explain a great deal of play and exploration behavior. DeCharms’ 
concept of personal causation, although differing in some minor details, served essentially the 
same theoretical purpose. 
The concepts of intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971, 1975) and self-determination theory 
(Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2006) further clarified the role of autonomy in the human 
psyche, in a manner especially important given the theoretical divide at issue in this study. 
Specifically, Deci and Ryan’s approach clarified the theoretical role of control over processes. 
Earlier incarnations of autonomy viewed procedural control as a clear psychological motivation; 
the implication being that failure to control outcomes would result in a lack of autonomy, forming 
a mediated argument similar to that of institutional arguments discussed in Chapter 2, and just as 
unhelpful. However,  
Control refers to there being a contingency between one's behavior and the outcomes one 
receives, whereas self-determination refers to the experience of freedom in initiating 
one's behavior. A person has control when his or her behaviors reliably yield intended 
outcomes, but this does not ensure self-determination, for the person can, in the words of 
DeCharms, become a 'pawn' to those outcomes. In those cases the person's behavior 
would be determined by the outcomes rather than by choices, even though the person 
would be said to have control…It is true that a person needs control over outcomes to be 
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self-determined in attaining them, but the need is for self-determination rather than for 
control (Deci & Ryan, 1985, p. 31)  
In other words, control over outcomes is not a need, but a necessary condition for the 
satisfaction of a need in the realm of goal-oriented behavior, of which politics is one. Outcomes 
are at the end of the causal chain, not the beginning. This distinction is crucial in the context of 
collective decision-making bodies, wherein an institutionally granted ability for participants as a 
whole to self-govern does not guarantee that any individual participant can count on getting their 
way on every decision. 
Autonomy, so conceived as the satisfaction of a psychological need for self-determination 
through the management of one’s own affairs without outside interference, dovetails quite neatly 
with the propositions of democratic theory regarding the inherent worth of democratic politics. 
Just as psychology proposes the individual need for self-determination, developmental democratic 
theory proposed a collective version of the same need for communities of individuals. In this 
context, we speak of moral autonomy: the capacity of groups of individuals to make their own 
decisions about the common good and put them into practice (Dahl, 1989, ch. 6). It is also very 
similar to the concept of self-management in participatory economics, wherein decision making 
power is distributed directly proportionally to the impact of the decision (Albert & Hanhel, 1991). 
Both these concepts represent attempts to apply ideals similar to the psychological concept of 
autonomy to group decision-making processes where the possibility of true individual control over 
a given process is vitiated, in the aggregate, by the fact that if one individual in such a process 
possesses complete autonomy, no one else involved in the process does. The collective nature of 
decision making in this version of the concept also underscores the importance of the break 
between outcome control and the need for self-determination discussed earlier. Individuals may 
not always get what they want out of collectively autonomous processes in which they are the 
minority, but such processes still confer autonomy because only those who are impacted by the 
decision have a say in their making; even “losers” have a meaningful voice in the process. A sense 
of control can be conferred by such processes due to the allocation of decision making power, 
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without regard to outcomes in any specific instance. I use the term citizen autonomy to refer to the 
individual possession of a portion of this collective control over the process of collective self-
governance. As Rousseau described it: “Each of us puts in common his person and all his power 
under the supreme direction of the general will; and in return each member becomes an indivisible 
part of the whole” (2002, p. 164). Given this, citizen autonomy can be defined as the ability of 
citizens to directly affect the course of processes by which political decisions are made. 
3.1.3: Operationalizing citizen autonomy: regime-based efficacy 
The extent to which citizen autonomy exists in a given polity is only indirectly interesting 
to the question here; what matters is which aspects of political regimes cause widespread 
perceptions of citizen autonomy. Asking citizens about this issue directly via survey questions 
would require us to assume an unreasonably high level of awareness of competing strains of 
democratic theory and political processes. For empirical analysis, we require an operational 
substitute for actual, intellectually-driven evaluations of citizen autonomy. Given that the issue of 
importance is the beliefs and feelings of citizens regarding autonomy, it makes sense to 
operationalize the concept via its “affective side”, or the emotional result of the satisfaction of the 
need for autonomy: self-efficacy (DeCharms, 1968, p. 20; White, 1959, p. 322). The affective side 
has the added advantage of being frequently measured in public opinion surveys, which is an 
obvious requirement for empirical examination. Campbell, Gurin and Miller defined it as “the 
feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political 
processes”  (1954, p. 187). Almond and Verba (1963, ch. 8), in their groundbreaking study of 
comparative public opinion, found that “competence” was associated with increased political 
participation, loyalty and political knowledge, although the causal structure of these relationships 
was left unexplored. Later researchers, inspired by Bandura (1977), split the concept into two 
constitutive dimensions: internal and external (Craig et al., 1990; Finkel, 1987; Kölln, Esaiasson, 
& Turper, 2013; Madsen, 1987). Internal efficacy is related to an individual’s knowledge and 
understanding of the political system and policy disputes, and is not of direct relevance here, as 
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the ultimate source of variation in support in this study lies at the level of the state. However 
external efficacy, which is sometimes (and more accurately) called regime-based efficacy (RBE), 
is another matter. Several authors have pointed out that citizens recognize that the utility or futility 
of their political action is in part determined by the extent to which regimes are willing or able to 
respond to such petitions (Finkel, 1987; Kölln et al., 2013; Madsen, 1987). In other words, 
although individuals may not understand the underlying reasons, they are capable of recognizing 
the extent to which their political regimes pay attention to their preferences and accede to or refuse 
their demands.  
3.1.4: Summary: The implications of democratic theory and psychology for regime support 
This body of theoretical and empirical work on the importance of autonomy is a major 
challenge to rational choice-inspired assumptions that, on the whole, citizens would rather involve 
themselves in politics at the minimum level necessary to defend their interests (Downs, 1957; 
Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). Delegation of decision making authority may be appealing in this 
or that instance, but when it becomes general practice, it robs citizens of the chance to shape their 
own fates. In the context of modern democratic nation-states, direct control by the citizenry in all 
aspects of politics is impractical. Even advocates of participatory democracy generally see it as a 
supplement to representative institutions, rather than a replacement (Barber, 1984; Urbinati & 
Warren, 2008). However it is not difficult to see that institutional variation, even in the domain of 
full democracies, may create considerable variation in the responsiveness of the political system 
and the autonomy of citizens. And given the psychological need for such empowerment, it is 
reasonable to suppose that regimes which encourage such sentiments would be viewed more 
positively by their citizens. In addition to this direct relationship, there is good theoretical reason 
to believe that support based upon citizen autonomy provides regimes a reservoir of good faith 
during troubled times which can further buttress their legitimacy.  
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3.1.5: RBE and forgiveness of failures 
The effect of RBE is more complex and powerful than simply as a necessary precondition 
for personal well-being. Psychological studies on the subject indicate that intrinsic motivations 
and externally imposed rewards and punishments interact with one another (Deci, 1971; Deci, 
Ryan, & Koestner, 1999; Johnson & Sarason, 1978). Especially relevant to this study is the role 
that a sense of control over events plays in altering individual responses to extrinsic stimuli. Rotter 
(1966) found that individuals tended to have distinct and durable beliefs about “loci of control,” 
each individual has set beliefs about how his or her behavior affects the course of events. Bandura 
(1977) refined this argument by emphasizing that while locus of control may be an element of 
personality which is relatively fixed, individuals are also quite capable of separately evaluating 
their efficacy depending upon the procedures by which rewards and punishments are generated. In 
other words, beliefs about one’s ability to self-govern are partly fixed and partly contextually 
determined.  
Although Rotter and Bandura were primarily concerned with the impact of control beliefs 
on learning (Rotter, 1954), psychologists later applied the same reasoning in analyzing how 
negative events varied in their generation of psychological distress. Johnson and Sarason (1978) 
found that a personal belief in one’s control over environmental reinforcers significantly weakened 
the effect of traumatic life changes on levels of depression and anxiety. Orpen (1994) found a 
similar relationship when studying anxiety over job insecurity. Walker (2001, ch. 8) applied this 
logic directly to situations in which individual perceptions of control were impacted by the details 
of a specific process (in this case, interactions with health care providers), not just fixed beliefs, 
with similar findings. 
The relevance of autonomy’s impact on reaction to external events for studies of regime 
support is fairly straightforward. Applying psychological research specifically to the political 
realm, it is reasonable to propose that citizens who believe that they have a meaningful impact on 
political decisions are likely to be far less distressed or enraged when those decisions go awry. In 
other words, the much-cited relationship between regime performance and support is very likely 
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non-additive. Autonomy and performance perceptions interact with one another, with the strength 
of the latter’s effect being partially determined by the former.  
This line of reasoning is quite similar to that developed and applied to states by Hirschman 
(1970). In his seminal work Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Hirschman argues (in the context of 
interactions between economic firms and clients) the choice available to individuals confronted 
with declining performance between immediate “exit,” or termination of the firm-client 
relationship, and suffering in silence is a false dichotomy. He posits a third option: voice, wherein 
dissatisfied patrons can choose to express their frustration over declining quality in an attempt to 
alter the firm’s behavior. Later in the book, Hirschman applies this reasoning directly to the 
relationship between citizens and the state. Exit is a difficult concept to apply to the state; specific 
behavioral manifestations which could be described as “exit” behaviors are not immediately clear, 
besides the radical step of emigration. However Hirschman directly addresses attitudes about 
political regimes when developing his theory of loyalty: 
As a rule, then, loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice…That paradigm of loyalty, 
‘our country, right or wrong,’ surely makes no sense whatever if it were expected that 
‘our’ country were to continue forever to do nothing but wrong. Implicit in that phrase is 
the expectation that ‘our’ country can be moved again in the right direction after doing 
some wrong…”(Hirschman, 1970, p. 78). 
The point here is that, while poor performance usually results in some form of withdrawal 
from the declining entity (if only in affective terms, as in the withdrawal of support from a political 
regime), this relationship can be broken, or at least bent. Loyalty, which is essentially the 
weakening of the performance-support relationship, is at least in part the product of effective voice. 
In the realm of democratic politics, voice can be much more than a simple statement of concern; 
indeed the whole point of democratic politics is that some level of influence is held by the 
governed. 
Democratic theory, psychology and Hirschman’s work in economics all concur with one 
another: the relationship between performance and regime support, whose existence I conceded 
earlier, is not constant. Rather, governance problems lead immediately to withdrawal of regime 
 48 
support only when citizens feel they have little or no say in the policy process. Where citizens 
perceive themselves to have an important role in shaping political decisions, they are more 
forgiving of failures and imperfections. This dynamic very closely resembles that described by 
Easton (1975), where political systems manage to weather economic storms which would engulf 
other polities. Citizen autonomy provides a potential mechanism that can explain that dynamic: it 
breaks the causal chain between performance and regime support. Given that the “high support” 
case used here also has grave governance issues, this additional impact of citizen autonomy will 
be crucial in explaining national variation. 
3.2: REPRESENTATION OR PARTICIPATION? THE INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF CITIZEN 
AUTONOMY 
With the potential of citizen autonomy shown, we can turn to an examination of what types 
of procedures might be expected to impact perceptions of this factor. The paradox of interest here 
is at the level of nations, and therefore requires institutional variables which impact individual 
perceptions of citizen autonomy. In the language of statistical analysis, this question requires a 
multilevel theoretical framework, with clear hypotheses regarding the relationships between 
national-level institutions and individual-level attitudinal measures. Extensive discussions of how 
specific institutions impact citizen autonomy and perceptions of it are left to the case studies, 
because it can be misleading to analyze the impact of institutional variants in isolation. Therefore 
the discussion of institutional antecedents of autonomy in this section will be kept at a relatively 
high level of abstraction, with a focus on types of mechanisms by which institutions can influence 
citizen autonomy. With this in mind, I identify three such mechanisms: substantive representation, 
descriptive/populist representation, and participatory opportunities. 
3.2.1: Substantive representation 
In Chapter 2, representation was ruled out as a possible explanation of support because it 
was mediated through performance, which failed to explain the discrepancies in Chile and 
Venezuela. The ability of representation to affect perceived levels of autonomy is an alternative 
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mechanism through which representative institutions could have an impact, and thus it is necessary 
to revisit the concept through this lens. To many theorists, the ability of citizens to choose 
representatives which will advocate for their interests is the fundamental mechanism for binding 
political elites to the popular will (Plotke, 1997). Although representation is often the preferred 
mode of governance for those who are highly suspicious of popular involvement in politics (e.g. 
Hobbes, 1985; Mosca, 1939; Sartori, 1987; Schumpeter, 2008), some developmental theorists 
share this modal preference. John Stuart Mill, for example, goes on at great length about the 
importance of participation in politics to the moral and psychological development of individuals. 
He then concludes that “But since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, 
participate personally in any but some very minor portions of the public business, it follows that 
the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative” (Mill, 2009, p. 87). 
Most developmental theorists are not nearly so sanguine about the capacity of 
representation to meet the needs of citizens. In order for representation to be an effective 
mechanism for ensuring autonomy (as Mill suggested it could), representatives would need to be 
almost entirely responsive to citizen preferences, a view of the concept which Pitkin (1967, p. 4) 
claims is the province of only “a vocal minority” of theorists. Many theorists argue that no 
mechanism for controlling representatives could ever be sufficiently binding to truly subjugate the 
will of elites to the citizenry as a whole. Representatives cannot be trusted or made to be 
trustworthy, therefore the people cannot have control in the absence of direct self-governance 
(Barber, 1984; Rousseau, 2002). Although this is a strong statement of this viewpoint, the notion 
that the principal-agent relationship which forms the core of representative democracy has grave 
potential for the distortion of popular preferences has a strong basis in democratic theory (Urbinati 
& Warren, 2008). 
It is likely that substantive representation, and particularly variations in the level of 
autonomy granted to representatives, can have a significant impact on levels of citizen autonomy. 
However this particular relationship is almost certainly not relevant to the comparison of interest 
here. All of the criticisms leveled against representation in Chapter 2 apply here as well: namely 
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that any problems which may exist in Chile are at least as severe in Venezuela. Whatever its faults, 
Chile is a full-fledged competitive political system and citizens there are much more able to choose 
their rulers than are voters in Venezuela under Bolivarian hegemony. The current Chilean regime 
has witnessed two successful turnovers at the executive level; Venezuela has had none. Chile has 
a perfect score on both political and civil rights as measured by Freedom House; Venezuela is 
counted as only partly free with a score of 5 on each. Chile also has a perfect combined Polity IV 
score, while Venezuela’s score of -3 indicates that it is at least a semi-autocracy. Despite the 
continuing existence of free elections, electoral competition in Venezuela has been stymied by a 
gradual increasing of the costs of being outside the dominant chavista coalition (Corrales, 2010). 
In short, substantive representation enforced by selection of elites is strong in the low-support case 
and weak in the high-support case, casting immediate doubt on its analytical value. Before 
discarding representation, however, it must be acknowledged that substantive representation is 
only one subtype of representation; other subtypes exist which may be more promising. 
3.2.2: Alternative forms of representation: descriptive and charismatic populist 
representation. 
As Urbinati and Warren (2008) note, representation has at least two constitutive 
dimensions, of which substantive representation is only the first. Descriptive representation, 
wherein leaders are bound to those they represent by shared characteristics (usually membership 
in a similar social group), rather than any set of policy preferences or interests. Chávez certainly 
had some phenotypical traits of Venezuela’s marginalized mestizo and Afro-Venezuelan 
populations. However descriptive representation based on race or ethnicity is not very promising, 
because research seems to indicate that some level of politicization along demographic lines is 
necessary for the relationship to have an impact; the presence of a leader who “looks like me” is a 
necessary but insufficient condition (Madrid & Rhodes-Purdy, 2016). 
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Populist representation 
A more promising alternative form of representation is charismatic populist representation. 
Throughout his reign Chávez took advantage, through his rhetoric and personal background, of 
long-standing feelings of resentment and exclusion which had been nurtured by the exclusivity 
and elitism to gather these excluded sectors under his leadership (Molina, 2006). In a sense, 
populist representation can be thought of as a subtype of descriptive representation, but one with 
a very particular type of group identity at its base. The populist Bolivarian coalition can be seen 
as one side of a newly activated, quasi-constructivist social cleavage, based on who was included 
(even in a thoroughly subordinate role) in the Punto Fijo parties. The implication is that Chávez 
was able, through his personal connection to the masses, to create a sense of inclusion based solely 
on one’s membership in the Bolivarian movement, rather than through any expansion of the 
political role of ordinary citizens.  
There is almost certainly an element of truth to the proposition that Chávez, through 
charisma and rhetoric, was able to engender a sense of inclusion and empowerment in the members 
of his movement. However the contention that these factors were, in and of themselves, sufficient 
to do this is far less plausible. Charisma is an extremely fuzzy concept; so much so that it verges 
on unscientific. How do we measure the ability of a leader to mesmerize only with words? How 
could we possible separate the impact of the leader’s words from his or her actions? As I argue in 
Chapter 5, populist rhetoric of grand struggles of the people against the oligarchy can give greater 
meaning to the actions of populists; however I find it incredible that such rhetoric can stand solely 
on the force of the populist’s personality, with nothing real to lend it plausibility. In short, an 
argument based solely on charisma would be extremely difficult to falsify, even if it were in fact 
wrong. Given this, charisma should only be considered a possible explanation in the absence of 
other explanations which survive empirical testing. In other words, if support for the leader, driven 
by charismatic attachment, is found to predict regime support, and no other explanation can be 
found, we might reluctantly conclude that the populist has indeed cast a spell over his or her 
followers. I will return to this topic in greater detail in Chapter 5. Given the concerns listed 
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previously, I instead turn to an alternative mechanism for developing citizen autonomy, leaving 
representation in all its forms to the side for the time being. 
3.2.3: Participatory opportunities 
Theories of procedural justice and utility often hold that participation (sometimes referred 
to as the fair distribution of decision-making authority) is a crucial aspect of just procedures (Lind 
& Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Participation here refers not to individual behavioral 
choices but rather an institutional granting of decision-making authority to those who will be 
governed by the decision. I use the term participatory opportunities to avoid confusion with actual 
participation. Participatory opportunities are defined as institutionally structured procedures 
through which citizens can have a direct role in making policy. It should be noted that these 
opportunities are not the only mechanism for granting citizen the ability to exert influence in a 
given procedural context; accountability and representation are also relevant. However given that 
neither of these match the cases of interest, from here out I will focus on direct participatory 
opportunities. 
Although participation likely can, at least in certain circumstances, improve support for 
democracy as many analysts have argued (Almond & Verba, 1963; Finkel, 1987), explanations 
based solely on actual participatory behavior have some serious shortcomings. First, they relegate 
the impact of participatory opportunities (a characteristic of the political regime) to a subordinate 
role in the causal chain: they only matter because they increase actual participation (an individual 
behavioral choice which may have any number of additional causal antecedents). Additionally, 
whatever hypothetical value direct participation may have, empirically speaking such a small 
number of citizens take advantage of such direct opportunities that actual participatory behavior is 
not a promising explanation of macro-level patterns of legitimacy. 
Opportunities for direct participation can have an impact on public opinion that reaches far 
beyond those individuals who actually avail themselves of said opportunities on a regular basis. 
Research on external political efficacy demonstrates that citizens are capable of recognizing when 
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political systems grant or deny them the ability to affect government decisions (Finkel, 1987; Kölln 
et al., 2013; Madsen, 1987; Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). Both representative and participatory 
institutions can enforce popular sovereignty, but the former are indirect and prone to breakdown, 
while the latter put political questions directly into the hands of those most directly impacted by 
policy choices. Given the theoretical importance of citizen autonomy established earlier, 
participatory institutions provide a procedural variable (that is, one that describes a regime 
characteristic) that theory can clearly link to an individual-level perception (citizen autonomy, 
operationalized as RBE), which in turn may well be an important source of legitimacy.  
The importance of participatory opportunities to empowering ordinary citizens is a key 
aspect of Bolivarian thought; indeed it is one of the few clear tenets of a movement whose ideology 
is extremely ill defined.  Chávez came to power on the promise to transform Venezuela into a 
“participatory, protagonist” democracy. The inclusion of the adjective “protagonist”, while 
somewhat awkward in English, is particularly telling. The idea of putting the destiny of the people 
in their own hands has clear echoes in the concept of citizen autonomy used here. The idea has 
manifested itself in Venezuela primarily in the form of direct democratic mechanisms at the 
national level (plebiscites, executive recall, and referenda) and more significantly in an ever-
increasing plethora of participatory fora, including: 
 
 A subset of the social welfare organizations known as misiones (Social Missions) 
(Hawkins, 2010; Hawkins, Rosas, & Johnson, 2011);  
 Círculos bolivarianos (Bolivarian Circles): small cells of up to 11 individuals sworn to 
defend the Bolivarian Constitution and its principles, as well as serve their communities 
(Hawkins & Hansen, 2006, pp. 102-103); 
 Comités de tierra urbana (Urban Land Committees): groups of 100-200 families in the 
vast barrios of the country’s cities, self-managed organizations responsible for drawing 
up maps of their communities to be submitted to the government, at which time 
individual families would be granted titles to their land. The CTUs also had broad 
discretion to address issues of community identity, strategies for improvement and other 
community issues (García-Guadilla, 2011, p. 104).  
 Rural equivalents of the urban land committees. 
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 Mesas técnicas de agua (water roundtables), focused on providing water infrastructure. 
 Legally recognized cooperative associations (López Maya & Lander, 2011). 
 Consejos comunales (communal councils), umbrella organizations which serve as the 
voice of civil society as a whole in a given area ("Ley orgánica de los consejos 
comunales," 2006; "Ley orgánica de los consejos comunales," 2009). 
The emphasis on direct participation in Bolivarian Venezuela provides a potential 
explanation for that system’s unusually high levels of support. Given the near total dearth of such 
opportunities in Chile, and the general elitist bent of the Chilean political system, it is a promising 
variable in both cases. However to contend that legitimacy in Venezuela is the result of perceptions 
of citizen autonomy is likely to be provocative to many readers. 
Evaluating participatory opportunities 
The proposition that chavista participatory programs increase actual or perceived citizen 
autonomy is likely to be extremely controversial. Critics of these programs label them as instances 
of impulsada (Briceño, 2012) or conditioned (Triviño Salazar, 2013) participation. How can 
instances of participation which are shaped and directed, at least in part, by the state be 
autonomous? Either explicitly or implicitly, such arguments rely on the assumptions of public 
space theorists, who argue that genuine participation is assumed to rise organically from the 
political space between the state and the private sphere, without interference or direction from 
political actors. (Avritzer, 2002; Oxhorn, 1994, 1995). 
Without taking a position on the impact such organizations may or may not have on the 
quality of democracy (which is beyond the scope of this research), it is simple enough to show that 
criticisms based on this reasoning are not compelling when applied to the councils without 
substantial modification. Imagine, for the sake of argument, an ideal organization as conceived by 
public space theory. Citizens gather together and coalesce into a movement, forming both 
organizations and identities which allow them to form a collective actor which can agitate to or 
petition the state. As I discuss in detail in Chapter 5, determining the autonomy of Bolivarian 
participatory programs is a difficult task, because it requires sorting out countervailing forces 
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which simultaneously grant and stifle the organizations’ autonomy. Quantifying the autonomy of 
this hypothetical organization, however, is simplicity itself: the level of autonomy of such an 
organization is exactly zero.  
One may recognize and admire the authenticity of such an organization, and its ability to 
grant its members the ability to shape their own political identity, but independence is not 
equivalent to autonomy. Indeed, independence of this sort is an illusion; the organization would 
be independent only in the sense that it was organically created by its members. It has absolutely 
no ability to govern itself: it operates in the context of a sovereign state which has the final 
authority to make political decisions which govern the organization’s members. When defined 
correctly, it becomes clear that independence is actually negatively associated with autonomy. 
That is to say, for an organization to be truly self-governing it must be granted that authority 
through a concession by the state, effectively making the organization a para-state institution. This 
would of course represent a necessary sacrifice of independence, which could nullify autonomy 
were interference in its operation sufficiently severe. What is clear is that these programs are at 
least potential examples of participatory opportunities as defined earlier. And if they are, the sheer 
abundance of such programs in Venezuela would make strong perceptions of autonomy, and thus 
strong regime support, far less puzzling.  
3.3: PARTICIPATORY POPULISM AND REPRESENTATIVE ELITISM IN VENEZUELA AND CHILE 
Participatory opportunities are by far the most promising source of the support paradoxes 
of interest here. Direct participation has a much clearer connection to autonomy as laid out by both 
developmental democratic theory and social psychology that any form of representation. It has the 
additional advantage of being the national-level independent variable upon which the two cases of 
interest here diverge most starkly. Chile and Venezuela represent fundamentally opposing 
solutions to the dilemmas posed by the simultaneous need or desire for democracy and the 
instability and social conflict which popular involvement in politics can create. 
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3.3.1: Representative elitism in Chile and Venezuela 
Despite their shared region, Chile and Venezuela are quite different, in terms of culture, 
demography and economic structure. Nevertheless their political histories share common episodes, 
albeit in different eras. Both countries adopted similar regimes after devastating democratic 
failures and traumatic periods of military rule. In Venezuela, a brief period of effervescent 
democracy ended when it was overthrown by a military coup led by Marco Pérez Jiménez in 1948. 
Chile’s longstanding tradition of competitive politics ended in 1973 with a similar coup. In both 
cases, leftist governments lost control of their grassroots militants and social bases, and upsurges 
of popular political activism were viewed as risky provocations which contributed to the failure of 
democracy (Coppedge, 1994, pp. 37-39; Ellner, 2003a; Hellinger, 2003; Myers, 2006). Years later, 
when democracy returned, elites in both states remembered the lessons of these democratic 
failures. These memories manifested as a deeply ingrained suspicion of mass politics, which was 
embodied in the nascent democratic regimes that came after military rule. In both cases, the ousted 
militaries and their supporters remained viable powers during and after transition. In Chile 
especially, where the loss of the country’s proud tradition of democratic politics was especially 
traumatic and where the military remained quite powerful, fear of its return to power was 
widespread among the returning political elite (Constable & Valenzuela, 1991, ch. 12). 
Elites in both states faced a dilemma: how to reestablish democracy, which has popular 
participation as a fundamental component, when such political inclusion was perceived as so 
threatening to stability? The solutions adopted by Chile and Venezuela differed considerably in 
the details (hardly surprising given the underlying structural differences), but both can be described 
as pacted transitions that were more concerned with limiting than expanding political competition 
or equitably distributing political power. In short, they embodied Adam Przeworski’s “cartels of 
incumbents against contenders”, wherein competition among elites was the lone form of 
institutionalized popular involvement in politics (Encarnación, 2005; Przeworski, 1991, pp. 90-
91). Under the Punto Fijo agreement in Venezuela, authority was tightly held by a small number 
of elites within the system’s dominant parties: the social democratic Acción Democrática 
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(Democratic Action, AD) and the Christian Democratic Comité de Organización Política 
Electoral Independiente (Independent Political Electoral Organization Committee, COPEI), and 
to a lesser extent the Unión Republicana Democrática (Democratic Republican Union, URD). The 
mass bases of the parties had a largely subordinate role that did little to genuinely empower average 
citizens (Ellner, 2003a, 2003b). Distribution of benefits derived from oil revenues became key to 
maintaining the top-down flow of power from elites to masses, given the absence of 
institutionalized channels for making demands on the political system (Karl, 1987, pp. 86-89). 
This democratic variant, wherein free elections were held but power was monopolized by a small 
number of internally elite-dominated political parties, came to be referred to as partidocracia, or 
partyarchy in English; a neologism which emphasized the widespread view that such regimes were 
not fully democratic, as they failed to establish true popular sovereignty (Coppedge, 1994, ch. 1). 
Chilean political elites likewise embraced performance-based legitimacy, although lacking 
Venezuela’s oil reserves, they had to rely on competent administration of the national economy, 
buttressed with careful expansion of the welfare state, rather than the distribution of rents. And 
although the institutionalization of the dominance of the large electoral pacts was more of a 
shotgun wedding than a consensual pact (it is largely enforced by the electoral system that the 
exiting Pinochet government demanded), elites from both sides of the ideological spectrum, wary 
of destabilizing political activity, accepted and adapted to the new rules of party politics. Unlike 
in Venezuela, elitist party dominance in Chile is the result of a variety of sources, rather than a 
single pact, including technocracy (Garretón, 2003; Kurtz, 2004a, 2004b; Silva, 1991), the 
electoral system (Posner, 1999), and elite preferences for top-down decision-making (Huber, 
Pribble, & Stephens, 2010; Posner, 2004). 
3.3.2: Participatory populism in Venezuela 
Both post-Pinochet Chile and puntofijo-era Venezuela adopted unresponsive, weakly 
rooted political systems that prioritized stability above all else, including democratic norms of 
participation and popular sovereignty. In other words, both adopted elitist representation as the 
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sole institutional mechanism for popular involvement in politics. It is important not to exaggerate 
the failings of these regimes. Both managed to consolidate, despite the very real possibility of a 
return to military rule. And each provided extremely significant economic benefits for considerable 
periods of time. In many important ways, the Chilean regime continues to thrive. Puntofijismo, on 
the other hand, demonstrated the underlying fragility of elitist representation. With the arrival of 
the debt crisis of the early 1980s and subsequent fluctuations in the price of oil, this system of rent 
distribution in Venezuela became unsustainable. I leave the details of the collapse to Chapter 5. 
For the present purpose it is sufficient to note that, with the pillar of economic benefits knocked 
out from under the regime, its minimal standard of democracy was woefully insufficient to bear 
the weight of the crisis. When democratic regimes stake their entire claim to legitimacy on their 
ability to deliver economic benefits, they more or less guarantee that economic crises will also 
become political crises.  
It is not surprising that the regime which rose from the ashes of the failure of elitist 
representation under puntofijismo repudiated its tactics so completely, sacrificing both competitive 
politics and sound economics in favor of populism and direct participation. This was less the result 
of any political learning: Chávez had been considering such an approach to democratic politics at 
least as early as 1975, after observing the design of the leftist military regime of Juan Velasco in 
Peru (Gott, 2011, p. 35). Something more akin to natural selection was at work, where potential 
successors to puntofijismo were evaluated by citizens based upon the strength of their opposition 
to the old system. Those who made the mistake of colluding with the former dominant parties 
(such as the leftist movement La Causa R) fell by the wayside (López Maya, 1997). Eventually 
Chávez’s promises of “participatory protagonist democracy” won through. The end result was a 
system that was the mirror image of both the ancién regime in Venezuela and the current 
democratic mode in Chile. Representation was relegated to at best a secondary role in enforcing 
popular sovereignty, and was to be maintained not through competition for votes but by the 
personal charisma of the populist. Instead the direct participation of ordinary citizens was seen as 
the primary mechanism for binding political decisions to the popular will. 
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3.5: CONCLUSION 
Were two democratic theorists, one instrumental and one developmental, to observe the 
Venezuelan and Chilean political systems, with no foreknowledge of public opinion data in either 
case, they would make radically opposing predictions regarding support and legitimacy. The 
instrumentalist, finding a nearly ideal manifestation of his or her preferred democratic variant in 
Chile, would assume that substantive representation, civil liberties and strong economic 
performance should be more than enough to ensure popular contentment. The developmental 
theorist, observing the plethora of opportunities for direct participation in Venezuela, would likely 
not be surprised to learn of the solid legitimacy of the Bolivarian regime, in spite of its populist 
tendencies. Table 3.1 presents an array of the various factors involved in such a hypothetical 
comparison. 
Table 3.1: Institutional determinants of autonomy and support in Chile and Venezuela  
  Chile Venezuela 
Representation Mixed Mixed 
Substantive High Low 
Descriptive/Populist Low High 
Performance High Low 
Participatory Opportunities Low High 
Support Low High 
 
As the table shows, only participatory opportunities unambiguously match patterns of 
support. Populist conceptions of representation remain as a potential confounding variable in the 
Venezuelan case, which can be evaluated by testing the predictions it suggests. 
Such a basic comparison is of course nowhere near sufficient to simply conclude that 
developmental theory is correct. However one can derive some concrete and empirically testable 
propositions from the preceding theoretical discussion, and through testing these against 
competing approaches, I demonstrate that developmental theory does in fact provide considerable 
leverage on the support paradox under investigation. The first proposition is that perceived citizen 
autonomy is a crucial source of regime support. Autonomy directly predicts support and further 
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reinforces it through its moderation of the impact of performance; polities filled with citizens who 
believe themselves to be autonomous can weather economic storms which would otherwise sink 
them.  
Developmental theory suggests that participatory opportunities, rather than any form of 
representation, are the most powerful source of perceived autonomy. Applied to the cases here, 
this suggests two additional propositions. First, participatory programs in Venezuela are likely an 
important source of that country’s unusually high levels of support. Second, it suggests that such 
programs could ameliorate low support in Chile. The remainder of this work is dedicated to testing 
hypotheses based upon these simple propositions with actual data. 
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Chapter 4: Attitudinal antecedents of regime support: a statistical analysis8  
The main argument of this thesis is that participatory opportunities are the key to explaining 
the paradoxes in Chile and Venezuela described in previous chapters. However the approach 
derived in Chapter 3 from democratic theory and organizational justice theory suggests that the 
impact of participatory institutions is not direct. This effect does not result from the satisfaction of 
conscious preferences, but from the satisfaction psychological and emotional needs of which 
individuals may or may not be totally aware. This implies that, in a state such as Chile wherein 
participatory opportunities are few and far between, Chileans certainly do not withhold support 
because they yearn for communal councils or participatory budgeting. The lack of participatory 
opportunities weakens support because the Chilean state fails to give its citizens a sense of efficacy 
and control over their fates; there is no need to assume that Chileans know what institutional 
alternatives would make them feel more efficacious. 
In short, the theory developed in Chapter 3 suggests that the impact of participatory 
institutions on support is indirect in most circumstances.9 The impact of such institutions is 
mediated by perceptions of regime-based efficacy (RBE). Furthermore, my theory implies that 
participatory institutions (mediated by RBE) can also moderate the relationship between 
performance and support. Given this complicated attitudinal relationship structure, it would be 
premature to immediately proceed to any analyses testing the impact of participatory opportunities 
on regime support. Instead, I must first demonstrate that the relationships between performance, 
RBE, and regime support can be supported by available data. Only once these relationships are 
established can we turn to the institutional origins of these attitudes.  In this section, I use cross-
national public opinion surveys from across Latin America and the United States to test these 
hypotheses, before turning to the role of specific institutions in the cases of interest in subsequent 
chapters. I do not confine these analyses to the cases of interest; again, theory suggests that the 
                                                 
8 Portions of this chapter have been accepted for publication in Comparative Politics (Rhodes-Purdy). 
9 Bolivarian Venezuela, where these institutions are an explicit part of Chávez’s concept of “participatory, 
protagonist” democracy is an exception, as shown in Chapter 5. 
 62 
attitudinal relationships to be tested are broadly applicable and should be evident in most 
populations.10 
4.1: HYPOTHESES AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The first and most basic hypothesis here is: 
H1: Regime-Based Efficacy (RBE) increases regime support, controlling for other 
factors. 
This hypothesis assumes the following statistical model. 
 
Regime Supporti =  γ0 +  γ1RBEi +  γ2Performancei + ζi (Eq 4.01) 
Where i is the ith respondent, and 𝜁 is the disturbance term.11 With the model specified, 
H1 can be restated as: 
 
H10: γ1  = 0 
(Eq 4.02) 
H1A: γ1  ≠ 0 
Performance is not a part of H1, but its inclusion will become clear shortly. As stated in 
Chapter 3, social psychology suggests that the relationship between performance and support is 
not constant across all individuals. Instead, theory suggests that RBE should moderate that 
relationship: individuals who feel their regimes provide them a great deal of say in the political 
process will be slower to withdraw support in the face of policy failures than individuals who feel 
powerless. 
H2: The effect of performance is moderated by RBE. 
Testing this hypothesis requires the model specified by equation 4.01 to be re-specified as:  
 
Regime Supporti =  γ0 +  γ1RBEi +  γ2Performancei 
+𝛾3(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝐵𝐸𝑖)  + 𝜁𝑖   
(Eq 4.03) 
H2 can be stated mathematically as: 
 
                                                 
10 However to ensure that the relationships do pertain to the cases of interest, I perform separate analyses of 
data from Chile and Venezuela, using the same model as the cross-national analyses, later in the chapter. 
11 I use 𝜁 following the conventions of structural equation modeling. 
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H10: γ3  = 0 
(Eq 4.04) 
H1A: γ3  ≠ 0 
It should be noted that with a non-additive model such as Eq. 4.03, the test of H1 presented 
in Eq. 3.02 is no longer valid, because: 
 
∂Regime Support
∂RBE
 ≠ γ1 (Eq 4.05) 
as it does in the additive model. Instead we have: 
 
∂Regime Support
∂RBE
 = γ1 +  γ3Performancei (Eq 4.06) 
In other words 𝛾1 is not, in the interactive model, the effect of RBE but only the intercept 
of the effect (the effect when performance is at zero, which for reasons explained later is also its 
mean). The actual effect is different for every individual, depending upon their level of RBE. The 
same is true for the effect of RBE: 
 
∂Regime Support
∂Performance
 = γ2 +  γ3RBEi (Eq 4.07) 
To account for non-additivity, H1 must be restated as: 
 
H10: γ1 +  γ3Performancei  = 0 ∀i 
(Eq 4.08) 
H1A: γ1 +  γ3Performancei  ≠ 0 ∀i 
In other words, H1 states that there are at least some levels of performance at which the 
effect of RBE is nonzero (and vice-versa). It should be noted that if zero is a meaningful value of 
the moderating variable, as it is here (RBE and regime performance both have fixed means of 
zero), then an estimate of the effect intercept (𝛾1or 𝛾2) that is statistically significant is a sufficient 
but not necessary condition for rejecting the reformulated H10. 
Most estimation methods assume independence of observations; that is to say, that all 
respondents’ answers and probability of being sampled do not depend on those of other 
respondents. This assumption is clearly violated here, because respondents are nested within 
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country-year survey waves. Respondents’ country and year of survey may have an impact on their 
opinions and feelings and thus must be controlled for. Given this, I re-specify Eq. 4.03 as follows: 
 
Regime Supporti
= +γ3(Performance ∗ RBEi)  +  ζi  β0k +  γ1RBEi
+  γ2Performancei 
(Eq 4.09) 
β0k =  γ0 + uk 
where 𝛽0𝑘 is the intercept for country-year k, 𝛾0 is the intercept for the sample as a whole, 
and u𝑘 is the difference between the country-year specific intercept and the overall intercept. This 
model is equivalent to adding dummy variables for each country-year, forming a fixed-effects 
model (Allison, 2009). 
Finally, I include a suite of demographic control variables which could conceivably impact 
regime support. These variables are not directly useful for testing the theory developed here, but 
failing to include such variables would render any estimation of the model described in Eq. 4.03 
suspect due to omitted variable bias. These variables include income, wealth, education, gender, 
ideology, race, urban/rural respondent, and age. This leads to the following, final structural model: 
 
Regime Supporti =  β0k +  γ1RBEi +  γ2Performancei 
+γ3(Performance ∗ RBEi)  + 
γ3Incomei + γ4Wealthi + γ5Educationi  + 
γ6Genderi + γ7Ideologyi + γ8Urbani + γ9Agei + γ10Racei + ζi ; 
(Eq 4.10) 
β0k =  γ0 + uk 
Distilling the theoretical discussion of institutional antecedents of RBE (H3 from figure 
3.1) is a more difficult task than the purely individual-level attitudinal hypotheses for several 
reasons. First, it is not possible to specify a fully convincing model which would allow for testing 
of the hypothesis that participatory opportunities (created by institutions) increase RBE. Measures 
of “participatory institutions” are not available (although reasonable proxies may soon be available 
via the V-Dem project), and if they were available, cross-national public opinion data which 
included a sufficient number of level-2 units with comparable measures of RBE are not.  
While it is not possible to construct a fully specified “causal” multilevel model that could 
be estimated by available data, it is possible to identify one major source of variation in RBE for 
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the cases of interest alone. That factor is the presence or absence of participatory opportunities. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: Countries which provide more participatory opportunities will produce higher 
average perceptions of RBE. 
Although the test of this hypothesis is primarily the domain of the case-focused chapters 
(5 and 6), a preliminary evaluation can be conducted by comparing average levels of RBE across 
groups of respondents, sorted according to the presence or absence of extensive opportunities for 
direct participation (E.O.D.P.) in their countries of residence. E.O.D.P. is measured by the 
presence or absence of initiatives, referenda, and presidential recall provisions, in the respondents’ 
countries, leading to the hypotheses: 
 
H20: μE.O.D.P. = μ~E.O.D.P. 
(Eq 4.11) 
H2A: μE.O.D.P. ≠ μ~E.O.D.P. 
where μE.O.D.P. and μ~E.O.D.P represent the population mean levels of RBE in countries with 
and without extensive opportunities for direct participation, respectively, assuming unequal 
variance across groups.12 This test has the advantage of having only one level of analysis, that of 
the individual. However it assumes equality of mean RBE within each group, which is not a very 
reasonable assumption, given the fact that individuals are nested within countries. To account for 
this, a multilevel mean structure model needs to be specified. This is done by decomposing the 
mean level of RBE into two components: 
 
μgk  =  βg +  ek  (Eq 4.12) 
where μ𝑔𝑘 is the mean RBE of country k in group g, 𝛽𝑔 is the mean for group g (presence 
or absence of E.O.D.P.) and 𝑒𝑘 is a random disturbance representing the difference of country k’s 
mean from the mean of the group to which it belongs. Based on this, H2 can be reformulated as: 
  
                                                 
12 See section 4.4.3 for an explanation of how countries were assigned to each group; for a list of countries 
by group, see Table 4.6. 
 66 
 
H20: βE.O.D.P. =  β~E.O.D.P. 
(Eq 4.13) 
H2A: βE.O.D.P. ≠ β~E.O.D.P. 
The advantages of multilevel model estimation in this instance are significantly weakened 
by the small number of countries involved in the region of interest here (nk = 18). Statistical tests 
will likely lack sufficient power to detect even sizeable differences. 
4.2: DATA 
To test these hypotheses, I use surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP). LAPOP conducts surveys in every country in the region (except Cuba) at two-
year intervals. I use the 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 waves of these surveys. Data from earlier 
waves is available for some countries, but many indicators of key concepts are not available in 
those earlier surveys. 
4.3: MEASUREMENT 
The concepts of interest here (regime support, performance, RBE) are complex and 
abstract. It is therefore reasonable to assume that respondents would have difficulty accurately 
assigning numeric values to their feelings and perceptions. It is also unlikely that any single 
question could accurately capture any of the aforementioned concepts accurately even if 
respondents could assign values accurately. This means that any indicator of the concepts of 
interest is likely to be contaminated by random measurement error. 
Measurement error leads to bias in parameter estimates. In multivariate models this error 
spreads to all estimates, not just those related to the variables with error. In order to have 
confidence in the results of analysis, this error must be accounted for in the model. I do so by using 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) techniques. SEM involves specifying two sub-models which 
are combined to form a single structural equation model. The first sub-model, often (although 
somewhat inaccurately) called the “structural” model, specifies relationships between variables, 
and is analogous to a typical regression model. The second sub-model is the measurement model, 
which decomposes each observed response (now called an indicator) into two components. One 
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component is affected by the underlying concept of interest, which is unobserved (latent). The 
other component is a random error term. The parameters of the two models are then estimated 
simultaneously. 
Generally, the following equations define the measurement model for the kth indicator y 
or x: 
 
yik =  vk +  λkηi +  ϵi (4.14) 
x1ik =  vk +  λkξ1i + δi (4.15) 
x2ik =  vk + λkξ2i +  δi (4.16) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑘, 𝑥1𝑖𝑘, and 𝑥2𝑖𝑘 are indicators of the endogenous latent factor (regime support) 
and the first and second exogenous latent factor (performance and RBE), respectively, for the ith 
respondent. η𝑖 is the value of the latent regime support variable for the ith respondent; ξ1𝑖 and ξ2𝑖 
are the values of the latent performance and RBE variables for the ith respondents, respectively. 
𝜆𝑘 is the “factor loading” for a given indicator and latent variable; it is analogous to a regression 
coefficient in OLS estimation. The lambda parameters determine how strongly the latent variable 
impacts the observed indicator. Finally, the epsilon and delta parameters are random measurement 
error terms. 
𝑣𝑘 is the intercept term associated with the kth indicator of a given latent factor. Normally 
this is fixed to zero by deviating each indicator from its mean; however in multilevel SEMs, the 
intercept must be included because it is not constant. Instead, it varies by country-year. Re-
expressing equation 4.14 in matrix notation, this leads to the following modification of equation 
4.14: 
 
ygik =  vWkg + λkηi +  ϵWi (4.17) 
vWgk =  vBk + ϵBgk (4.18) 
𝑦𝑔𝑖𝑘 is the value of the kth indicator of the endogenous latent factor for ith respondent in 
country-year g. vW𝑘𝑔 is the within country-year intercept for the kth indicator; it is the same for 
all respondents within a country-year, but varies across country-years. To specify this, vW𝑘𝑔 is 
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decomposed in Equation 4.18 into two components: a “grand intercept”, which is the same for all 
respondents (vB𝑘) and a random, country-year level error term, ϵ𝐵𝑔𝑘. This is sometimes called 
weak factorial invariance. It suggests that, while the latent variables impact the indicators in 
equivalent ways across second-level groups, the means for indicators, as well as their measurement 
errors, will vary from group to group. Substituting Equation 4.18 into 4.17 leads to the following:  
 
 ygik =  vBk +  λkηi +  ϵWik +  ϵBgk (4.19) 
4.3.1: Dependent variable indicators 
Regime support is the dependent variable. It is treated as a single latent variable, with the 
same three observed indicators in all models: pride in the political system (b2), respect for political 
institutions (b4), and support for the political system (b6). These are among the indicators used by 
the designers of the survey (Booth & Seligson, 2009).  
4.3.2: Regime performance and RBE indicators 
Performance is measured by a combination of questions regarding the handling of specific 
governance issues: poverty reduction (n1), citizen security (n11), and general economic 
management (n15). It also includes a general evaluation of the economy (soct1) and approval of 
the President (m1). To tie the concept closer to the regime level, I also include the utilitarian-
sounding but regime-level “satisfaction with the way democracy works” indicator (pn4). The 
multi-wave model includes only presidential approval, approval of economic handling, evaluation 
of national economic situation and satisfaction with the way democracy works. The reduced 2012 
measurement model includes only the three evaluation-of-governance questions and approval of 
the President. The satisfaction indicator is suspect for  a number of reasons (Canache, Mondak, & 
Seligson, 2001), and the general economic evaluation is dependent upon outcomes which may be 
shaped by any number of factors in addition to policy outputs. Both load significantly on the latent 
performance factor, and results do not change much when these indicators are included or 
removed. 
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Regime-based efficacy is measured by questions assessing the belief that politicians care 
what people like the respondent think (eff1), the belief that parties respond to the opinions of voters 
like respondents (epp1), and confidence in political parties (b21). This last is somewhat worrisome, 
but political parties are key institutions for collecting and acting on popular demands, and 
combined with the other indicators, this indicator likely does significantly load on the RBE latent 
concept. Nevertheless, to provide greater confidence in the results, the 2012 model includes an 
additional responsiveness question (parties represent their voters well, epp3) to ensure proper 
construct validity. The estimation results do not change with the inclusion or exclusion of 
indicators, and fit statistics and parameter estimates indicate that all indicators are appropriate for 
the latent concepts. The decision to exclude certain indicators in the 2012 analysis is merely a 
robustness check; results from the measurement model support the inclusion of these indicators.  
The fact that some of the measures for RBE explicitly mention parties raises the possibility 
that the variable in question is more related to regime responsiveness, rather than RBE. That is to 
say, perhaps the willingness of elites to respond to popular wishes is what most strongly impacts 
these measures, rather than the perceived ability of citizens to shape politics through their own 
behavior. Those concerns can be allayed in two ways. First, in the final chapters of this thesis, I 
show a positive impact of participatory democratic institutions on RBE. This would not be the case 
if the measures used for RBE were actually measures of responsiveness, since these institutions 
allow for direct, unmediated participation. Second, as RBE and regime performance are assumed 
to be correlated, it is likely that any impact of responsiveness would be controlled for by the 
performance measure. 
4.3.3: Variable measurement in the ANES model 
As a robustness check against the concerns listed above, I conduct an out-of-sample 
analysis of the 1988 – 2012 American National Election Survey (ANES) dataset, which includes 
different indicators for all of the key concepts. Of particular importance, none of the indicators in 
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the ANES dataset mention political parties, and one of the indicators (nosay) does not mention 
elites or political actors at all. Indicators for this model are presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Indicators for ANES models 
REGIME SUPPORT  PERFORMANCE  RBE  
Trust in Federal government  Presidential approval  Government cares about 
people like respondent 
Government run by big 
interests  
Congressional approval  People like respondent have 
no say in government  
Government wastes tax 
money  
Evaluation of economy  Government pays attention to 
people like respondent 
Most politicians are crooked  Elections make government 
pay attention  
  
4.3.4: Measurement model identification 
The factor complexity in all models is one; all indicators load on only one factor. All latent 
factors have variances fixed at 1 for identification purposes. As the covariance of two variables 
with unit variance is equivalent to the correlation between the variables, this also allows tests of 
whether the latent factors are conceptually distinct (see results section for details). 
In all cases except the 2012 reduced model, the measurement models are identified by the 
three indicator rule (Bollen, 1989). The 2012 reduced model includes two indicators (epp1 and 
epp3) which both concern parties, and which are part of the same question block. This means that 
a respondent’s attitudes toward parties may impact both of these indicators, separate from their 
perceptions of RBE. To account for this, I allow the measurement errors for these two indicators 
to be correlated. This model is identified by the single-factor rules method (O'Brien, 1994). 
4.3.5: Measurement model results 
Measurement must precede analysis of relationships; without confidence in the measures 
of concepts, no analysis of the structural or causal relationships between concepts can be trusted. 
Given this I estimated the parameters of the measurement models described above separately from 
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the structural model; the results are presented in this section.  The results for the measurement 
portions of the LAPOP and ANES models are presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. 
 72 
Table 4.2: Measurement model estimation results, LAPOP 
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Table 4.3: Measurement model estimation results, ANES13,14 
 
                                                 
13 Error variance is not a parameter for categorical indicators. 
 
14 GFI statistics are not available for the multilevel ANES measurement model. The use of categorical 
indicators in a multilevel measurement model requires numerical integration, for which GFI statistics are 
not available. The statistics presented here are for the equivalent single-level models. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Parameter (n=18,104) Est. SE p-value Est. SE p-value 
Regime support factor loadings       
Trust 1.668 .039 .000 1.706 .041 .000 
Big interests 2.404 .077 .000 2.355 .078 .000 
Waste 1.337 .038 .000 1.339 .039 .000 
Crooked 1.422 .033 .000 1.409 .034 .000 
Regime performance factor loadings       
Presidential approval .445 .017 .000 .446 .017 .000 
Congressional approval .186 .038 .000 .183 .038 .000 
Evaluation of economy 1.135 .062 .000 1.138 .062 .000 
RBE factor loadings       
Government cares 2.186 .101 .000 - - - 
No say 1.585 .061 .000 1.098 .055 .000 
Government pays attention 1.553 .067 .000 - - - 
Attention at election time 1.241 .050 .000 1.379 .067 .000 
Variances       
Support 1.000 - - 1.000 - - 
Performance 1.000 - - 1.000 - - 
RBE 1.000 - - 1.000 - - 
Covariances       
Performance, RBE .396 .027 .000 .359 .035 .000 
Performance, Support .861 .024 .000 .860 .024 .000 
Support, RBE .643 .014 .000 .643 .019 .000 
Error variances       
Presidential approval 1.238 .017 .000 1.238 .017 .000 
       
Goodness of Fit Statistics    
 Model 1 Model 2 
Statistic Value P-value Value P-value 
Chi-square 1945.7 .000 1786.9 .000 
RMSEA .05  .06  
CFI .95  .94  
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Overall, the results presented above support the use of the measurement models 
developed here. First, all factor loadings are positive and statistically significant; the 
models include no irrelevant measures. The correlations between latent variables are high, 
indicating that they are related. However model restrictions which fix those correlations at 
1 produce significantly poorer fitting models. This means that, while the latent factors are 
clearly related, they are not identical to one another. The assumption that RBE, regime 
performance, and regime support, are all separate concepts is supported by these data. 
The goodness of fit indices (GFI) also show that these models are appropriate, with 
the exception of the Chi-square tests, all of which are statistically significant. While this 
would generally indicate poor model fit, the Chi-square statistic is extremely sensitive to 
sample size; specifically, its value increases as sample size increases, regardless of fit. All 
of these models include tens of thousands of observations; it is unlikely that any model 
based on these data would produce an insignificant Chi-square statistic. Given this, it is 
more useful to look at GFI statistics which are less sensitive to large sample sizes. I include 
three of the most frequently used statistics: the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Root Mean 
Squared Error of the Approximation (RMSEA), and the Standard Root Mean squared 
Residual (SRMR). Hu and Bentler (1999) show that a two-index strategy, with an SRMR 
cutoff of .06, and either a CFI cutoff of .95 or an RMSEA cutoff of .05 are jointly sufficient 
to demonstrate good model fit.  
With these combinations of cut-offs in mind, all the models for the LAPOP data 
appear to have excellent fit; all RMSEA values are below .05, and all SRMR values are 
below .06. The two 2012 models have CFI values over .95, although the CFI for the 2006-
2012 model is slightly below that figure. However as this model still passes the 
SRMR/RMSEA test, I still consider it to have at least acceptable fit. 
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The statistics for the ANES models are not as unambiguously supportive. Model 1 
is exactly at the cutoff point, while Model 2 is slightly above. This seems to result from the 
fact that several indicators of regime support, which tend to emphasize things such as waste 
of tax dollars, are highly correlated with indicators of regime performance. Although 
Model 2 appears to have only acceptable, rather than “good” fit, I include it as a robustness 
check in structural analyses because of aforementioned concerns about other measures of 
RBE. 
The GFI statistics also allow for comparison between similar models, specifically 
the two models for the 2012 wave LAPOP data and the two ANES models. The statistics 
clearly show that the reduced 2012 model fits the data better than the full model. This is 
likely due to the fact that the excluded indicators, while loading significantly on the latent 
factors, contain a larger proportion of random error than do the other indicators. For 
example, the latent performance factor explains only 14.1 percent of the variation in the 
evaluation of the economy indicator, and only 17.3 percent of the variance in the 
satisfaction with democracy indicator, compared with 35.9 percent to 69 percent of the 
variation of the other performance indicators. Generally, the evidence supports the use of 
the reduced model for the 2012 LAPOP data. For the ANES data, the GFI statistics are 
quite close for both models, but suggest that the full model fits the data slightly better. 
However as the reduced ANES model allows for a robustness check, concerning issues not 
related to model fit but to the content validity of the measures for the concept in question, 
both are used in the structural analysis, to which I now turn.  
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4.4: ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL MODELS 
The results from the estimation of the measurement models show that the indicators 
used are valid. With this shown, I turn to analysis of the relationships between the latent 
concepts, which are the main subject of this chapter.  
To estimate the parameters specified in Equation 4.10, I specify a multilevel fixed-
effects model, with observations nested within country-years to account for non-
independence of observations (Allison, 2009). The inclusion of country-year-level errors 
also controls for the idiosyncratic effects of those country-years, in a manner equivalent to 
a model with country-year dummy variables. All model parameters were estimated using 
maximum likelihood with standard errors which are robust to non-normality and violations 
of independence of observations (MLR), with missing values. This method does not require 
specifying a model of missing-ness, but allows the likelihood function to be constructed 
observation by observation, using whatever information is available (unless all exogenous 
variables are missing) (Allison, 2012).  
The interaction between performance and efficacy was estimated using the LMS 
method employed by the canned procedure in MPLUS (Klein & Moosbrugger, 2000; Klein 
& Muthén, 2007). This method is, owing to its direct treatment of non-normality under 
latent interaction, likely the most precise method of estimating such relationships (Kline, 
2011, pp. 346-347).  
4.4.1: LAPOP models 
Results from the estimation of the LAPOP data are presented in Table 4.4; estimates 
of the measurement model parameters were very similar to those presented earlier and are 
thus omitted here for brevity. 
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Table 4.4: Structural model results, LAPOP analysis15 
 
Before discussing specific parameter estimates, model fit must be evaluated. A 
poorly-fitting model must be rejected as a whole, or its poor fit explained and justified, 
before looking at any specific component of the model. At first glance, all models seem to 
fit poorly; none of them pass the two-index strategy discussed earlier. The GFI statistics 
for the measurement models indicated good fit, meaning that the problems presented here 
seem to stem from the structural model.  
All of these GFI statistics impose some penalty for including irrelevant parameters. 
This is due to the fact that all of these statistics improve as the number of free parameters 
increases, regardless of whether those parameters have any explanatory power. As Table 
                                                 
15 GFI statistics are not available for SEMs with latent interactions. GF statistics presented here are for 
models with interaction terms omitted. All Chi-square tests were statistically significant. 
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4.4 shows, many of the control variables are not statistically different from zero. These 
irrelevant factors are a likely source of poor model fit. To test this, I estimated new models 
with all independent variables with coefficients that were not statistically different from 
zero at the .95 level excluded. All three models pass the two-index strategy with these 
reductions. The 2012 models pass both the SRMR/RMSEA and SRMR/CFI tests; the 
2006-2012 model passes the first and nearly passes the second. This demonstrates 
conclusively that poor model fit is due to the control variables; however I continue to use 
the full models throughout, because the included variables are standard in public opinion 
research and their omission would raise concerns of omitted variable bias. Since the poor 
fit is clearly the result of parsimony penalties, rather than more serious forms of 
misspecification, I accept the models and move on to analysis of specific parameter 
estimates. 
The parameters of most interest here are the coefficients for regime support 
regressed on regime performance, RBE, and the interaction term. Both performance and 
RBE have coefficient estimates that are significantly different from zero. In all three 
models, the effect of RBE is greater than that of performance by a significant margin. The 
magnitude of the effect is quite large. Both latent predictors have fixed variances of one; 
the dependent latent factor is fixed to the scale of systemic pride, which is standardized 
(along with all other indicators) to avoid estimation problems arising from wide disparities 
in the variances of observed indicators. Thus the dependent variable also has unit variance. 
This means that a unit increase in RBE produces an increase of .35, .351 and .25 in support 
in the multi-wave, 2012 full and 2012 reduced models respectively. In other words, if one 
considers the empirically realistic scale of a standard variable to be -3 to 3, then a move 
from RBE’s realistic minimum to its realistic maximum would produce a change in support 
of 25 to 35 percent of its realistic scale. The effect of performance, while smaller, is still 
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substantively significant, ranging from .112 to .186. This provides strong evidence for the 
impact of both RBE and performance on regime support. 
However the theory developed in Chapter 3 suggests that the impact of RBE on 
support is not confined only to its direct effect, but also includes its moderation of the 
impact of performance. As the interaction term is statistically detectable, the interaction 
must be taken into account when evaluating H1. This interactive effect is presented 
graphically in Figure 4.1. The graphs show the effect magnitude of the independent 
variable named at the top of the graph, with its values arrayed along the y axis. This 
magnitude depends on the value of the other variable, arrayed along the x-axis. The red 
lines are the confidence intervals of the overall effect. The dotted blue lines represent the 
“zone of insignificance”; the range of values of the moderating variable between which the 
other variable’s effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero. 
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Figure 4.1: Interactive effects of RBE and performance on regime support, multi-wave 
model 
 
 
The coefficient estimate of the interaction term is statistically significant and, as 
expected, negative. If an individual rates one factor highly, the other ceases to matter much; 
indeed if RBE is high the effect of performance on support is essentially null. On the other 
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hand, if a respondent is highly critical on one dimension, the rating on the other becomes 
critically important for determining support. RBE, when rated very highly, can “turn off” 
the effect of performance evaluations entirely. The reverse is not true; positive evaluations 
of policy outputs can reduce the impact of RBE, but cannot entirely nullify it. As shown in 
Figure 4.1, performance must be more than five standard deviations above its mean for the 
impact of RBE to be potentially nullified (within the zone of insignificance), while the 
impact of performance is potentially zero with RBE at just under two standard deviations 
above the mean.  
This result holds regardless of sample or indicators used, although both the direct 
and moderating effects are somewhat more modest in the 2012 reduced model. However 
even at its most modest, the estimated total effect of performance decreases from .261 to 
.111 as RBE moves from its lowest point (three standard deviations below its mean) to its 
highest (three standard deviations above), cutting the effect of performance by 57.4 
percent. 
These results largely hold, even if the model is restricted to the cases of interest 
(Chile and Venezuela) individually, rather than tested with regional data. Given the very 
general psychological theory from which these relationships are derived, there is no reason 
to believe that RBE and performance would impact support differently in either of these 
countries. Nevertheless it is better to test than to assume, and so Table 4.5 presents 
estimations of the 2006 – 2012 model applied sequentially to Chile and Venezuela. 
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Table 4.5: Structural model results, Chile and Venezuela 2012 
 
Chile 
(n=6,580) 
Venezuela 
(n=27,680) 
Regime Support Est SE p-value Est SE p-value 
Regime performance .205 .027 .000 .235 .027 .000 
RBE .332 .021 .000 .288 .027 .000 
Interaction -.092 .009 .000 -.050 .005 .000 
       
Income -.005 .011 .673 .002 .009 .859 
Goods owned -.018 .011 .089 .005 .008 .521 
Education -.024 .010 .023 -.008 .008 .334 
Female .016 .016 .298 .016 .013 .214 
Age .028 .009 .001 .021 .007 .002 
Urban -.033 .026 .199 -.034 .029 .236 
Ideology .008 .009 .392 -.036 .009 .000 
Race -.028 .007 .000 .008 .008 .267 
2008 dummy -.162 .029 .000 .260 .024 .000 
2010 dummy -.146 .024 .000 .068 .019 .000 
2012 dummy -.147 .032 .000 .065 .018 .000 
These results closely match those for the regional data. In terms of the attitudinal 
structure of regime support, Chile and Venezuela seem to be quite typical of Latin America. 
4.4.2: ANES models 
As mentioned earlier, some concerns over whether the indicators used for RBE 
actually measure the concept in question remain. Specifically these questions are worded 
in such a way that they measure responsiveness as well as RBE (Kölln et al., 2013). 
Additionally the specific mention of parties in some questions raises the possibility that 
attitudes towards parties, rather than beliefs about efficacy, are driving the results. As a 
robustness check against these issues, I also analyzed ANES data using the same model 
structure as used for the LAPOP data. Results of these analyses are presented in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6: Structural model results, ANES data 
 
The results from analysis of ANES data are similar to those obtained from analysis 
of the LAPOP data. Both performance and RBE have coefficient estimates which are 
significantly different from zero, and the interaction is negative and significant in all 
models. However for these models the effect of performance is larger than that of RBE. 
This may be due to real differences in the effect size based on region, but it is likely 
attributable at least in part to the indicators for support available in the ANES data. Several, 
including questions about wasting tax dollars and whether all politicians are crooked, are 
much more utilitarian than the more neutral indicators included in the LAPOP data. An in-
depth examination of these possibilities is outside the scope of this dissertation, which 
focuses on Latin America. These data are intended to determine if the results of the LAPOP 
analysis are adversely impacted by the peculiarities of the RBE indicators in that survey; 
the fact that all three ANES models, including that which does not mention political actors 
at all, produce similar results suggests that one can have confidence in the LAPOP results 
in spite of the imperfect RBE measures. 
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4.4.3: Analysis of the determinants of RBE 
The evidence described in the preceding section strongly suggests that the 
interactive relationship between support, performance and RBE theorized in Chapter 3 is 
correct. However these analyses have little to say about what impacts average levels of 
RBE in a given country at a specific time. Theory suggests that countries with extensive 
opportunities for direct participation should have higher levels of RBE than those which 
do not (see H2 in section 4.1).16 To test this, I used the International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance’s direct democracy database, which contains data on whether a 
given country has provisions for mandatory referenda, initiatives, and provisions for 
recalling the President. To categorize countries as either having or lacking direct 
participatory opportunities, I conducted a Latent Class Analysis (LCA) of the Latin 
American countries included in the 2012 wave of the LAPOP study. Based on the presence 
or absence of combinations of these three indicators, countries were assigned to one of two 
classes: countries with extensive participatory opportunities, and countries which do not 
have many such opportunities. This categorization is presented in Table 4.7. 
  
                                                 
16 Participatory institutions such as those analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6 should not be confused 
with direct democratic institutions, which are what the IDEA dataset measures. However, both institutional 
variants provide respondents an opportunity to have a direct role in the political process, and thus positive 
results using IDEA data should at least demonstrate that my theory is sufficiently plausible to warrant 
application to the cases of interest. It would of course be better to test the influence of participatory 
institutions directly, however such data is not currently available. Conducting such analyses using soon-to-
be-available data from the Varieties of Democracy project is a major future research task for this project; 
see the conclusion for details. 
 85 
Table 4.7: List of countries with and without direct participation 
Many participatory opportunities Few participatory opportunities 
Bolivia Argentina 
Dominican Republic Brazil 
Ecuador Chile 
Guatemala Colombia 
Honduras Costa Rica 
Mexico El Salvador 
Nicaragua Panama 
Peru Paraguay 
Uruguay  
Venezuela  
Using the measurement scheme for the 2012 reduced model, I conducted an 
analysis which allowed the intercept of RBE to vary across these two groups. I then 
conducted a likelihood ratio difference test, comparing this model to one which constrained 
the mean to be equal. The difference was significant at the .05 level (p=.048). The mean 
for countries without opportunities was fixed at 0; the estimated mean of countries with 
opportunities was .11. This is by no means a definitive test of H3; however it does provide 
sufficient evidence to delve into a more rigorous test of that hypotheses through an analysis 
of the cases of interest. 
4.5: CONCLUSION 
The analyses presented here demonstrate clearly that the relationship between RBE 
and support implied by both participatory democratic theory and social psychology is 
strongly supported by available evidence. RBE is a crucial variable for explaining support, 
more so than regime performance or any of the demographic control variables. And as 
social psychology suggests, RBE is also capable of significantly reducing the importance 
of performance as a predictor of support. These results are robust to choice of indicators, 
differences in survey years, and differences in geographical domain.  
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This chapter has less to say about those factors which shape RBE. The final analysis 
suggests that participatory opportunities play some role, but the difference between 
countries which have opportunities for direct participation and those that do not is rather 
modest. Furthermore, a simple comparison of means cannot account for any number of 
potential confounding variables. However a full regression model positing institutional 
antecedents for RBE would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to specify. The sheer 
number of institutional variants which might play a role would quickly dwarf the number 
of second-level groups (fewer than 80 in even the LAPOP multi-wave model). The fact 
that many relationships would not be additive exacerbates this issue. Single-member 
districts, for example, could either enhance or inhibit RBE, depending upon the size of the 
district, the level of competition within the district, rules for internal party structure, and 
so on. 
Given this, in the following chapters I instead elect to focus on two case studies: 
Chile and Venezuela. I chose these cases because each has a disjunction between support 
and performance. I support my case that participatory opportunities are the critical factor 
in determining RBE in each country. In Venezuela, I show that participatory self-
governance is a core part of the Bolivarian regime’s strategy for winning the support of its 
population, and for developing an organizational base which it can activate to defend it 
during its not infrequent crises.  
Chile is a more difficult case, because the outcome of interest (low support despite 
strong performance) is attributable to the absence of something, rather than something that 
is present. However this analytical challenge is not insurmountable. In Chapter 6 I show 
that a lack of participatory opportunities is the root cause of Chile’s democratic malaise in 
two ways. First, I demonstrate that issues of participation are a driving factor in the lack of 
confidence in the country’s party system, using statistical analysis of data collected by the 
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Center for Public Studies (CEP). Second, I show that participatory opportunities could 
ameliorate low support in Chile, using an experimental analysis and an evaluation of a 
municipal level participatory initiative in Providencia commune.  
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Chapter 5: Participatory populism: hegemony, self-governance, and 
regime support in Bolivarian Venezuela17 
The framework developed in Chapter 3 and tested in Chapter 4 is just that: a 
framework. It provides a skeleton on which theories of support may be built; actual theories 
of support in specific cases must descend the ladder of abstraction, taking into account the 
idiosyncratic details of the cases they seek to explain. In this chapter, wherein I attempt to 
explain Venezuela’s surprisingly high levels of support under the rule of Chávez, two 
apparently contradictory features of the institutional environment stand out as potentially 
crucial. The first is the plethora of participatory programs which have been initiated by the 
Bolivarian regime, as mentioned in Chapter 3 and elaborated upon later in this chapter. 
Given the preceding discussion of the importance of participatory opportunities, and the 
sense of efficacy and control they engender, the relevance of these programs should be 
clear. Here we have a potential explanation of regime support which comports nicely with 
the analytical framework used in this thesis. 
However any argument that relies on participatory opportunities and citizen 
empowerment to explain support in Venezuela is complicated by the second institutional 
feature to which I alluded earlier. Bolivarian Venezuela is hardly the ideal participatory 
state envisioned by Rousseau, Pateman, and Barber. While participatory self-governance 
may have proliferated at the local level, national politics are another matter entirely. There, 
hegemony reigns: the concentration of power in the executive branch (and in the hands of 
the president especially), and the erosion of representative institutions and mechanisms of 
horizontal accountability are the predominant features of the chavista regime. 
                                                 
17 A version of this chapter has been published in Political Research Quarterly (Rhodes-Purdy, 
2015). 
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This contradiction of practices makes my analytical task much more challenging. 
Any incautious application of a participatory democratic framework, focusing on the 
empowerment of citizens as the primary causal variable, runs headlong into the reality of 
creeping authoritarianism at the level where the most consequential decisions are made. 
How can local level empowerment, however real, overcome the diminishment of 
representative institutions and competitive politics? The contradiction also exacerbates a 
perpetual difficulty in the analysis of other aspects of populist regimes: how can one 
reconcile their participatory tendencies with their hegemonic ambitions?  
Both of these are core features of populism, but most analysts highlight one 
characteristic as the “true” nature of populism, while discounting the other as an aberration 
or illusion. Approaches which see populism as a form of radical or participatory democracy 
emphasize the participatory nature of self-governance programs, while downplaying the 
role of the leader. Conversely theoretical frameworks which define populism as 
personalistic, unmediated leadership see the authority of the leader as the sole source of 
support for populist regimes. As a result they view participatory programs as little more 
than instruments of clientelism or other forms of social control. These one-sided 
assessments leave a number of questions unanswered: are self-governance programs 
sponsored by populist regimes truly participatory? If so, why would leaders who seek to 
centralize power in their own hands devolve power in some circumstances? And how do 
the regimes populists construct manage to maintain support, when their promises of 
empowerment seem to produce such limited mechanisms for citizens to influence politics?  
In order to answer these questions, we need a thorough analysis of how 
participatory fora function within the institutional environment of the Bolivarian system as 
a whole. Such an analysis must examine both the internal dynamics of these programs, and 
their interaction with other regime institutions and political actors. By so doing I show how 
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local participatory self-governance can dramatically enhance regime support, even amidst 
a crisis of governance and the erosion of representative democracy. 
In this chapter I challenge the assumption that populist tactics of power 
concentration and popular empowerment are theoretically irreconcilable. Instead, I chart a 
course between participatory democratic views of populism (e.g. Laclau, 2005; Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1985) and the cynical view of populism as demagoguery embraced by liberals 
(e.g. Riker, 1988). I argue that both personalistic hegemony and genuine participatory 
governance are part of a single, unified political strategy which populists use to legitimate 
their regimes.  
Participatory programs are a novel solution to an intrinsic problem of populist rule. 
I define populism as a political strategy wherein a leader wins support by promising to end 
the political exclusion of the masses. However when the time comes to make good on these 
commitments, a problem arises: any power the leaders concede to their supporters is 
necessarily lost to themselves. Populists cannot afford to diminish their own authority, 
because the diversity and weak social roots of most populist coalitions require strong 
leadership to adjudicate disputes between factions and maintain unity. The necessity of 
maintaining hegemony while empowering the masses places populists between a rock and 
a hard place. If they concede too much power, they risk fracturing the cohesion of their 
movements and thus threaten their political survival; if they concede too little, the masses 
will lose faith in their promises and the regime will lose legitimacy. I call this tension the 
populist’s dilemma.  
While all populists face this dilemma, solutions vary from case to case. However 
all solutions involve a similar balancing act: participatory access must be granted, but in a 
form which does not threaten or diminish the dominance of the populist. Participatory 
programs allow populists to meet their commitment to empowering their supporters, and 
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thus maintain legitimacy, especially among the true believers. The charismatic rhetoric of 
the populist and the actual provision of participatory opportunities are mutually 
reinforcing. Opportunities for self-governance lend verisimilitude to the populist’s claims 
to empower the people. Simultaneously, the populist’s assertion that he or she seeks to 
usher in a new kind of politics based on the restoration of sovereignty to the people imbues 
these programs with greater meaning and importance than their limited nature would 
otherwise provide.  
In addition, the organizations which sprout up or gather around these programs can 
provide much-needed support for mobilization during times of crisis. However strict limits 
are placed on these programs to ensure that they cannot challenge the populist. First, they 
are constrained to the local level; this confinement to a small scale and concrete policy 
issues ensures that they do not threaten the leader’s national predominance. In addition, 
access to these programs is preferentially provided to regime supporters, inducing them to 
remain loyal to the leader. I call this strategy for resolving the populist’s dilemma, wherein 
genuine participation at the local level serves to legitimate and reinforce hegemony at the 
national level, participatory populism. To restate in terms of the framework developed in 
Chapter 3, participatory populism provides locally-bounded participatory opportunities to 
give citizens a sense of empowerment, while reducing the role of citizens at the national 
level through the erosion of representation. However in combination with populist rhetoric 
and the intense emotional ties between the populist and his or her followers, this limited de 
facto empowerment is perceived by supporters as a significant increase in their political 
role, leading to increased legitimacy. This support manifests both in survey data and in the 
behavior of regime supporters as they mobilize to defend the populist project during times 
of threat. 
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This chapter proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I briefly discuss existing 
approaches to the study of mass organization under populist regimes, and lay out the logic 
behind the populist’s dilemma, which occurs due to the contradiction between the need to 
maintain legitimacy and the hegemonic tactics necessary to keep populist coalitions 
together. There are three competing approaches which can be used to interpret this 
dilemma: personalistic populism (personalism hereafter, for brevity), participatory 
democracy, and participatory populism. Each theory proposes distinct answers to the 
following questions: do participatory fora actually provide ordinary citizens an active role 
in making decisions which affect them? If so, are these fora independent, or is loyalty to 
the populist coalition a prerequisite for them to function? And finally, and most relevant to 
the current question, how do these programs build or reflect support for populist regimes? 
In the second section I focus on the communal councils (CCs), participatory 
community development programs which act as umbrella organizations for civil society in 
a given locality, to put these competing theories to the test. I find that in both design and 
practice these programs conform to neither participatory democracy nor personalism. The 
councils do provide genuine opportunities for participatory self-management at the local 
level thus allowing the regime to keep its promises of empowerment. But because these 
opportunities are more available to regime supporters, they also reinforce Bolivarian 
hegemony at the national level by strengthening the ties between the regime and civil 
society. These findings are drawn from public opinion data and secondary analysis of an 
extensive body of qualitative analysis on this topic, and from discussions with experts on 
the topic and my own interviews.  
The extent to which programs like the councils meet objective standards of 
participatory self-governance is an important question. However populist regimes do not 
rise and fall on academic evaluations; the perceptions of supporters and militants are what 
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truly matter. Whereas a great deal of qualitative work exists on this topic, quantitative 
analysis of the role participatory programs play in shaping public opinion, especially 
regime support, is extremely limited. Determining whether or not the participatory features 
of these programs help to legitimate populist regimes is an important question for 
adjudicating between theoretical approaches. In the third section, I use public opinion data 
collected from the 2010 and 2012 waves of the LAPOP survey to test predictions generated 
by participatory democracy, personalism, and participatory populist frameworks regarding 
the relationship between the councils and support for the Bolivarian state. The results are 
consistent only with those hypotheses derived from the participatory populist framework. 
5.1: THE POPULIST’S DILEMMA: POPULAR EMPOWERMENT AND POWER 
CONCENTRATION 
Although this chapter focuses on how participatory programs might foster support 
within a populist regime, I begin by examining competing views of why populists would 
sponsor such programs. As I will show, the theoretical approaches see distinct motivations, 
and each of these motivations have deducible implications for the relationship between 
participatory opportunities and support for populist regimes. The theoretical divide in the 
literature on participatory programs in populist regimes can be distilled into a single 
question: why would populists sponsor participatory fora? Analysts who view populism 
through a radical or participatory democratic framework (e.g. Laclau, 2005; Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1985) generally see populism as fundamentally democratic (if somewhat illiberal), 
and thus take these programs at face value. They assume that these programs embody a 
genuine commitment to popular empowerment (e.g. Ellner, 2011; Wilpert, 2005, 2011).  
Those who view populism as the domination of the masses by a single charismatic 
individual  (see De la Torre, 2010; Weyland, 2001 for examples of this view) paint a far 
less rosy picture. Any “inclusionary” measures undertaken by such regimes are seen as 
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little more than cynical attempts to divert the energies of the populace away from 
challenging the authority of the populist. Analysts who use this framework when studying 
participatory programs see them as either vehicles for clientelism (Álvarez & García-
Guadilla, 2011; García-Guadilla, 2008), ways to circumvent representative institutions 
(McCoy, 2006) or mechanisms for enforcing loyalty at the grassroots (Corrales, 2011a, 
2014). 
Neither approach can satisfactorily answer the question stated earlier; each is 
confronted with factors it cannot explain. The significant expansion of opportunities for 
participation these programs grant makes little sense within a personalistic framework, 
which views hegemony as the only goal of populist leaders. Participatory and radical 
democrats, in turn, cannot account for the dependence of these programs on the populist or 
their preferential treatment of groups which support the populist. A comprehensive 
explanation of the logic of participatory governance under populism requires a new 
analytical approach. 
5.1.1: The populist’s dilemma: hegemony and control in populist regimes 
My analytical framework begins with a definition of populism which is inspired by 
two sources. First I concur with Weyland (2001) that populism is best understood as a 
political strategy which leaders use to gain popular support. However while Weyland 
emphasizes the unmediated, disorganized aspects of populist rule, I focus instead on the 
tendency of these leaders to divide society into two camps: the wholly good people, and an 
evil elite which has usurped the people’s rightful sovereignty (Canovan, 1999; Hawkins, 
2010). The core feature of the populist worldview is the belief that society is composed of 
haves and have-nots, and what is either possessed or lacked is access to political power 
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(Laclau, 1977, 2005). In other words, access to the political system creates a fundamental 
cleavage which shapes social conflict as much as race or class.  
Thus I define populism as a political strategy wherein a leader propagates a populist 
worldview, courting the masses by promising to end their political exclusion. Latin 
America’s stark inequalities and incomplete democratization have made this an attractive 
strategy throughout the region’s history. However the equally recurring instability of these 
movements demonstrates the inherent tension that exists when ambitious leaders promise 
to empower neglected segments of society to win power for themselves. By bringing 
previously excluded citizens into the political system, these leaders are able to gain power 
which would otherwise be unattainable. Once in power, they need the active support of 
their popular bases to survive elite counterattacks (Roberts, 2006). Without a mobilized 
base, Juan Perón would have likely languished in prison in 1945 (De la Torre, 2010, p. 24; 
James, 1988, pp. 185-186) and Chávez would not have regained the presidency after being 
overthrown in 2002 (Hawkins & Hansen, 2006, p. 102).  
However this dependence on the masses can weaken the authority of the populist, 
and thus threaten his or her political survival. Increasing access to the state can raise 
expectations of more substantive empowerment, which can quickly spiral out of the 
populist’s control. Radical movements often rise to challenge the limitations of 
incorporation within a populist coalition and to demand more autonomy for their favored 
constituencies (James, 1988, pp. 10-11; Spalding, 1977, pp. 187-191). Even if populists 
were inclined to grant these demands, the diversity of populist movements would preclude 
such largesse. Unified only by prior exclusion, populist coalitions tend to be exceptionally 
diverse, aggregating many groups with conflicting interests. Lacking institutionalized 
methods of conflict management, only the personal authority of the populist can settle 
disputes (Spalding, 1977). Just as the populist depends on the people, “the people” in turn 
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depend on the personal authority and charisma of the populist to prevent the dissolution of 
the movement into internecine struggle. In sum, populists must balance two contradictory 
requirements: the need to empower their base on one hand, and the need to maintain control 
of that base on the other. I refer to this tension as the populist’s dilemma. This dilemma 
flows directly from the contradictory imperatives of ending political exclusion while 
maintaining the hegemony of a single individual.  
5.1.2: Solutions to the populist’s dilemma: functional incorporation and 
participatory populism 
While this dilemma plagues populism generally, solutions to it vary from case to 
case, depending upon the structure of exclusion to which each populist reacts. Although 
this paper focuses on contemporary populists, a brief discussion of the dilemma and its 
solutions under classical populists18 shows the general relevance of the populist’s dilemma 
and provides a useful baseline for comparison.  
Contemporary populists must craft new strategies for escaping the populist’s 
dilemma because the structure of exclusion is fundamentally different from that faced by 
classical populists in two primary ways. First, the political exclusion to which classical 
populists reacted was far more severe. The classical populists generally predated the 
incorporation of poorer citizens into the formal political system (Germani, 1978, p. 102). 
Activism outside of the formal political system (such as labor organization, unionization, 
and strikes) was frequently met with brutal repression (James, 1988, p. 171). In this context, 
even modest expansions of participatory opportunities could be powerful. Second, the era 
of classical populism coincided with the ascendance of an organized working class, which 
provided both opportunities and risks for leaders who could gain control over the nascent 
labor movement.  
                                                 
18
 This group includes Perón in Argentina, Vargas and Goulart in Brazil, and Cárdenas in Mexico. 
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Reacting to these two factors, Perón (Germani, 1978; James, 1988), Vargas 
(Spalding, 1977), and Cárdenas (Middlebrook, 1995) resolved their dilemmas by granting 
the working class access to the political system through state-approved unions, reversing 
the repression and neglect that had characterized earlier periods, while creating new forms 
of control. Unionization expanded, labor demands regarding wages and working conditions 
were taken seriously (if not always met), union members were elected to legislatures, and 
relations between labor and the state became relatively cordial (James, 1988, p. 25). But 
these populists also marginalized more radical, autonomous labor leaders, and used state 
control over union funding and legal recognition to ensure the labor movement remained 
subordinate to populist authority. While the level of empowerment under classical 
populists like Perón is a controversial topic, especially considering their imposition of new 
forms of control, these regimes represented a clear expansion of the political role of 
ordinary citizens. 
While functional or corporatist incorporation worked for the classical populists, it 
is far less viable in present-day Latin America. Contemporary populists react not to 
competitive oligarchy but to the shortcomings of liberal representative democracy. They 
must make their appeals to a populace which has had formal political rights for decades, 
and where social groups (such as organized labor) have often been incorporated through 
previous populist movements or political parties.  In this context, previously utilized 
populist tactics are unlikely to be viewed as genuinely empowering, and massive, nation-
wide social organizations are largely unavailable.19 Instead contemporary populists must 
rely on one of the most difficult sectors of Latin American society to organize: the urban 
popular sector, i.e. those involved in the informal economy. And they must make their 
                                                 
19 Bolivia, with its large and powerful indigenous movement, is a partial exception. 
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appeals in an environment where corporatist and liberal democratic inclusionary 
mechanisms have been tried and found wanting.  
In short, modern populists cannot incorporate citizens along functional or 
corporatist lines; they must find novel forms of empowerment in order to give their appeals 
credibility. In this context, local-level participatory governance is an attractive alternative 
solution to the populist’s dilemma. Participatory governance grants citizens not merely a 
voice in politics, but the ability to make some decisions directly. Yet these programs are 
inherently limited in scope to small communities due to the difficulty of enacting macro-
level participatory governance. As a result their policy domain is confined mostly to basic-
needs issues and community development.  
In other words, modern populists can legitimate their claims of empowerment by 
granting opportunities for direct citizen participation in policymaking, but the policy 
domain which those opportunities cover is far more constrained; participatory fora do not 
touch highly contentious national issues. And these new forms of participation are subject 
to many of the same controls as were labor unions under classical populists. As I show 
later, access to participatory opportunities is granted preferentially to regime supporters, 
and the organizations which coalesce around these programs are expected to mobilize to 
defend the regime during periods of crisis.  
The preceding discussion suggests that populists likely do offer genuine 
participatory opportunities, at least at the local level, but these opportunities are not granted 
out of altruism or any ideological commitment to participatory democracy. Instead they are 
a strategic concession, made by populists in order to ensure their survival and maintain 
their authority at the national level. These programs allow populists to devolve power, thus 
meeting their commitments to empowerment and preserving the legitimacy of their 
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regimes. I call this strategy, where local level participatory governance is provided to 
legitimate national level populist hegemony, participatory populism.   
Summary 
We now have three frameworks through which to analyze participatory programs 
in populist regimes, and how such programs affect citizen support for those regimes: 
personalism, participatory democracy and participatory populism. All three theories 
propose answers to the three questions raised in the introduction, as summarized in Table 
5.1. 
Table 5.1: Theoretical predictions 
 Theory/Approach 
Question 
Personalism 
Participatory 
Democracy 
Participatory 
Populism 
1. Do populist regimes grant genuine 
participatory opportunities? 
No Yes Yes 
2. Are those opportunities a crucial source 
of regime support? 
No Yes Yes 
3. Are those opportunities granted in a 
way that develops autonomous civil 
society? 
No Yes No 
Personalism emphasizes the unmediated connection of the masses and the leader as 
the primary source of support for populist regimes, and would thus no to all questions. 
Participatory democracy, which emphasizes bottom-up empowerment, would give the 
opposite answers. Participatory populism agrees with participatory democracy on the first 
two, and personalism on the last. These predictions (which I specify in the second and third 
sections) can be tested with quantitative and qualitative data to determine which most 
closely conforms to those data. From this point forward, I focus on Venezuela under 
Chávez, certainly the most prominent and influential instance of populism in contemporary 
Latin America. 
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5.1.3: Participatory populism and the Bolivarian revolution 
A brief review of the history of Chávez’s rise to power and the ideology of his 
movement shows close adherence to participatory populism. The Bolivarian movement 
originated within the Venezuelan military as a reaction to the perceived corruption of the 
democratic state, and its inability to meet the challenges that arose during the economic 
crises of the early 1980s. The political system of this era (called the Punto Fijo system) 
was formally democratic, but its claim to legitimacy was based more on the regularity of 
competitive elections and the distribution of oil rents than on any true adherence to popular 
sovereignty (Hellinger, 2003). Authority was tightly held by a small number of elites within 
the system’s dominant parties (Coppedge, 1994), and the mass bases of the parties had a 
largely subordinate role that did little to genuinely empower average citizens (Ellner, 
2003a, 2003b).  
With the arrival of the debt crisis of the early 1980s and subsequent fluctuations in 
the price of oil, this system of rent distribution became unsustainable and eventually 
imploded. However the breakdown of representative democracy in Venezuela can be only 
partly attributed to the recurrent economic crises that rocked the country from 1983 through 
the 1990s. The inability of the political system to absorb new demands generated by these 
crises destroyed the legitimacy of representative institutions, leading to massive social 
unrest (López Maya, 1999) and the eventual collapse of the party system. The behavior of 
various leaders further contributed to the loss of faith in the ability of puntofijismo to 
enforce popular sovereignty. The lack of accountability and responsiveness was perhaps 
most clearly embodied when Carlos Andrés Pérez, a member of the center-left and statist 
AD, implemented a program of neoliberal structural adjustment shortly after running 
against such programs during the election of 1988 (López Maya, 1999, pp. 212-214). This 
about-face was only the latest in a long line of perceived slights by Punto Fijo elites against 
 101 
popular opinion. It also signaled the beginning of the system’s end; Pérez was the last 
President from either of the two parties that had dominated Venezuelan politics for over 40 
years. Ten years later, both AD and COPEI were forced to give up any ambitions of 
regaining power with their own candidates, throwing their support to an outsider, Henrique 
Salas Römer.  
Hugo Chávez, who achieved political fame (or infamy, depending on one’s point 
of view) as the leader of a failed coup, was Römer‘s challenger in the 1998 presidential 
elections. Both candidates attempted to mobilize voters around the banner of anti-elite 
resentment, with both running on anti-party platforms. Chávez’s victory and rise to power 
can be attributed to two strategic sources: unwavering opposition to all elements of the 
partyarchy of the Punto Fijo era (Molina, 2006, p. 170) and the unification of excluded 
sectors under a single political banner (Myers, 2006, p. 13). In particular, his insistence on 
consigning not only the parties, but also the constitution which supported their dominance, 
to the dust bin of history, in favor of a new system based upon principles of “participatory, 
protagonist democracy”, aided his victory. Chávez’s militant insistence on a new 
institutional framework resonated with an electorate which had become disillusioned by 
the inability of representative politics to bind elite decisions to the will of the people. 
Empowerment of the excluded is perhaps the central source of legitimacy for the Chávez 
regime; promises of political inclusion had to be fulfilled in order for the movement to 
survive. Once in power, the newly ascendant Bolivarians found, as have many politicians 
throughout history, that promises are far easier to make than to keep.  
Chavistas, like many populists, viewed the political exclusion around which they 
coalesce not as a problem to be resolved through politics as usual, but as the result of the 
wicked design of an implacable elite foe determined to deprive the people of their rightful 
sovereignty. In other words, populists tend to adopt a Manichean view of political 
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competition (Hawkins, 2010), where all members of society are either part of “the people”, 
or the evil elite, with nothing in between. To the Bolivarians, steeped in resentment towards 
every aspect of the old regime, the “elite” included all those actors who had any significant 
role in the Punto Fijo party system. The “elite” or “oligarchy” so defined included not only 
the leaders of AD and COPEI, but also their largely subordinate social organizations, such 
as the national labor confederation. Destruction of la oligarquía and continuous struggle 
to prevent its return is seen as a necessary precondition for ending the exclusion of the 
masses. This theme is apparent in chavista rhetoric which emphasizes movement unity and 
solidarity above all other concerns, lest the old elite take advantage of intra-factional 
conflict (Yepes, 2006, p. 251).   
Concerns over infighting were more than justified. The Bolivarian coalition has 
included a wide variety of groups and social sectors. By basing his electoral appeal on 
resentment towards the crumbling party system, Chávez drew significant amounts of 
support at different times from the urban poor, intellectuals, the military, social 
movements, and even the private sector (McCoy & Myers 2006, ch. 2-5). Clearly, these 
groups have many contradictory interests and historical antagonisms, but they unified 
around the promise to end their political marginalization. The cracks in this coalition 
became apparent shortly after Chávez took power. Populist movements are, in a sense, 
inherently self-defeating: victory destroys their primary point of grievance. The leftward 
tilt of Chávez’s actual political platform immediately drove away those in the business 
sector and a substantial portion of the middle class that had initially supported the MVR 
movement (Corrales, 2011b, p. 75).  
Latent conflicts were further exacerbated by the heavy-handed tactics seen as 
necessary for uprooting remaining traces of the ancien régime. Whatever the attitudes of 
Bolivarian elites, grassroots chavistas tend to be fully committed to the principle of a direct 
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political role for the masses  (Hawkins & Hansen, 2006; Ramírez, 2005). The tactics 
required by the drive to destroy all vestiges of the old system further eroded support for 
Chávez among those sectors who had been coopted under Punto Fijo and for whom 
emancipation from party dominance was an especially potent draw. Nowhere was this 
clearer than in the 2002 coup that briefly deposed Chávez, and the subsequent general strike 
of 2002-2003 and recall referendum of 2004. The protests that led to Chávez’s short-term 
ouster and the effort to hoist Chávez on his own constitutional petard by recalling him from 
office were both led by a worker-business coalition; this odd political union was forged by 
an attempted takeover of the national worker confederation through a reform of the national 
labor law and the firing of upper executives of the state oil company (Ellner, 2003b, pp. 
170-173). The coalition was joined by those sections of civil society that were dissatisfied 
with chavista policy towards autonomous social movements (García-Guadilla, 2003, p. 
181). A number of prominent intellectuals who had supported Chávez mostly out of 
antipathy towards the old oligarchy also parted company as the hegemonic tendencies of 
the regime became more apparent (Hillman, 2006).  
Although the Bolivarian movement survived all this turmoil, it did not do so 
unscathed. Support for Chávez had cratered, leading to significant defections of both 
prominent elites and large swathes of the movement’s popular base. Participatory 
protagonist democracy was difficult to reconcile with the movement’s heavy-handed 
attempts to dominate independent civil society. When a movement which promises 
empowerment shows more interest in establishing hegemony over every aspect of society 
than in actually providing a meaningful political role for its core constituency, the result is 
inevitable: a major crisis of legitimacy is a foregone conclusion. Survey data from the 
period confirms this: regime legitimacy, measured by satisfaction with the way democracy 
works, reached its lowest ebb in 2004 (Latinobarómetro, 1998-2008). 
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To summarize, the Bolivarian movement’s commitment to expanding the political 
role of its constituents exists in constant tension with its perceptions of its insecurity. The 
movement’s military origins shape this dynamic: supporters are seen as soldiers who must 
do their duty to protect the movement from omnipresent threats, and the struggle against 
the enemies of the people must take precedence over proactive inclusion of the masses. 
Meeting commitments of popular empowerment in this context is extremely tricky. 
Traditional institutions, such as political parties and elections, are unattractive mechanisms 
because they are marred by their association with the old regime. The situation is further 
complicated by the need for movement unity: any devolution of political power must be 
done in such a way that it does not ignite latent conflicts. This dilemma was particularly 
acute in the specific case of Bolivarian Venezuela, where the revolution had already 
strained the ties that bound its coalition nearly to (and for some groups far past) the 
breaking point in its war with la oligarquía. And yet, it should be reemphasized, 
empowerment was not optional: the legitimacy of the Bolivarian regime, already tarnished 
by intense conflict and repeated power grabs, rested on it. In short, chavismo contained 
mutually contradictory drives that created what could be termed a populist’s dilemma: the 
need to devolve power to maintain legitimacy, which coexists with the need to centralize 
power in order to eliminate the remnants of the old regime and maintain movement 
cohesion. 
Overcoming the populist’s dilemma 
The antecedents to the communal councils, in place as early as 2000, demonstrated 
a potential escape from this dilemma. As it waged its campaigns against the perceived 
enemies of the revolution at the national level, the Bolivarian movement was 
experimenting with a number of local level organizations aimed at deepening ties with its 
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popular base through the provision of participatory self-management. One of the earliest 
and most important of these were the Bolivarian Circles, which were formed in small cells 
of up to 11 individuals sworn to defend the Bolivarian Constitution and its principles, as 
well as serve their communities (Hawkins & Hansen, 2006, pp. 102-103). In 2002, Chávez 
issued a decree (in response to an earlier opposition demand for land titles for barrio 
residents) to form Urban Land Committees (CTUs) in groups of 100-200 families in the 
vast barrios of the country’s cities, where (as in most large Latin American cities) self-help 
housing is the rule and many residents lack any legal rights to their property (Holland, 
2006). The CTUs were organized as self-managed organizations responsible for drawing 
up maps of their communities to be submitted to the government, at which time individual 
families would be granted titles to their land. The CTUs also had broad discretion to address 
issues of community identity, strategies for improvement, and other community issues 
(García-Guadilla, 2011, p. 104). Other organizations, such as rural equivalents of the 
CTUs, Water Roundtables, and legally recognized cooperative associations were also 
established during Chávez’s first term (López Maya & Lander, 2011). 
The potential of these organizations to reinforce the faltering Bolivarian movement 
became apparent during the response to the 2002 coup and the recall election of 2004. The 
Bolivarian Circles played a key role in organizing the protests that returned Chávez to 
power after his brief removal (Hawkins & Hansen, 2006, p. 102). The Circles, CTUs and 
other organizations were extremely effective in mobilizing support for Chávez during the 
recall elections (García-Guadilla, 2011, pp. 94-98). These institutions proved capable of 
organizing large numbers of citizens from the popular groups which the movement relied 
upon for support, even when the Bolivarian elite was in total disarray, as it was during the 
coup. That these organizations could be re-directed towards defense of the revolution at 
times of extreme threat was no less important: as will be shown later, citizens involved in 
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these organizations who might otherwise have preferred to maintain a focus on community 
issues felt compelled, either by a sense of duty or direct pressure from chavista elites, to 
do their part in defending the revolution in a time of peril. 
Throughout the tumultuous period between the passage of the Bolivarian 
constitution and the movement’s multiple existential crises through 2004, the drive to 
expand participation was undeniable, but was almost entirely reserved for the community 
level. This was no accident: devolution of power to local-level self-management 
organizations was a uniquely attractive tactic because it avoided many of the inherent risks 
that populist movements face when devolving power to their bases. Participatory 
organizations would concern themselves primarily with basic issues of community 
development, decided among groups of individuals with common social status and 
backgrounds. This left thorny policy questions that might cross the social cleavage lines 
that constantly threaten to become active fault lines within the chavista coalition in the 
hands of Chávez himself, relying on his personal charisma to settle disputes and adjudicate 
conflicts in a controlled manner. However the patchwork of multiple programs, often with 
overlapping mandates and goals, prevented them from fulfilling their full potential, both 
for deepening local democracy and defending the national movement.  
Clearly local participatory fora, especially in a state with access to extensive funds 
from petroleum sales, represent an attractive way out of the populist’s dilemma. Whether 
or not the communal councils actually fulfill this role is an empirical question that must be 
investigated. In the following section, I use qualitative and public opinion data to determine 
whether or not the councils are truly participatory, and if so, whether that participation is 
truly democratic.  
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5.2: LEGITIMATING POPULISM: PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE AND REGIME SUPPORT 
Before investigating the councils’ practices, a clear standard for evaluating their 
participatory bona fides must be put forward, and potential violations of that standard 
posited. Participation is an extremely broad term that can include anything from signing a 
petition to running for office, depending on how the concept is defined. Many populist 
movements involve a substantial degree of mobilization, although this often takes the form 
of predominantly symbolic activities (such as rally attendance). This is a critically 
important distinction for the theory presented herein, as I will argue that the communal 
councils provide much more genuine participatory opportunities than those provided by 
classical populists. Given the importance of genuine participatory access to my argument, 
a stricter standard is necessary here, one wherein the political action of common citizens 
has a meaningful and relatively direct effect on governance. I borrow a concept from 
participatory economics to serve as this standard: the concept of self-management, which 
requires that decisions be made by those who are governed by those decisions (Albert & 
Hanhel, 1991). This concept overlaps a great deal with the top three rungs of Sherry 
Armstein’s “ladder of participation, especially “delegation of power” (1969, pp. 219-223). 
Applying this to the CCs specifically, decisions regarding policies and projects must be 
made by the assembly of citizens (wherein the citizenry as a whole has final authority), 
without undue interference from outside actors. Potential violations of this standard include 
higher-level government organizations dictating policy to the councils (which would then 
be reduced to little more than a rubber stamp), or the hijacking of council governance by 
their administrative personnel. 
The legal framework that establishes the council is clear: the assembly of citizens 
in the council is the “highest instance of deliberation and decision making for the exercise 
of community power.” Decisions in this body must be made by majority vote of at least 
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twenty percent of community members to have legal force ("Ley orgánica de los consejos 
comunales," 2009, art. 20-22). The councils determine community development priorities, 
and may implement projects based on those priorities using resources transferred from 
municipal or regional governments, or from funds (such as Fundacomunal) managed by 
the central government. Often projects involve working with other Bolivarian 
organizations, such as the social mission for housing or the chavista union for construction 
workers, especially for major projects such as housing construction (Caripa, 2012). Types 
of projects include housing, organizing sports teams, developing basic infrastructure such 
as electricity and water.  
The rules of procedure set out by law, supported by evidence from survey data, are 
sufficient to dismiss concerns that voceros may exercise undue dominance in their councils. 
As José Machado of Centro Gumilla, a Jesuit-aligned research institute in Venezuela, 
points out, voceros are subject to recall at any point; those who usurp the assembly’s 
authority can be easily dismissed (Machado, 2009, p. 17). An analysis which relied on 
extensive interviews with council leaders found that the election of voceros was not a 
significant problem (Triviño Salazar, 2013). Concerns over hijacking of the councils by 
their administrative personnel seem unfounded. The importance of funding from the central 
government is a more serious potential violation and thus requires closer analysis. 
Although funds for council projects can, by law, come from a number of sources 
(including municipal and regional governments), in practice most of the funds for projects 
come from the national government, especially in poor communities where municipalities 
lack resources (Briceño, 2012; Liendro, 2012a). This dependence on external funding 
raises the question of whether the funding decisions of the central government reflect stated 
community priorities or unilateral impositions. If national elites ignore or pre-shape the 
will of the community, participation cannot be considered genuine. Deepening this 
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concern, the ministries often submit project proposals to the councils. For example, two 
voceros whom I interviewed mentioned that their councils were currently working on 
projects proposed by the central government (Liendro, 2012b; Ripley, 2012). 
Although these objections are serious, neither proves common enough to abrogate 
the authority of the councils to make decisions. Both the voceros who mentioned 
government-proposed projects (one of whom is an opposition supporter) denied that there 
was any undue pressure to accept the government proposals, although councils usually do 
accept government proposals because they tend to be easier to implement. Relations 
between the councils and the central government were not always cordial, often due to 
conflict with the ministries over funding delays and a lack of transparency. Nevertheless a 
survey of 1,000 council members collected by Centro Gumilla (Machado, 2009, p. 29) 
indicate that 71 percent of respondents felt that the community as a whole consented to all 
council projects in their community; only seven percent felt that “official entities” (i.e. the 
central government) had the last word in council decisions. The ministries may not be 
entirely responsive to the stated priorities of the communities, but deliberate violations 
seem to be the exception rather than the rule. This undermines the suggestion that the 
existence of government proposals represents a violation of participation. In the normal 
course of things, the assemblies appear to work largely as intended, at least in the planning 
phase: they set community priorities, and create proposals for development projects based 
on participatory decision-making. 
The design of the councils in law clearly establishes them as participatory 
organizations, and no compelling evidence exists in either qualitative or public opinion 
data that the state or political actors intervene in the councils’ business in a manner 
sufficiently systematic to represent a violation of participatory norms. This is not to say 
that the councils function exactly as designed. Like everything else in Venezuela, serious 
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problems of corruption, inefficiency and outright incompetence create all manner of 
problems for the day to day functioning of the councils. Whether or not the participatory 
opportunities provided by the councils are also democratic is another question entirely. 
5.2.1: Who are “the people?” Participation and democracy in the communal 
councils  
While the councils are clearly participatory, this does not address the question of 
whether or not they deepen democracy, as adherents of participatory democracy would 
expect (Burbach & Piñeiro, 2007; Wilpert, 2005, 2011). To investigate this, following Dahl 
(1971) and Schedler (2002), I focus on the importance of universality to democracy: that 
is, the requirement that whatever political rights they grant be available to all citizens, both 
in law and in practice, and that citizenship be fairly universal. The qualities of political 
rights and privileges are an entirely separate matter from the breadth of those rights; 
citizenship can provide extensive access to political power while being denied to 
substantial portions of the population.   
Such restrictions would be quite in keeping with the Bolivarian worldview of its 
opponents as would-be usurpers of the legitimate sovereignty of the people, but contrary 
to the predictions of participatory democracy, which sees participatory self-governance as 
a mechanism for the development of the an autonomous and politically effective civil 
society (Biaocchi, 2001). In short, if it can be shown that access to participatory 
opportunities (no matter how genuine) is granted preferentially to regime supporters, it 
would provide evidence against the applicability of participatory democracy and in favor 
of participatory populism. 
As mentioned before, the dependence of the councils on state funding raises the 
real possibility of deliberate politicization, wherein government allies may be given unfair 
access to resources. This dependence ties the effectiveness of councils to the central 
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government, reinforcing delegative tendencies of the political system (Lovera, 2008). With 
few safeguards for ensuring that funding decisions are apolitical, serious potential for abuse 
exists (Álvarez & García-Guadilla, 2011, p. 177). There is further cause for concern 
because not all projects are funded, although ministry personnel involved in funding 
decisions claim that sufficient resources are available to fund major priorities for all 
councils (Araujo, 2012). Centro Gumilla found that only 57 percent of councils had their 
projects funded, and of those 47 percent experienced significant delays in funding 
(Machado, 2008, pp. 37-38). Centro Gumilla further found that a plurality of individuals 
dissatisfied with their council cite the fact that the councils do not function at all, and this 
tendency is especially marked among opposition councils (Machado, 2009, p. 16). These 
findings concur with studies of other chavista programs, such as the social missions 
(Hawkins, 2010; Hawkins et al., 2011). Nor is deliberate, top-down bias the most important 
source of exclusion from the communal councils. 
While direct and intentional violations of democratic norms are difficult to 
conclusively show given available data, there is considerable evidence for another form of 
discrimination, more nebulous but nonetheless crucial.  This violation of universality 
follows directly from the Bolivarian worldview, wherein political power is the sole right 
of “the people”, membership in which is synonymous with membership in the movement 
and support of its revolution. This close identification of political access and movement 
loyalty was written into law in 2009, wherein the purpose of the councils was rewritten to 
include “the construction of a…socialist society” (art. 2). The inclusion of the term 
“socialist”, which occurs throughout the document, might seem relatively innocuous, but 
in the Venezuelan context wherein the term has become a rallying cry for the Bolivarian 
movement, it sends a clear message: the councils and other participatory forums do not 
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represent universal democratic rights, but are tightly intertwined with the struggle against 
those whom the Bolivarians view as enemies of the people.  
This association between the councils and chavismo has become so close that in 
some circumstances the distinction disappears entirely (Handlin, 2012). One professor, 
trying to get a list of council participants in a given municipality was directed by the 
mayor’s office to another location where the list was available; the location turned out to 
be local headquarters for PSUV (García-Guadilla, 2013). Occasionally the lack of 
distinction between these programs and their political creators leads lower level 
functionaries to engage in demonstrably undemocratic activity. An employee in the 
complaints department of Fundacomunal reported, shortly after the new organic law for 
the councils was enacted (which required all councils to re-register and demonstrate their 
compliance with the new laws) that a local official was refusing to certify the founding 
documents of councils whose voceros were not PSUV members (Bowman, 2013). 
This partiality manifests itself not so much in what the state provides but in what it 
fails to provide: political education and organizational support for citizens, many of whom 
are new to political participation of any kind, much less direct deliberative participation. 
One ministry employee cited the lack of organization as the reason why opposition councils 
have trouble gaining funding; these councils often submit dozens of contradictory, 
underdeveloped proposals that require months of revision with ministry technical teams to 
become ready for action. Chavista councils, by contrast, tend to be high functioning, 
submitting proposals that demonstrate feasibility of the work proposed and have clear 
priorities already in place when they arrive at the ministries (Araujo, 2012).  
The reason that chavista councils are so much better organized is not entirely clear. 
Within the councils, the result is that many citizens who would prefer to focus on 
community priorities exclusively feel compelled to take a more active role in chavista 
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politics in order to get the support their councils need. Many voceros reported feeling 
compelled to join PSUV in order to “be heard” (Álvarez & García-Guadilla, 2011, pp. 199-
200; García-Guadilla, 2008, p. 139). Even if there is no deliberate discrimination at the 
ministerial level, the crippling inefficiency of the central government means that a strong 
connection within the PSUV is a considerable advantage in getting through administrative 
bottlenecks.  
This would mirror the experience of other participatory programs, where active 
work in chavista campaigns is expected of participants in government-sponsored 
participatory programs, especially when the revolution was seen as facing an existential 
threat (García-Guadilla, 2011). In times of great need, the Bolivarian elite has on occasion 
thrown out all pretense of impartiality and demanded that the councils fulfill their “duties” 
to the movement. In 2009, the Minister of Participation directly ordered the councils to 
campaign for the chavista side in the constitutional referendum (López Maya & Panzarelli, 
2013, p. 257).  
To summarize, discrimination against opposition councils is likely a mixture of 
direction from upper leadership, sporadic acts by individual chavistas, and reflexive 
adherence to a populist view of opponents as enemies. Whatever the relative proportions 
of each, the councils clearly fail to encourage the kind of autonomous civil society that 
participatory democracy would envision. Instead the councils are an instance of what one 
author who conducted extensive interviews with council participants called “conditioned 
participation” (Triviño Salazar, 2013). Self-governance in local matters is a real aspect of 
the councils, but it is granted in such a way that it encourages movement unity and allows 
the councils to be turned towards defense of the regime when the need arises. This finding 
is consistent with whate other researchers have found when studying other Bolivarian 
social organizations (Hawkins, 2010; Hawkins & Hansen, 2006) 
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It should be re-emphasized that this does not cast any doubt on the reality of 
participatory governance within the councils; discrimination can be thought of as 
unacceptable restrictions on democratic citizenship, which is an entirely separate issue 
from the content of rights conferred by that citizenship upon those who possess it. This 
distinction is important, because it further supports the view of Bolivarianism as an 
instance of participatory populism. Partiality in the provision of access to functioning 
councils is clear, but that partiality does not extend to the principles of participatory 
decision-making within the councils. This combination fits poorly within a framework 
influenced by personalism or participatory democracy, but is entirely consistent within a 
worldview that sees direct participation, and the empowerment it brings, as essential 
political rights, but which reserves political rights for those who prove themselves worthy 
through support of the struggle against an oligarchical class constantly scheming to usurp 
the authority of the people. 
5.3: COUNCIL PARTICIPATION AND REGIME SUPPORT: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Although the level of entanglement of the state and the councils shown through 
qualitative analysis casts immediate doubt on participatory democracy as an appropriate 
framework, such analyses cannot adjudicate between the two varieties of populism so 
conclusively. The mere existence of participatory programs does not favor one form of 
populism over the other: rather the disagreement between the two rests on their role in 
building popular support for the Bolivarian system. Quantitative analysis of public opinion 
data has the potential to reinforce the qualitative findings by addressing this. Personalism 
suggests that support for the populist is the primary determinant of regime support. 
Participatory populism, on the other hand, predicts that the populists’ dilemma is resolved 
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via the councils (and other programs like them), by fulfilling the movement’s promises of 
empowerment and inclusion.  
The preceding statements can be refined into hypotheses which can be tested with 
survey data. Personalism suggests two hypotheses: 
 
 H1a: Support for Chávez should have a positive effect on regime support, all 
other things being equal. 
 H1b: Any association between council participation and support for Chávez and 
his regime should consist of a strong positive impact of regime support and 
support for Chávez on council participation. 
Participatory populism suggests two hypotheses, both of which require a bit more 
explanation. Recall that the populist’s dilemma is resolved through a trade-off: national 
hegemony of the populist for local self-governance. This satisfies the promises of 
empowerment upon which Chávez staked his movement’s legitimacy. While this 
proposition is not directly testable, it does imply two subsidiary hypotheses which are. 
First, because the effect of the councils is dependent upon the satisfaction of a desire for 
participatory access, it suggests that the effect of council participation is not constant, but 
rather will be much stronger among those who have strong participatory preferences. 
Conversely, if personalism is correct and the “participatory” nature of the councils is 
illusory, then one would expect citizens with strong participatory preferences to become 
disillusioned and withdraw support. This hypothesis can be refined as: 
 
 H2: The effect of council participation varies with the respondent’s preference for 
participatory modes of governance. The effect should be highly positive only 
among those with strong participatory preferences. 
In other words, a significantly positive interaction term supports participatory 
populism; a null or (especially) a negative one would provide strong evidence against it. 
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Finally, while the satisfaction of the regime’s promises suggests a direct effect of council 
participation, the importance of empowerment described earlier also suggests an indirect 
effect. The councils should have an additional impact on regime support through their 
impact on a respondent’s sense of their ability to influence the political sphere. This 
hypothesis can be refined as: 
 
 H3: Council participation should have a strong positive impact on external 
political efficacy. External efficacy should in turn have a significant impact on 
regime support. 
This hypothesis is the most direct application of the framework developed in 
Chapter 3; it is therefore appropriate that it shares a label (H3) with the corresponding 
hypothesis specified in Chapter 4. Participatory institutions are hypothesized to impact 
RBE, which in turn effects support. H1a is consistent with both frameworks, but H1b 
cannot be true if either H2 or H3 is true. A chart of these relationships is presented in Figure 
5.1. 
Figure 5.1: Relationship chart 
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H3 can be further modified based on relationships theoretically predicted by the 
populist context in which participatory governance programs operate, allowing us to 
further discriminate between the two participatory explanations of support in the Bolivarian 
regime. Specifically, participatory populism predicts that the impact of council 
participation on RBE will not be constant across all individuals for two reasons. First, 
qualitative analysis suggests that these programs (and the support necessary for them to 
function effectively) are not equally available to all; regime supporters have far greater 
access. Second, Chávez’s participatory rhetoric, and his supporters’ fervent belief in that 
rhetoric, likely inflates the perceived importance of these programs, as they are not merely 
mechanisms for participatory local governance but part of a broader attempt to restore the 
people to their rightful sovereignty. This leads to the following corollary to H3: 
 
 H3a: The effect of council participation on RBE will be significantly stronger 
among chavistas than among opposition supporters. 
5.3.1: Data 
 To test these hypotheses, I use data from the 2010 and 2012 waves of the LAPOP 
survey in Venezuela. LAPOP is one of the most frequently used and highly respected 
regional public opinion survey projects. Each wave includes roughly 1,500 respondents per 
country. Sampling is conducted using subnational clusters to ensure a representative 
sample is obtained; details can be obtained from LAPOP’s website 
(www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2012/AB-2012-Tech-Info-12.18.12.pdf).  
Dependent variable: regime support 
Regime support is difficult to measure; questions of whether any one indicator of 
the concept has the necessary validity to produce reliable conclusions militate against a 
single-variable approach. I use three questions to measure regime support: respect for 
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political institutions (b2), pride in the political system (b4) and systemic support (b6). 
These indicators are recommended as measures of regime support by the creators of the 
LAPOP survey who have also demonstrated their validity as indicators of the concept 
(Booth & Seligson, 2009). Results from the measurement portion of the model indicate 
that these indicators are appropriate measures of the latent concept; the results are presented 
in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2: Measurement model estimation results 
Loadings for regime support Est. SE P-value 
Pride in political system (b2) 1.000 - - 
Respect for institutions (b4) .717 .021 .000 
Systemic support (b6) .938 .020 .000 
    
Error Variance Est. SE P-value 
Pride in political system (b2) .277 .012 .000 
Respect for institutions (b4) .627 .018 .000 
Systemic support (b6) .358 .013 .000 
External efficacy is measured using a seven-point question about perceived interest 
of political actors in respondents’ opinions (eff1). 
Independent variables 
Endogenous SEMs are, in my experience, extremely prone to estimation failure. 
That is, the algorithms for maximizing the likelihood function tend to break down with 
such complex models. The quantitative model used in Chapter 4 thus provides a basis for 
this model, but the additional complication of a reciprocal relationship between council 
participation and support caused the estimation routine to fail, no matter what tweaks were 
made (e.g. different starting values, parameter constraints). As such this model uses a single 
variable, support for Chávez (m1, see Chapter 4), rather than the latent performance 
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variable used in Chapter 4. RBE is also measured by a single variable, (eff1, see Chapter 
4), rather than a latent variable with multiple indicators, for the same reason. Finally, due 
to unresolvable estimation problems, I am forced to omit the interaction between support 
for Chávez and efficacy. This is unfortunate, but ultimately a reasonable sacrifice as the 
interactive effect has already been established conclusively in Chapter 4, and other issues 
are more important for the question at hand.  
Participation in the communal councils is measured via a four-point scale of 
frequency of participation (cp15). The last of the substantively interesting variables, 
participatory preference, is measured via a seven point scale question which asked 
respondents if they agreed that the people should govern directly (pop107). Both council 
participation and participatory preference are rescaled to have a minimum of 0 and a 
maximum of 1, for ease of interpreting the interaction term. In addition to these, I include 
a number of standard demographic control variables: income, education, ideology, sex, 
race (a dummy coded 0 for white respondents and 1 for all others), urban/rural, and a 
dummy variable for survey year. 
5.3.2: Model equations and Estimation  
The model here is based upon those used in Chapter 4; however given the 
introduction of several new variables, some with complex relationships, I choose to write 
out the equations underlying analysis in detail here, rather than simply relying on those 
listed in Chapter 4 with modifications explained in the text. The primary relationship of 
interest here is the relationship between regime support and council participation, 
controlling for support for Chávez. Personalism predicts that support for Chávez, the 
Bolivarian regime, or both, should determine council participation. Conversely, 
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participatory populism and participatory democracy both predict that council participation 
should predict regime support. This leads to the following set of equations: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 = 𝑙 𝛾10 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +
 𝛾11𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶ℎá𝑣𝑒𝑧𝑖 +  𝜁1  
(Eq 5.01) 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 =  𝛾20 +  𝛽21𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 +
 𝛾21𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶ℎá𝑣𝑒𝑧𝑖 +  𝜁2  
(Eq 5.02) 
The participatory frameworks both make two additional predictions. First, as it is 
the participatory opportunities provided by the councils that are assumed to drive the 
positive effect on regime support, it is reasonable to presume that the effect will be stronger 
among those with participatory preferences. Second, council participation is assumed to 
have an indirect effect on regime support through its relationship with external (regime-
based) efficacy. This leads to the following modification of Equation 5.01, and a new 
equation for external efficacy: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 =  𝛾10 +  𝛽11𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +
 𝛽12𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝛾11𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 +
 𝛾11𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 +
 𝛾13𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶ℎá𝑣𝑒𝑧𝑖 + 𝜁1 
(Eq 5.03) 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖 =  𝛾30 +   𝛽31𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +
 𝛾31𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾32𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶ℎá𝑣𝑒𝑧𝑖 +  𝜁3  (Eq 5.04) 
Two additional modifications must be made to make the model complete. I include 
a suite of control variables in Equation 5.03, and a dummy variable for urban respondents 
in Equation 5.04. Additionally, to test H3a, I include an interaction term in Eq. 5.03, with 
confidence in Chávez moderating the impact of council participation on RBE. This leads 
to the following: 
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𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 =  𝛾10 +  𝛽11𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +
 𝛾11𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 +  𝛾11𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ∗
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 +  𝛾13𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶ℎá𝑣𝑒𝑧𝑖 +  𝛾14𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 
+ 𝛾15𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝛾16𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 +  𝛾17𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 +  𝛾18𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 +
 𝛾19𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖 +  𝛾1,102012 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 +  𝜁1 
(Eq 5.05) 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 =  𝛾20 +  𝛽21𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 +
 𝛾21𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶ℎá𝑣𝑒𝑧𝑖 +  𝛾22𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖 + + 𝜁2 (Eq 5.06) 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖 =  𝛾30 + 𝛽31𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +
 𝛾32𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾33𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶ℎá𝑣𝑒𝑧𝑖 +
 𝛾34𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶ℎá𝑣𝑒𝑧𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝛾35𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 +
𝛾36𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝛾37𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾38𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 +  𝛾39𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 +
 𝛾3,10𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾3,11𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖 +  𝛾3,122012 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 +  𝜁3  
(Eq 5.07) 
Estimation of model parameters was conducted in MPLUS version 7.2 (data and 
code are available on request), using Maximum Likelihood with missing values (MLMV). 
MLMV builds the likelihood function one observation at a time, using whatever 
information is available for each observation, without requiring the specification of a 
measurement model (Allison, 2012). Because communal council participation is likely 
predicted in part by systemic support and chavismo (as personalism suggests), I allow 
participation to be endogenous in order to avoid bias. This requires treating the council 
participation variable as continuous, which is risky given its four-point scale; treating it as 
ordinal using a WLS estimator did not substantially alter the results. The measurement 
model is identified via the three factor rule. By excluding the “urban” dummy variable 
from the equation for support and including it in the equation for council participation, the 
structural portion of the model is identified via the rank and order conditions (Bollen, 
1989). Since efficacy is not impacted by support, I conducted analysis of that model 
separately. This allowed the inclusion of all relevant control variables without concerns 
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over identification issues. Results of the structural component of analysis are presented in 
Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: SEM analysis of regime support 
 
The first important result is that chavismo has an extremely strong positive impact 
on regime support. This is not very surprising. It does cast further doubt on participatory 
democracy as a reasonable framework for analysis (although it was already discredited by 
the qualitative analysis), but says little about which type of populism best fits the Bolivarian 
state. The results for council participation are far more enlightening. Council participation 
has a substantial positive impact on support, but only among those with strong participatory 
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preferences. Among those who do not prefer direct participation20, the effect is actually 
negative (-1.30), which may reflect dissatisfaction with some of the operational problems 
that impact many councils. However among those with strong participatory preferences21, 
the impact of council participation rivals that of chavismo (.577 compared to .653), which 
is remarkable given the overwhelming dominance of Hugo Chávez in the Venezuelan 
political system. The results for efficacy further support participatory populism; results for 
the analysis of RBE are presented in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: SEM analysis of RBE 
RBE (n=2,986) Est. S.E. p-value 
Council participation -.098 .090 .274 
Confidence in Chávez .462 .133 .001 
Interaction .435 .117 .000 
    
Participatory preference .019 .008 .017 
Income -.022 .017 .196 
Education .046 .016 .005 
Ideology -.009 .017 .616 
Age .036 .015 .019 
Urban .047 .015 .001 
Female -.004 .030 .892 
Race -.030 .031 .325 
2012 Dummy -.011 .017 .496 
These results are consistent with participatory populism and inconsistent with the 
other two approaches. Opposition supporters who participate regularly in the councils 
actually feel less empowered compared to those who do not, although the difference is not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, chavistas who participate in councils have a 
much higher predicted support levels than those who do not. Chavistas who engage with 
                                                 
20 Participatory preference at 0. 
21 Participatory preference at 1. 
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the communal councils frequently have a predicted support level of .799, while those who 
do not have a predicted level of .462.22 
The findings most directly inspired by the framework developed in Chapter 3 also 
find strong support here. Support for Chávez has a massive impact on efficacy; this is 
unsurprising given the Bolivarian regime’s previously discussed tendency to grant greater 
political rights to supporters and to diminish the rights of everyone else. However of the 
remaining variables, no variable has a greater impact on RBE than council participation 
except ideology (again, not surprising in such a polarized political environment).  
In sum, these analyses demonstrate that the councils allow the Bolivarian 
movement to convince its militants that its most important promise is being kept: that those 
who were long excluded from democracy as practiced during the Punto Fijo era are finally 
allowed to exercise power directly and collectively within their communities. They further 
show the importance of this promise to the legitimation of a regime which might otherwise 
have alienated its base with its authoritarian practices. With this contention supported, the 
view of chavismo as a straightforward incarnation of personalism becomes difficult to 
maintain. It would be foolish to deny that Chávez’s political style and personalism are 
similar in many ways, but the type of participatory self-management shown to exist in the 
councils, and the reliance on same to legitimate the regime, simply do not fit within a 
framework defined by the complete dominance of the leader, who utilizes his personal 
charisma and emotional connections with followers, rather than genuine empowerment, to 
maintain his position. 
                                                 
22 Assuming all other variables fixed at zero. 
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5.4: CONCLUSION 
Personalism and participation are both readily apparent features of the Bolivarian 
political system, and theories which deny one or the other are incomplete. The fact that 
participatory populism, with its combination of authoritarian and democratic practices, 
was23 so successful at maintaining support for the populist regime raises some interesting 
questions. Many students of participatory democracy experiments hope that such 
organizations can improve the quality of democracy (Biaocchi, 2001). Following Rousseau 
(2002) and others, advocates argued that micro-level participation could train citizens to 
become more assertive and active in the political process at higher levels, challenging 
entrenched power-holders and thereby enhancing representative institutions (Avritzer, 
2002; Barber, 1984; Pateman, 1970).  
The case of Venezuela demonstrates an important caveat: that participatory 
governance can exist outside a liberal democratic framework. Participatory experiments do 
not exist in a vacuum, but are nested within a broader political system, and their effect on 
that system is not always straightforward. In the Venezuelan case, participatory governance 
actually serves to reinforce the ties between the masses and a dominant leader (Lovera, 
2008). Given the undeniable incompetence of the Bolivarian elite, such reinforcement was 
absolutely crucial for the movement’s survival. The inherent constraints on participatory 
self-governance programs, particularly their confinement to local-level issues, make it an 
attractive choice for populists seeking novel ways to empower citizens without vitiating 
their own dominance. And yet, the high levels of support in Venezuela that I sought to 
explain in this chapter demonstrate the power of such limited participatory access in a 
                                                 
23 Recall that this strategy requires both participation and the charisma of the populist to function. With the 
death of Chávez, the latter has been lost and systemic support has cratered under the weight of the regime’s 
failures. This is discussed in greater detail in the conclusion (Chapter 7). 
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political context long defined by the enervation of the people. In such circumstances, a 
small amount of participatory empowerment can cover a multitude of sins. 
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Chapter 6: The other liberalism: laissez-faire, protected democracy, and 
support in Chile24 
Of all the terms that have been applied to anemic regime support in Chile (crisis of 
representation, dissatisfaction with democracy, etc.), none fits better than the term malaise. 
Like malaise, Chile’s legitimacy issues are chronic, rather than acute; something is clearly 
amiss, but the malady does not appear to be fatal. Although waves of contentious politics 
and increasing electoral abstention are cause for concern, no one expects the system to 
collapse anytime soon. And like physical malaise, the underlying source of the problem is 
maddeningly difficult to pin down. It is easy enough to find potential causes, both in the 
academic literature and the general conversation on the topic: neoliberalism, authoritarian 
enclaves, and the party system are all commonly cited reasons why Chileans express little 
affection for their state. However due to a lack of theoretical clarity and methodological 
rigor, we still know little about why the best governed state in Latin America has produced 
a detached and apathetic citizenry. Which of the variables listed above matter? Do some 
matter more than others? Do they all impact support directly, or are the effects of some 
factors mediated through others? If poor support is caused by neoliberalism or the party 
system, what specific characteristics of these abstract concepts are to blame? None of these 
questions can be entirely settled by the existing literature.  
This chapter seeks to provide answers to all these questions by applying the 
theoretical model developed in Chapter 3 (see also Figure 1.1), and tested in Chapters 4 
and 5. The most crucial aspect of this framework is the proposition that intrinsic 
characteristics of democratic procedures shape support directly and separately from 
performance. This suggests that, in order to truly understand the roots of Chile’s legitimacy 
troubles, we must disentangle the impacts of economic factors from those of political 
                                                 
24 Portions of this chapter have been accepted for publication in Comparative Politics (Rhodes-Purdy). 
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procedures. The first step in this separation is to recognize that not one, but two liberal25 
revolutions were initiated by the Pinochet regime and bequeathed to the democratic system 
that replaced it: one economic, the other political. In this chapter, I seek to analyze which 
of these revolutions is most responsible for patterns of support in modern Chile. In the first 
section I review the economic dimension, briefly summarizing the story of Chile’s turn to 
laissez-faire economics after decades of economic statism. And while this turn is cited by 
many commentators as the immediate source of Chile’s lack of support, available evidence 
does not bear this out. 
It is the second, political transformation which I find has the greatest effect on 
Chilean political attitudes. The military dictatorship, responding as much to the rapid 
incorporation of new social groups into the political system as to Allende’s socialist 
experiment, left behind a tutelary, protective26 democratic system of the sort commonly 
associated with liberal conceptions of the proper role of the state in society. This system 
confined the political role of citizens to the periodic selection of rulers. And it placed severe 
constraints on the potential of those electoral choices to translate into significant policy 
changes. In other words, the Chilean political system, while excelling in both governance 
and substantive representation, provides few significant participatory opportunities. The 
evidence presented here shows that the lack of such opportunities is the most important 
source of democratic disaffection in Chile. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review the existing literature on Chile’s 
modern economic transformation from statism to liberalism, including works that cite that 
                                                 
25 From this point forward I use the term “liberal” in the classical sense of the word, as described in 
Chapters 2 and 3, in place of “neoliberal”. The latter term is normatively loaded and usually applied 
exclusively to economic (rather than political) systems. 
26 These terms are frequently used synonymously in the Chilean context; this is an error. Tutelary and 
protective characteristics of the Chilean state can be distinguished from one another. And as I will show, 
while the former have been eradicated, minimal progress has been made on the latter. 
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transformation as the source of weak support. However, available data do not support such 
theories. I then propose an alternative explanation, which posits that the protective 
elements of Chile’s democracy, installed by a military government27 whose principal goal 
was to prevent the return of social politicization of the sort that erupted prior to its seizure 
of power, influence support separately (although not independently) from economic 
variables. 
 I then test this theory in three ways. First, I demonstrate that concerns over 
participation, rather than representation or economic performance, drive citizen attitudes 
towards both the state and Chile’s least popular institution: its party system. These findings 
are consistent with my argument, but they are somewhat indirect. This reflects the difficulty 
involved in proving that the absence of something (participatory opportunities) is the cause 
of an outcome. To overcome this, I use a series of laboratory experiments conducted among 
Chilean university students to test the counterfactual argument that a Chile with extensive 
opportunities for participation would gain more support from its populace, regardless of 
policy outcomes. This test has the advantage of providing additional evidence for the 
hypothesized impact of participatory institutions on support (see H3 in Chapters 3 and 4). 
However experiments, like all social science methods, have their weaknesses. The question 
of external validity is particularly worrisome; it is difficult to evaluate if the highly 
controlled context of a lab experiment accurately reflects real-world dynamics. To increase 
confidence in the findings, I also conducted a qualitative program evaluation of one of the 
rare opportunities for direct participation in Chile: the participatory process by which one 
municipality created its communal development plan. I show, through the evaluation and 
a survey conducted by the municipality (designed in consultation with the author), that this 
                                                 
27 It should be noted that the Chilean political class, for the most part, accepted the limitations on popular 
engagement with little protest and with some enthusiasm. 
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program significantly reduced tensions between the municipality and social movement 
activists, which had been endemic prior to the program. This is precisely what the theory 
developed here predicts. None of these pieces of evidence alone would be sufficient to 
prove that my framework is correct and that a lack of participatory opportunities is to blame 
for Chile’s lack of legitimacy. However when taken together, with the weaknesses of each 
method compensated for by the strengths of the others, the findings presented here provide 
convincing evidence of my theory. 
6.1: ECONOMIC LIBERALISM AND SUPPORT IN CHILE 
Despite its objective successes in the democratic era, Chile’s economic model is 
not popular among ordinary citizens (Angell, 2010). It is therefore a reasonable proposition 
that the model may be related to poor support, as many scholars (not to mention non-
academic social commentators) have argued. Theories of support in Chile which blame 
economic liberalism vary considerably in the details, but a general theory can be 
summarized by reviewing the literature on the subject, although not all cited authors would 
agree with every element. 
A thorough rehash of the move from statism to liberalism in Chile is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, and would only cover extremely well-trodden ground. As I ultimately 
conclude that economic liberalism does not provide much insight on the question of support 
in Chile, this summary will be brief. Prior to the military takeover in 1973, the Chilean 
state had a major economic role (Bitar, 1986; Garretón, 1989b; Oxhorn, 1995; Stallings, 
1978). Even before the Marxist Popular Unity (UP) entered government, the state 
controlled 47 percent of GDP, a staggering proportion even by Latin American standards 
(Stallings, 1978). Control of the state was thus of paramount importance for all social 
groups in pursuing their economic interests. This situation only intensified as the political 
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system began to challenge the entrenched interests of the elite, first with the Christian 
Democratic (PDC) government of Eduardo Frei, and later with the election of Socialist 
Salvador Allende. The Frei administration, in part due to coaxing by the U.S. (A. 
Valenzuela, 1978, p. 35), embarked on a program of land reform which directly threatened 
the interest of the landed aristocracy.  
The UP government of Salvador Allende drastically accelerated the pace of reform. 
The fall of Allende’s government had many causes, but the core economic dispute which 
triggered the constitutional crisis was the dramatic and rapid expansion of the state-owned 
enterprises, achieved largely through the expropriation of private businesses28. The 
infringements on private property were too much for the economic elite to bear. Previously 
the state’s role had largely been protective of domestic capital, as Chile followed an import-
substitution-industrialization (ISI) model (Garretón, 1989a, ch. 1; A. Valenzuela, 1978, p. 
13). The result was a political impasse that would tragically be resolved with bombs and 
bullets rather than ballots, ending with the overthrow of the UP government and the suicide 
of its leader. 
Nevertheless, the military did not immediately embark upon a new economic 
project29. Although the junta did reverse many of Allende’s reforms, the fundamental 
restructuring of the economy did not begin immediately. Instead the military hithered and 
dithered with piecemeal changes (Fontaine Aldunate, 1988). However in 1975 a group of 
liberal economists called “the Chicago boys” gained influential posts in the regime. 
Beginning with anti-inflationary measures in 1975 and accelerating rapidly in 1977, the 
regime pushed full speed ahead with the adoption of an almost fundamentalist liberal 
                                                 
28 The mass mobilizations which drove this process were probably even more crucial; see Section 6.2.1 for 
a more detailed discussion. 
29 As I will show later, this indecision was because the transformation of politics, not economics, was the 
first priority of the dictatorship. 
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model, the result of which was a massive withdrawal of the state from its historic role in 
the Chilean economy. This included the privatization of state-owned enterprises, reduction 
in taxation and social spending, limiting labor organization, and eliminating protectionist 
measures. With the adoption of the “seven modernizations”, the logic of laissez-faire was 
extended to even more areas of society, include healthcare, pensions, and education, among 
other areas (Foxley, 1983, ch. 4).  
The economic model survived the transition to democracy, which began with the 
plebiscite of 1988, relatively unscathed, and persists to this day (although in modified 
form). This is somewhat surprising, given the severe economic pain it inflicted upon much 
of society. Although the model produced significant macroeconomic gains over much of 
its existence, during the transition the economy was under severe strain due to an eleventh-
hour spending spree by the dictatorship (Angell, 2010) and the poverty rate was an abysmal 
45.1 percent (Oppenheim, 2007, p. 257). Scholars point to a number of factors to explain 
the durability of economic liberalism into the contemporary era. Liberal economics tend to 
create an atomized, highly individualistic society wherein collective action is difficult, 
especially for the poor (Garretón, 1989b; Roberts, 1998). The electoral system devised by 
the regime during the transition process led to overrepresentation of the right, which could 
thus block reforms (Polga-Hecimovich & Siavelis, 2015; Posner, 1999), although this point 
is contested (Zucco, 2006). Finally, the parties which emerged from the crucible of 
dictatorship were fundamentally different from those which had operated in earlier 
democratic eras (Oxhorn, 1994, 1995). Specifically, ties to the grassroots, especially 
among the socialist parties (PS and PPD), had not survived repression and the exile of 
much of the leadership. And given the continuing threat that the military might emerge 
from its barracks again if the political system deviated too much from its economic legacy, 
these parties were ill disposed to renew their ties with society. 
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According to those who cite Chile’s economic liberalism, the end result is a system 
wherein the economy remains largely decoupled from the political system (Garretón, 2003; 
Kurtz, 2004a, 2004b). Economic policy has become technocratic, outside the realm of 
political contestation (Silva, 1991, 2008). This leaves issues of pressing interest to the poor 
and working classes effectively off the political table, as no political actor is willing and 
able to fight for those interests; this lack of interest attendance ultimately produces low 
support (Posner, 1999; Santos, 2005). The economic liberalism explanation of poor support 
in Chile is intuitive, given the model’s unpopularity, and sounds perfectly plausible. 
Indeed, I will point to many of the variables mentioned in the preceding discussion when I 
develop my own approach, although the underlying theoretical logic will be very different. 
It is also a perfect example of why social science theories must be rigorously tested, as its 
predictions simply fail to hold up to data. Before showing this, it is necessary to clarify the 
causal story a bit. A graph of the theory is presented in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: Graph of economic liberalism theories of low support 
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This graph should feel familiar: it is yet another example of a performance-centric 
theory which, while including input-oriented variables, places them towards the beginning 
of the causal chain. The immediate source of discontent, in other words, has little to do 
with politics and everything to do with policy outcomes. This suggests an important 
prediction: those who suffer most (or benefit least) from laissez-faire economics should be 
the least supportive of the Chilean state. In other words, low support should be concentrated 
among the poor and working classes. 
This prediction does not hold up to available data. The Chile-specific analysis 
presented in Chapter 4 (see Table 4.5) contains three separate measures related to 
socioeconomic status: income, wealth (goods owned), and education. The first two have 
no significant effect on support. And while education does have an effect, it is in the wrong 
direction: more educated respondents were less supportive of the Chilean regime. Evidence 
from other surveys also contradicts the economic theory of weak support put forth by critics 
of the laissez-faire model. Figure 2.3, summarizing data from Center for Public Studies 
(CEP) data found that the middle sectors, rather than the poor, were the least supportive of 
the regime. However, analyses presented later in this chapter find no relationship at all 
between SES and support30. 
Why the discrepancy between theory and evidence? Theories go awry when they 
rest on bad assumptions, and the assumption that the Chilean system neglects the interest 
of the poor is highly dubious. While the liberal model certainly wreaked havoc on subaltern 
sectors during the dictatorship, successive center-left governments have in fact 
substantially modified the model, softening its rougher edges. Chile does extremely well 
by regional standards on issues such as inflation, employment, poverty reduction, and 
                                                 
30 This holds regardless of whether support is regressed on SES in combination with other variables. When 
regressed alone, the highest social class (ABC1) is more supportive than the poorest, but there are no 
significant differences between any of the other classes. 
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public security, which are of paramount importance to the poor (Mainwaring et al., 2010). 
Regardless of the various obstacles the poor face in forcing elites to attend to their interests, 
those interests have not, in fact, been neglected. The Chilean left (especially the PS and 
PPD) have abandoned their doctrinaire Marxism, but charges that they have entirely left 
the poor to the vicissitudes of the market are untrue and unjust. By many metrics, Chile’s 
poor do better than their counterparts in any Latin American country. 
Despite the contradictory evidence, I too place the blame for Chile’s legitimacy 
woes at the feat of liberalism. However liberalism in Chile is not confined to the economic 
sphere; the military regime also initiated a liberal31 revolution in the political realm, and 
this revolution has been altered considerably less than the economic variety. This political 
liberalism, and the institutions which embody it, circumscribe participatory opportunities 
to the bare minimum required of a full-fledged democracy. The absence of such 
opportunities is responsible for the weak legitimacy of the Chilean regime. 
6.2 TUTELARY PROTECTIVE DEMOCRACY AND REGIME SUPPORT IN CHILE 
As the framework developed in Chapter 3 shows, the widespread assumption that 
what regimes do is the primary criterion citizens use to evaluate them is unfounded. 
Individuals also have attitudes about the procedures and institutions which produce 
decisions. Whether or not such decision-making processes allow ordinary citizens to have 
a meaningful say is of paramount importance. This framework has considerably more 
potential to explain support patterns in Chile than economic liberalism. While the Chilean 
economic system has departed significantly from doctrinaire laissez-faire in a manner that 
produces positive (if not ideal) outcomes across the social spectrum, those aspects of the 
                                                 
31 Although explained in detail later, it is worth noting here that “liberal democracy” is often used to mean 
“full democracy”, encompassing everything from the US and Chile to the Nordic social democracies. I will 
use it here in a much narrower sense. 
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political system which inhibit the ability of citizens to exert influence over the political 
process largely remain. 
In this section I outline the changes in the Chilean state, from the time leading up 
to the Allende era to the present day. Although this material is not absolutely necessary for 
my argument, it provides useful contextual information for those readers not familiar with 
Chilean politics. Additionally, it further emphasizes a major theme of this research, namely 
that political forces are often powerful causal variables in their own right, and independent 
of the economic outcomes they produce. The political history of Chile should not be 
understood as a struggle between workers and capitalists, nor between landlords and 
peasants. Rather it is a story of conflict between politicians, often reformist presidents and 
intransigent Congresses. The political sphere was opened to new groups, many from the 
subaltern sectors, by political actors seeking to gain advantages over their opponents. This 
rapid incorporation of the lower social strata, and the chaos it wrought, contributed to the 
crisis of the Allende government. The political system developed by the military which 
still exists (albeit in modified form) reflects the lessons of this history, and was deliberately 
designed to prevent political actors from resorting to mobilization to resolve political 
disputes in the future.  
6.2.1: The state and society in the pre-Allende period 
The assumption that economic liberalism must be the source of support is a grave 
but predictable error. Political science often gives undue precedence to socioeconomic 
factors; the literature on regime support is, as discussed in Chapter 2, particularly prone to 
this sort of mistake. This is particularly important for students of Latin America, where the 
state has historically had a crucial role in economic development and management. As 
stated earlier, the economic role of the Chilean state from the consolidation of democracy 
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in 1932 until the Allende era was enormous even by regional standards. This caused the 
state to take a leading role in shaping the economic destiny of the country; the state did not 
simply reflect social dynamics, but fundamentally altered them at key points in history. 
Political parties, through control of the state, determined which social groups would 
become political actors. Many analysts have noted that the political incorporation of new 
groups, particularly those belonging to the so-called “popular sectors” (i.e. the working 
class, the peasantry, and the urban informal sector) significantly outpaced any underlying 
economic changes (Oxhorn, 1995; Pinto, 1996). This discrepancy occurred because 
economic change did not propel new actors in the political arena; instead existing actors 
reached out and pulled new groups in. This process of politically-driven incorporation was 
accomplished through two mechanisms: changes to suffrage and electoral rules, and 
through organization and mobilization by political parties.  
Changes to voting rules were not the result of bottom-up demands, but rather 
initiated by existing political actors attempting to win influence by expanding suffrage to 
potential supporters. The first major expansion of the franchise, the removal of property 
restrictions on voting rights, was included in the constitution of 1925. The constitution was 
ratified during a period of intense struggle between a conservative Congress and the 
reformist President Arturo Alessandri, who was also supported by groups within the 
military. The expansion of the electorate was intended to provide additional political 
backing to Alessandri’s modernization program, and to break his dependence on the 
military. This fundamentally altered the dynamics of political competition, but not 
necessarily in the way Alessandri hoped. The Communist Party and other Marxist groups, 
which had been quite radical, now had a viable chance to compete for power through 
elections, and Marxist parties managed to seize a sizable portion of the working-class vote 
from Alessandri, who primarily catered to the middle sectors (Boeninger, 1997, pp. 98-99). 
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While these reforms gave a formal political role to miners and laborers, they had 
little impact in the countryside. The rural peasantry remained under the control of their 
landlords, and agricultural areas remained conservative bastions until well into the 20th 
century (Lapp, 2004; Roberts, 1998). This changed due to two factors. The first was the 
return to power of populist reformer (and former dictator), Carlos Ibáñez; the second was 
the rise of the Christian Democratic party (PDC). Ibáñez was a reformer along the same 
lines as Alessandri, although the two were bitter political enemies by midcentury. And like 
Alessandri his reform program faced intense opposition from Chile’s landed aristocracy, 
who controlled a sufficient proportion of legislative seats to block most reforms. In an 
attempt to marginalize his opponents, Ibáñez attempted to break one of the primary sources 
of the right’s electoral strength: the domination of peasants by landlords (Baland & 
Robinson, 2006, p. 21). Control of the peasantry was critical to the electoral survival of the 
right, which represented a constituency that was great in wealth but small in numbers.  
The landed aristocracy had several means at its disposal to ensure that peasants 
could vote where other, more autonomous subaltern groups could not, and to force those 
peasants to cast their ballots for the right. Landlords frequently circumvented Chile’s ban 
on voting by illiterates by teaching peasants to sign their names (Millar, 1981). And 
because Chilean parties printed their own ballots, landlords could easily determine if a 
peasant voted against the right and punish them accordingly (Loveman, 2001, pp. 221-
223). The electoral reform of 1958 broke this control by introducing an Australian ballot 
which included all party slates, depriving landlords of information regarding individual 
voting choices. The reform had its desired effect: eventually conservative dominance in 
rural areas diminished considerably (Baland & Robinson, 2006).  
This change did not occur instantly. In the election immediately following the 
reform, conservative Jorge Alessandri won the Presidency. Simply allowing peasants to 
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vote as they chose was not sufficient to ensure their defection to the center or left. The 
peasantry, long subject to domination by landlords and lacking political experience, could 
not simply transform itself into an effective political force independently, at least not in the 
short term. However reform did create opportunities for parties to organize and mobilize 
the peasantry. The PDC was the first party to seize this opportunity. The PDC, although 
originating in the Conservative party, eventually developed its own communitarian 
ideology as an alternative both to traditional oligarchic conservatism and Marxism 
(Garretón, 1989a, pp. 13-15; A. Valenzuela, 1978, p. 34). This political project required 
the party to expand beyond its core constituency in the middle sectors by wooing groups 
that might otherwise support the Marxist left. The newly-liberated peasantry was a pool of 
support previously untapped by centrist and leftist parties that held great promise for the 
PDC. 
The PDC also looked to the cities for support. Particularly they sought to organize 
individuals who belonged to the informal sector. These poor voters had been largely 
ignored by the left, which focused mostly on the industrial working classes (Garretón, 
1989a, p. 29; A. Valenzuela, 1978, pp. 5, 26). The urban informal sector had also been 
impacted by the reform of 1958, which introduced true compulsory voting by making 
registration mandatory and stiffening penalties for nonvoting (Lapp, 2004, p. 60). Given 
the tendency of lower income voters to abstain from voting at higher rates than wealthier 
voters, this reform ensured that parties which could successfully mobilize the subaltern 
sectors would have the largest possible gains for their efforts. The PDC’s courting of newly 
politically relevant social groups was largely successful; by 1964, the PDC had grown in 
power and influence to the point where the right, in a strategic move to prevent the left 
from eking out a plurality, threw its support to PDC leader Eduardo Frei. However by the 
end of Frei’s term in office, the party would have cause to rue its rapid introduction of the 
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poor into the political system. The failure of the PDC to translate its incorporation of new 
groups into victory in the 1970 Presidential elections began a trend that would ultimately 
lead to the fall of democracy in Chile. Newly included groups could not always be 
controlled, particularly when expectations were high and the pace of reform was 
insufficiently rapid. Many of the groups organized by the PDC defected to support 
Salvador Allende and the UP in 1970 (Kurtz, 2004b, pp. 102-103). Despite his victory, 
Allende soon found himself in a similar situation to that of the PDC.   
If forced to point to a single policy battle that contributed most to the military coup 
of 1973, the creation of a socialized sector of the economy (the Area of Social Property, or 
APS) is the most likely candidate. Although the policy of the state entering into economic 
arenas previously reserved to the private sector was bitterly contested in and of itself 
(Boeninger, 1997, pp. 177-180; A. Valenzuela, 1978, p. 59), the way in which the program 
came to be implemented was far more destructive to Chilean democracy. The UP never 
gained control of the legislature, and made the disastrous choice to circumvent that 
institution in its creation and expansion of the APS. One mechanism for expropriation 
which had particularly unfortunate unintended consequences was a law, dating back to the 
twelve-day socialist regime of Marmaduke Grove in 1932, allowing the state to seize an 
enterprise which was suffering from production problems, especially those caused by labor 
disputes. This caused UP militants in the labor movement to expand the use of strikes and 
disruptions, which often led the government to expropriate enterprises it otherwise would 
have left in private hands (Winn, 1986). Essentially the UP, by making use of a decades-
old law in ways never intended by its authors, unintentionally invited UP militants to 
radicalize. By encouraging its base to engage in contentious labor politics, the UP set in 
motion an escalating series of mobilizations and counter-mobilizations which quickly spun 
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out control. The resulting chaos, exacerbated by international antipathy and severe 
economic problems, led directly to the military coup of 1973. 
Summary 
One major point from the preceding discussion is worth restating before proceeding 
further, which is the causal primacy of the political realm. Between 1925 and 1973, 
political changes were the driving force behind the activation of social groups that 
eventually led to attempts at radical restructuring of the economy, and incorporation 
occurred from the top down, rather than the reverse. The base-level demands for economic 
restructuring that arose during the UP government were a historical exception, and resulted 
in part from the strategic behavior of UP leaders. The norm in 20th century politics was for 
members of the political class, including charismatic figures like Arturo Alessandri and 
Ibáñez, as well as party leaders such as Frei and Allende, to use expansions of political 
rights and mobilization to further their own ends and break political deadlocks. These 
expansions would occasionally be accompanied by economic reforms intended to entice 
the newly enfranchised to the banner of this or that party, but in all cases Chilean 
governments and political parties directed the course of economic and social 
transformation, not the other way around. 
Tragically this process of rapid incorporation led mostly to frustrated expectations 
at the mass level, and not a few strategic blunders at the elite level, which together caused 
militants to break free of party control and engage in forms of activism that destabilized 
the entire system (Garretón, 1989a). This led to intense conflict which the democratic 
system could not survive. This is worth noting, because while the Chilean political class 
certainly soured on the idea of statist socialism in the economic realm after Allende’s 
overthrow, this historical process also inculcated an intense fear of popular mobilization 
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and political engagement which first developed on the right and later spread to a renovated 
left. This context is crucial for understanding the legacy of the military government and 
transition to democracy. 
6.2.2: Chilean democracy in the modern era: the legacies of authoritarianism 
Many Chileans hoped (or even assumed) that the military would seize power, take 
immediate steps to calm the political situation and right the course of the economy, and 
promptly return the reins of power to civilians. This was not unreasonable; periods of 
military rule in the 20th century had been infrequent and brief. However the military regime 
which took power in 1973 sought not simply to calm society, but to transform it. The 
leaders of the new junta were not ignorant of the historical process I describe above. They, 
and the armed forces in general, had come to believe that the political class had been 
extremely irresponsible in mobilizing the popular sectors to further their aims, and that this 
process of top-down incorporation led directly to the intense class conflict and deep 
politicization of society which preceded the fall of Allende; as a result they sought to create 
a new political order that could de-politicize and discipline society through political and 
economic institutions (Foxley, 1983). The new regime was not about to return power to the 
same feckless politicians who had caused the crisis in the first place; a new political order 
had to be established prior to any return to civilian rule.  
The 1980 Constitution: the foundations of tutelary, protective democracy 
The military’s political vision can be seen in the constitution which institutionalized 
its rule. Although the transition process brought a number of amendments in 1989, the 
system of government was not significantly altered. The 1980 constitution laid the 
foundation for a transition back to civilian rule under what might be called a tutelary, 
protective democracy. While the tutelary features have since been eliminated, the 
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protective features, which severely circumscribe the political role of the citizenry, remain 
largely in place. The formally democratic and substantively elitist processes created under 
this document are the principal source of Chileans’ disaffection with their regime. 
Tutelary democracy has philosophical roots in Plato’s Republic, and its conception 
of the guardian state. Plato envisioned a state governed by a class of philosopher kings 
whose duty would be to guard and guide the polity, which was seen as incapable of 
responsible self-governance (Dahl, 1989, ch. 4). A tutelary democracy is essentially a 
guardian state where power is directly held by the representatives of the people, but where 
exercise of that power is overseen by a guardian class. In the earliest versions of this 
concept, the guardian was a colonial power (Shils, 1962); however as Latin American 
countries began to emerge from dictatorship in the 1980s, militaries assumed guardian roles 
in many states (Przeworski, 1988).  
Several institutional features of Chile’s 1980 constitution can be classified as 
tutelary. The National Security Council (NSC) served as the official organ of military 
guardianship. The NSC included the President of the Republic and the presidents of the 
Senate and the Supreme Court, but in practice could be dominated by the four heads of the 
armed forces who were also members (Constitution of Chile 1980, art. 45). The NSC had 
significant powers; it had to be consulted on foreign and domestic security policy 
(Constitution of Chile 1980, art. 40), appointed two members of the Constitutional Tribunal 
(Constitution of Chile 1980, art. 81), and appointed four former heads of the armed forces 
to the Senate (Constitution of Chile 1980, art. 45.d). In short, the military, through its 
majority in the NSC and its guaranteed seats in the upper chamber of the legislature, had 
the ability to insinuate itself into the business of all three branches of the Chilean regime. 
The tutelary features of the Chilean regime have since been removed, albeit in a process 
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that was far too slow for many32; in a 2010 article Patricio Navia proclaimed that all 
“authoritarian enclaves” in the Chilean system had been eliminated (2010). However these 
were not the only mechanisms the military included in the constitution to secure its political 
legacy. The constitution also includes a number of features which, while not tutelary, serve 
to inhibit the pace of political change. 
While Chilean democracy is no longer tutelary, it remains protective. The 
protective conception of democracy was discussed in some detail in Chapter 3 as it relates 
to instrumentalism, but it is worth reviewing it here. The protective view of democracy 
sees competitive politics as a means to ensure the survival of some other social or political 
goal (Held, 2007, p. 35). Political liberalism is often associated with protective democracy. 
Liberals see democracy as the best form of government for protecting individual rights and 
the pursuit of private interests. The key point is that popular sovereignty is not the goal of 
such a democracy; indeed protective democracy includes a suspicion of the unchecked 
powers of the masses and the fear that politics will devolve into a tyranny of the majority 
(e.g. Madison, 1952; Sartori, 1987; Schumpeter, 2008). Therefore, while protective 
democracies allow the populace to select its rulers, they also place a considerable number 
of hurdles into the policy process in order to slow the pace of change and ensure that 
minorities can block changes which infringe upon their rights. The result is a system in 
which popular opinion has only a weak and indirect role in shaping policy. 
The Chilean democratic system has many protective features, and unlike its tutelary 
characteristics, most of the protective elements remain in force. The basic structure of 
government, with separation of powers between the legislature and the presidency, as well 
as the bicameral structure of the legislature, are common features of protective democracies 
                                                 
32 The constitutional reform which fully removed the last vestiges of the guardian state occurred in 2005, 
fifteen years after the first civilian president took office. 
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inspired by classical liberalism. However the military placed additional veto points in the 
Chilean regime. Originally, nearly half the Senate (at least 10 out of 23 members) were to 
have been appointed by the President, the Supreme Court, or the NSC (Constitution of 
Chile 1980, art. 45), although the number of elected Senators was increased during the 
transition process (Constitution of Chile 1980, art. 45). This meant that the Senate would, 
for at least eight years, be significantly influenced by individuals who never faced election 
and would therefore have little need to consider popular opinion.33   
The electoral system, established by organic law as required by Article 43 of the 
1980 Constitution, is another major protective feature. 34 As stated previously, the binomial 
system creates a district magnitude of two for both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. 
The first and second place electoral pact each win a seat unless the first-place pact gets 
twice as many votes as the second-place pact. There is some dispute as to how much this 
system gives an unfair advantage to the political right, which usually gets about one-third 
of the vote but half the seats (Polga-Hecimovich & Siavelis, 2015; Zucco, 2006). The fact 
that this system limits the impact of voters’ choices is, however, undeniable. Imagine a 
district in which the vote split in an election at time period 1 is 60-40, but shifts at period 
2 to 40-60. It is difficult to imagine any electoral system except for the binomial system 
wherein a difference of this magnitude would cause absolutely no change in the winners; 
such an outcome would be rare even in first-past-the-post systems like that of the United 
States and the United Kingdom. Such a shift in voting to fail to produce a change in 
representation in a FPTP system, a party would have to have at least 90 percent support at 
                                                 
33 These appointed Senators blur the line between tutelary and protective features. As these Senators were 
given seats based on positions to which they came during the dictatorship, they also formed part of the 
guardian class, and thus had a tutelary role. 
34 The electoral system was replaced with a multi-district PR system in 2015 ("Tie breaker: a new voting 
system should liven up politics," 2015). However since this event occurred outside the time period under 
analysis here (which ends roughly in 2014), it will be discussed as though it were still in place. See the 
conclusion for a discussion of this repeal. 
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time period 1. Whatever its impact on the left-right balance of power, it is clear that this 
system minimizes the ability of voters to determine who wields legislative power.  
The impact of this system is exacerbated by the fact that other features of the 
Chilean system require large majorities, which the binomial system virtually precludes, to 
make all but the smallest of policy changes. Although it is the most discussed, the electoral 
system is not the strongest protective feature of the Chilean state. That prize goes to the 
various supermajority requirements for legislative change. The Chilean constitution and 
corresponding organic laws go into considerable policy detail in areas such as labor 
organizing and education, to name but a few. Amendments to these policy areas require 
significant supermajorities in the legislature: depending upon the issue area, either two-
thirds, three-fifths, or four-sevenths of each chamber must approve changes to policies 
which are encoded in the Constitution or organic law (Constitution of Chile 2005, art. 66). 
In 2014, Michele Bachelet returned to La Moneda promising to reform the electoral system 
and abolish private secondary education. Despite her massive popularity, she was not able 
to obtain the three-fifths majority necessary for the former nor the four-fifths necessary for 
the latter.35 The Concertacíon came nowhere close to the two-thirds majority that would be 
necessary to replace the constitution entirely, another demand which seems to be gaining 
in popularity in Chile. 
Consequences of tutelary, protective democracy 
To summarize, the Chilean political system has gradually been cleansed of the stain 
of authoritarianism, but remains riddled with counter-majoritarian features and veto points. 
These have served their intended purpose: they drastically reduce the efficacy of ordinary 
                                                 
35 Again, there has been progress on both these issues very recently, but since these changes could not have 
influenced the public opinion data presented here, this section ignores them. See the conclusion for a 
discussion. 
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chilenos, confining their role to the periodic selection of leaders. Many scholars have noted 
that a culture of elitism has taken hold in Chile’s political class. Party leaders generally 
prefer intra-elite negotiation to mass contestation to advance their agendas (Huber et al., 
2010). There can be no doubt that the Chilean left went through a process of renovation 
during military rule and transition to democracy which made them wary of popular 
mobilization (Roberts, 1998). The Chilean political class has, for the most part, come to 
embrace this system. However to those who stridently criticize this elitist turn, one must 
ask: what else could the left have done?  
The values, beliefs, and preferences of the political class vis-á-vis popular 
mobilization and inclusion are irrelevant. Even if the elite had been committed to 
revitalizing the social roots of parties, it is unlikely that such a renewal would have taken 
place. There was simply nothing to gain (and much to lose) by adopting such a strategy. 
Mobilization is risky and, given the view of Chile’s history common among the right, 
extremely threatening; any gains of such a strategy would have had to override the danger 
of provoking the military. Revitalization of grassroots links would have been an exercise 
in futility. The Concertación could have put all of its resources and energies into mobilizing 
its base and it would have made very little difference. The electoral system, which prevents 
large voting majorities from translating into large majorities in the legislature, combines 
with supermajority requirements to completely stymie any mobilization strategy for 
massive institutional change. And such an aggressive political strategy would have driven 
the right even more securely into the arms of the armed forces. As it happens, the slow, 
negotiated reform strategy of the center-left was not only the best strategy for reform, it 
was likely the only strategy which could hope to bear fruit. Indeed recent history bears this 
out. During her first campaign and administration, Michele Bachelet ran on promises of a 
more inclusive, participatory style of governance, only to abandon these promises once the 
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strategic realities of governing in a protective democracy became clear (Weeks & 
Borzutzky, 2012). 
Nevertheless individuals do not form political attitudes with an eye towards what 
might have been; rather they respond to what exists before them. And what exists in Chile 
is a system with extreme protective features designed to limit the exercise of popular 
sovereignty. Chile is undoubtedly a democracy, but due to the institutional features it is 
one in which the only formal mechanism for participation is political parties which have 
little interest in developing strong social roots. Political parties seem to be bearing the brunt 
of the blame for this state of affairs. Figure 6.2 below presents data on confidence in various 
institutions from a 2012 study of political attitudes. 
Figure 6.2: Confidence in Chilean institutions36 
 
                                                 
36 Source: CEP 
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While none of the representative institutions of Chile cover themselves with glory 
here, political parties are the least loved of all, with only nine percent of individuals 
expressing confidence in them. To drive this point home, I note that the armed forces, who 
killed at least 2,000 civilians, tortured thousands more, ruled with an iron fist for nearly 
twenty years, and created the current political regime, are five times more trusted than 
political parties. Given the power of parties and their failure to give a voice to ordinary 
citizens, this should not come as a surprise. Indeed the elitism of Chile’s parties has led 
some scholars to conclude that Chile has become, not a polyarchy (Dahl, 1971), but a 
partyarchy (Coppedge, 1994). One recent work on regime support in Chile, concluding that 
concerns over representation are not the cause of democratic dissatisfaction, speculates that 
this development of partyarchy may be responsible (Siavelis, 2009), given the pronounced 
antipathy towards parties and the party system in public opinion data. Within the analytical 
framework used here, we should expect such a system to have anemic support at best, 
because while the system may meet the material needs of its citizenry, it severely neglects 
their need to have a voice in the political processes which impact them. 
6.3: EMPIRICAL TESTS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIBERALISM 
The previous section demonstrated that Chile underwent two liberal revolutions 
under the Pinochet regime: one economic, the other political. Both have been subsequently 
altered by democratic governments, but the essential legacy of military rule remains: a 
laissez-faire economy and a protective democracy. This raises an important question: 
which matters more for support? Should we look to performance, or to procedures? 
The theoretical and empirical work presented so far suggests that, while 
performance issues probably matter, we cannot afford to neglect the independent impact 
of protective democracy and the partyarchy which it has created. In the following section, 
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I test that assertion with data. First, I perform statistical analyses of data relating to regime 
support, as well as to attitudes towards the party system. This data shows that concerns 
over participation, rather than performance (or its close relative, interest attendance), drive 
lack of support for the Chilean regime and its party system. I then use experimental 
analysis, buttressed by a program evaluation of a participatory initiative in Providencia, to 
further demonstrate that participation, or rather the lack of same, is responsible for the woes 
of Chilean democracy. 
6.3.1: Testing the impact of protected democracy: analysis of CEP data 
Two hypotheses can be derived directly from this logic. The first is that lack of 
support for the party system is driven by the failure of parties to encourage participation. 
The second is that this lack of faith in the party system is a form of depressed RBE; citizens 
who express disaffection with the party system do so because parties no longer enable 
ordinary Chileans to impact the course of politics. This implies that confidence in the party 
system should have much the same effect that RBE does in previous models (see Chapter 
4). 
I test the latter hypothesis first, using the “Audit of Democracy” study, conducted 
in 2012 by the Center for Public Studies (CEP). This model is very similar to the model 
defined by equation 4.11 in Chapter 4, with a few small differences. Regime support is 
measured by a latent variable which impacts four indicators, all measures of institutional 
confidence. Those institutions are: government, the Congress, the public ministries, and 
the courts. Booth and Seligson (2009) have shown that, although individuals can have 
idiosyncratic attitudes towards one institution or another, when specified as indicators of a 
single latent variable they form a measure of “broad institutional confidence” which is 
highly correlated with regime support. Performance is measured by evaluation of the 
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economy, which is the only indicator of the concept available. Confidence in political 
parties is used in place of regime-based efficacy (RBE); this substitution will be justified 
with additional tests. Given Chile’s homogeneity, no variable for race is included. Finally, 
socioeconomic status is measured via respondents’ registered social category. Results are 
presented in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: Analysis of CEP data on regime support 
Measurement    
    
 Regime Support (n=1,481) Est SE p-value 
 Factor loadings    
 Confidence in government 1.000 - - 
 Confidence in Congress 1.046 .039 .000 
 Confidence in courts .663 .038 .000 
 Confidence in public ministries .819 .038 .000 
     
 Error variances    
 Confidence in government .398 .023 .000 
 Confidence in Congress .340 .022 .000 
 Confidence in courts .735 .030 .000 
 Confidence in public ministries .595 .027 .000 
 Courts*ministries .157 .021 .000 
 
Structural    
    
 Regime Support (n=1,481) Est SE p-value 
 Evaluation of economy .161 .035 .000 
 Confidence in parties .582 .056 .000 
 Interaction -.126 .064 .049 
     
 Social class    
 ABC1 .049 .044 .257 
 C2 .012 .056 .830 
 C3 -.027 .083 .748 
 D -.075 .083 .369 
     
 Education .033 .035 .353 
 Age .111 .028 .000 
 Female -.012 .025 .638 
 Urban -.064 .026 .015 
 Ideology .235 .035 .000 
Several of these results are important here. First, note that confidence in parties 
works exactly as it should if it is a reflection of parties’ role as enablers of popular 
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engagement in politics. Confidence in parties significantly and strongly impacts regime 
support; furthermore, it moderates the impact of economic concerns, just as RBE did in 
Chapter 4. Additionally, note that none of the SES dummies have a significant impact; this 
is evidence against the economic liberal theory of low support in Chile. 
I freely admit that the interpretation of confidence in parties as a measure of RBE 
is questionable, even in light of the results presented above. Party confidence was used in 
models in Chapter 4, but only in tandem with other variables which relate directly to RBE. 
However no assumption is actually necessary on this point, as the CEP study also included 
a suite of questions related to party system attitudes directly. By analyzing the relationship 
between these specific questions and general attitudes towards the party system, I am able 
to show conclusively that participatory access problems are the most important factor. I 
conduct two analyses: one analyzing the sources of discontent with existing parties, and 
another which analyzes more abstract views of the necessity of parties to democracy.  
Table 6.2 presents an analysis of the antecedent attitudes which lead to a lack of 
faith in political parties. CEP includes several questions that can shed light on whether 
participatory or representational issues are responsible for low confidence. These include 
two measures of participatory preference37, and three questions about specific aspects of 
parties in Chile: whether parties encourage participation, whether they provide voters with 
real alternatives (an evaluation of the parties’ representative function), and whether they 
serve only to divide people. The analysis also includes the same control variables as the 
earlier CEP model. 
  
                                                 
37 These are measured by a belief that each of the following is important: “For politicians to take the 
opinions of citizens into account when making decisions” and “Allowing citizens to have more 
opportunities to participate in the making of public policy (politicas) decisions.” 
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Table 6.2: Sources of confidence in parties 
Confidence in parties (n=1,481) Est SE p-value 
Parties give alternatives .066 .027 .014 
Parties encourage participation .160 .026 .000 
Parties only divide people .103 .027 .000 
    
Participatory preference -.087 .036 .016 
Evaluation of the economy .145 .027 .000 
Social class    
ABC1 .288 .221 .193 
C2 .127 .195 .515 
C3 -.009 .171 .960 
D -.003 .168 .985 
    
Education .019 .035 .583 
Age -.024 .028 .387 
Female -.077 .052 .135 
Urban .088 .060 .144 
Ideology .017 .037 .638 
 
Although the evaluation of the representative function of parties does influence 
party confidence, the participatory function matters more. Those with strong participatory 
preferences are far less likely to express confidence in parties generally. Although 
evaluations of the parties’ role in representation matters, assessments of parties’ role as 
facilitators of participation matters twice as much. This seems to suggest that, while 
concerns about representation (such as those raised by the economic liberal argument) may 
have an impact, the lack of participatory opportunities which parties are expected to offer 
is far more important. 
This is even clearer when analyzing beliefs about the necessity of parties for 
democracy. Results are presented in Table 6.3. Belief in the necessity of parties has been 
shown to more directly reflect attitudes regarding the party system than confidence in 
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political parties, which tends to be impacted both by party system attitudes as well as 
assessments of specific, individual parties (Bélanger, 2004; Poguntke, 1996).  
Table 6.3: Sources of the belief that parties are necessary for democracy 
Confidence in parties (n=1,481) Est SE p-value 
Parties give alternatives -.018 .028 .517 
Parties encourage participation .169 .027 .000 
Parties only divide people .156 .027 .000 
    
Participatory preference .202 .039 .010 
Evaluation of the economy .044 .028 .114 
Social class    
ABC1 -.005 .237 .982 
C2  .095 .213 .657 
C3  .034 .191 .861 
D  .026 .188 .889 
    
Education .086 .036 .017 
Age .144 .029 .000 
Female -.045 .053 .391 
Urban -.048 .063 .442 
Ideology -.040 .040 .324 
Here there is little doubt about which factors shape attitudes towards parties. 
Neither the performance metric, nor measures of SES, nor evaluation of parties’ 
representative function matter for determining this attitude. However evaluations of the 
participatory function of parties matter more than any attitudinal or demographic variable 
present. Together these analyses paint a fairly clear picture: systemic support in Chile is 
driven down by negative attitudes towards the country’s party system. And the party 
system is despised because political parties should serve as the primary link between 
citizens and the state, and Chile’s parties have abdicated that role.  
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While the preceding analyses all support the hypothesis that a lack of participatory 
opportunities is responsible for the weak legitimacy of the Chilean state, these tests are 
somewhat indirect. They require considerable inferential leaps about the relationship 
between party system attitudes, regime attitudes, and question interpretation. Additionally, 
observational statistics cannot demonstrate causality, due to the inability to control for all 
conceivable confounding variables. Fortunately I need not rely on these tests alone; in the 
following section, I provide a more direct and rigorous test of my framework using 
laboratory-style experiments. 
6.3.2: Participatory institutions and support in Chile: an experimental analysis 
To provide a more conclusive test of H3, I conducted a lab experiment in Chile 
among 147 students in six classes at Catholic University and Diego Portales University, 
which formed experimental blocks. The questionnaire (in Spanish) is available in the 
appendix to this chapter. Students in each block read a short news article about a decision-
making process at the municipal level, involving a grant from the national government to 
be spent on community security. The issue of security was chosen because it was likely to 
have equal salience across demographic groups. The news article stated that municipalities 
could spend the money on security cameras or hiring private security personnel. 
Respondents were asked about their preferred option prior to being informed of the 
outcome. The outcome of the decision-making process remained constant across groups: 
the municipality chose to spend the money on cameras. 
Students were randomly assigned to one of two treatments. In the first treatment, 
the municipal government consulted a group of security experts before making their 
decision. In the second treatment, the municipality held a series of participatory town-hall 
meetings (cabildos) wherein residents of the municipality debated and voted directly on 
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the issue, choosing the cameras. Two treatments were applied without a true control group 
(which would entail divulging only the choice of policy with no explanation of how the 
choice was made) because such a control would make the actual choice the sole criteria for 
evaluation. Explicating the expert-led process allowed for a point of comparison which is 
similar to how decisions are commonly made in Chile. 
The subjects were then asked a series of four questions regarding their support of 
the municipality and its handling of the issue: whether they approved of the way the 
municipality handled the process, whether they thought the process was fair, whether they 
thought the process was undemocratic, and if they thought the municipality should use the 
method for future decisions whenever possible. I constructed two scales of these questions 
(differences on individual questions were also tested). First, I constructed an un-weighted 
index by adding all items (with democratic-ness recoded to match the others) and re-scaled 
the sum so that the index has a value from 0-1. This assumes that all questions have equal 
importance, which is not reasonable. To relax that assumption I estimated the parameters 
of a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) model, which posits that answers on these 
questions are caused by a latent “support” variable. I used the estimated factor scores from 
this analysis, which is a continuous variable with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 
1 by construction. I analyzed the effect of both experimental treatments (technocratic and 
participatory method of choice) in two ways. I conduct simple t-tests (with unequal 
variance assumed) for differences across treatments for each question and both indices. 
This approach left two issues unaccounted for. First, it did not control for whether or not 
the subject agreed with the chosen outcome. Second, it cannot account for the fact that the 
experimental subjects were not independently selected, but were nested within the classes 
in which the experiments were administered. I conducted a multilevel regression analysis, 
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with subjects nested within classes, which included a dummy variable for agreement with 
outcome, to account for these complications. Results are presented in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: Results from experimental analysis 
Measurement 
Indicator (n=147) Parameter Estimate S.E. p-value 
Approval 
Loading .617 .059 .000 
Error .620 .073 - 
Fairness 
Loading .929 .041 .000 
Error .137 .075 - 
Democratic-ness 
Loading .705 .051 .000 
Error .503 .071 - 
Future use 
Loading .584 .064 .000 
Error .659 .074 - 
 
Goodness of Fit 
Statistic Value P-value 
Chi-square 2.007 .367 
RMSEA 0.005  
CFI 1.000  
 
T-tests 
 
  
 Mean for mode of decision    
Item Technocratic Participatory Difference S.E.  P-Value 
Approval (n=147) 2.987 3.625 .638 .206 .002 
Fairness (n=144) 3.247 4.169 .922 .193 .000 
Democratic-ness (n=145) 2.419 4.085 1.67 .208 .000 
Future use (n=143) 3.108 3.884 .776 .219 .001 
      
Index, un-weighted (n=140) .488 .736 .248 .040 .000 
CFA predicted index (n=147) -.420 .443 .863 .148 .000 
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Table 6.4 continued: Multilevel regression 
 CFA predicted index 
Predictor (n=147) Estimate S.E. P-value 
Intercept (grand mean) .186 .078 .017 
Participatory method .408 .070 .000 
Agreement with outcome .371 .078 .000 
    
Between-group variance .000   
Even when accounting for satisfaction of a subject’s preference, the mode of 
decision-making had a significant and substantively large impact on municipal support. 
Subjects in the participatory treatment group were, on average, more supportive of the 
municipality by .863 units. This is equivalent to an increase of roughly 20 percent of the 
CFA predicted index’s empirically observed scale. Results were similar for the un-
weighted scale and all of the individual questions; in all cases the participatory treatment 
group had higher levels of support than those in the technocracy treatment. 
The multilevel regression, which controls for agreement with the actual outcome 
(installation of cameras) and accounts for the fact that experimental subjects were not 
independently selected (due to nesting within classes), shows a similar impact. The 
multilevel regression used factor effects coding for the independent variables (1 for present 
and -1 for absent); this means that the intercept is the grand mean, and the coefficients for 
method of decision and outcome agreement represent the difference between the 
participatory treatment group and those who agreed with the chosen outcome and the grand 
mean. Both participatory method and outcome agreement had a significant impact on 
subjects’ reported support, albeit somewhat smaller than that estimated by the t-tests.  
Due to the relatively small number of respondents and constraints on the time 
students could spend on the experiment, I did not directly model the mediated relationship 
between participatory opportunities, RBE and support in this experiment. The impact of 
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participatory opportunities on support is analyzed directly. However the breakdown of 
results by individual questions conforms to the notion that RBE is the underlying causal 
mechanism. Note that the differences across conditions for fairness and democratic-ness, 
which are procedural evaluations, are somewhat larger than those for the more utilitarian 
approval question and the largely neutral future use question.  
The experimental results demonstrate far more conclusively what the statistical 
analyses presented earlier cannot: that institutions which allow for a direct role in decision-
making produce greater support for the sponsoring actor, even when controlling for 
agreement with chosen policies. These results do have some significant limitations. Since 
all participants were university students, extrapolating these findings beyond the student 
population is risky, as non-students may have different attitudes regarding participatory 
governance. The fact that students are the most vocally dissatisfied group in Chilean 
society allays such concerns to some extent. But taken in combination with the statistical 
analyses presented earlier, the evidence provided here strongly confirms my theoretical 
framework.  
The results of experiments are always subject to concerns about their external 
validity. The price one pays for the ability to randomize and control possible independent 
variable values is an abstraction away from real-world dynamics which could contaminate 
the results in unpredictable ways. In short, the question remains: would participatory 
programs have the same impact if implemented in a real-world setting? In the following 
section, I analyze one such program to bolster these experimental results.  
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6.3.3: Participatory governance in the real world: Piensa Providencia 
This section will show that a real-world participatory program, similar to that 
envisioned in the experiments described in the previous section38, produced increased 
support for the municipal administration by significantly reducing tensions between the 
government and social organizations. This section proceeds in two parts: first I review the 
design and implantation of the program, relying on interviews with municipal staff and my 
own observations, to demonstrate that the program was truly participatory. I then present 
evidence from a program evaluation survey, administered by the municipality and designed 
in consultation with the author, to show that the program had the predicted effect: namely 
that it improved relations between the municipality and its citizens. 
Before diving into a description of the program, a brief explanation of the context 
in which it was implemented is necessary. Providencia is a comuna (municipality or 
commune) lying just to the east of downtown Santiago. It was once a middle-class area, 
but has rapidly increased in affluence over recent years. Despite the increasing 
socioeconomic position of its residents, it is not one of the bastions of the elite, who live in 
municipalities further to the east such as Las Condes and Vitacura. Social organizations 
grew as the city’s profile became increasingly upper-middle class. This was especially true 
in Bellavista, a neighborhood which sits at the foot of Cerro San Cristobal. Bellavista was 
once a district of bars and nightclubs, but the increasing number of upper-middle class 
residents led to the proliferation of social organizations, including many associated with 
the student movement, as well as strong community organizations.  
This rapid development of left-of-center social organizations was not, for many 
years, reflected in the composition of the municipal government. For sixteen years, from 
1996 until 2012, the municipality’s chief executive (alcalde, or mayor) was Cristián Labbé. 
                                                 
38 This similarity is not coincidental; the experiment was inspired in part by this program. 
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Labbé was a member of the far-right Independent Democratic Union (UDI), who had 
served as a member of the armed forces and the notorious spy agency DINA; he would 
later be arrested in 2014 for his role in the violence perpetrated by the regime immediately 
after the 1973 coup ("Difunden lista completa con 1500 ex agentes de la DINA que incluye 
a alcalde Cristián Labbé," 2012). Needless to say Labbé had little love for the nascent social 
movements which took root in the municipality after 2006. His administration paid them 
as little attention as possible (Bica, 2013), except when they engaged in disruptive politics; 
he used a heavy hand to end student takeovers of high schools during the 2006 student 
protests ("Estudiantes del liceo Lastarria se reintegran mañana a clases," 2006). Eventually, 
independent leftist Josefa Errázuriz, with support from social movements in general and 
the student movement in particular, ousted Labbé from the mayor’s office. In this sense 
Errázuriz identified with a broader trend within the Chilean left towards a more socially-
rooted political strategy (Fuentes, 2013). In short, Errázuriz came to office at a time when 
municipal relationships with organized civil society were defined by mutual mistrust and 
animosity. Her election certainly raised hopes that relations would improve, but a certain 
amount of suspicion among activists was inevitable. After sixteen years of opposition, the 
municipality would have to prove its commitment to greater inclusion and participation. 
The Piensa Providencia (PP) program analyzed here was the first major initiative 
under the new administration which attempted to introduce a new kind of politics into 
municipal governance. The program concerned the development and implementation of 
the Communal Development Plan (PCD, Plan Comunal de Desarrollo). These plans are 
stipulated by Chilean law, and govern the joint administration by the municipality and the 
state of investment and implementation of projects to promote health, well-being, 
education, and public services, among other things ("Ley orgánica constitucional de 
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municipalidades," 2006). Municipal governments have the discretion to develop their own 
plans, which they then submit to the state. 
PP, implemented in 2013, specified that the PCD would be developed through a 
series of three town-hall meetings (cabildos), with a separate meeting held in each 
neighborhood of the municipality. The first meeting introduced the program and, through 
working-groups on various specific policy areas, developed proposals for the plan. Those 
proposals were then submitted to the relevant experts on the municipal staff, who converted 
them into actionable items that could be included on the development plan. At the second 
meeting, the técnicos (policy experts such as architects, engineers, and urban planners) met 
directly with participants, explaining any changes or omissions of proposals. For example, 
many proposals were rejected because they concerned issues (such as rules for bicycling 
on sidewalks) that pertained not to the PCD, but rather the regulatory plan, which is 
analogous to a municipal code in the United States. At the end of the second meeting, 
participants were allowed to vote on the priority of the various proposals. The municipal 
staff then wrote the PCD according to these priorities, and the final plan was presented at 
the third set of cabildos.  
The program was designed to maximize participation and transparency throughout 
the process. The municipal staff identified two major potential stumbling blocks: the 
ingrained passivity of a citizenry that has few opportunities for direct involvement in 
politics, and the possibility that the social organizations would dominate the process for 
their own ends (Bica, 2013; N. Valenzuela, 2013). To address the former, the municipal 
staff designed aspects of the program to encourage the free expression of ideas. The first 
round of cabildos began with an exercise called “dreams of my neighborhood”, where 
participants were asked to write their hopes for their neighborhood on a card and place it 
on a wall; some of these were read aloud. Observing this, I found the exercise a bit vapid 
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at first. It was only as the meeting progressed that I understood the purpose of the exercise. 
Chileans are simply not used to such direct participation; multiple participants at the first 
round of meetings asked where the técnicos were. This exercise was in fact a very effective 
ice-breaker, essentially welcoming participants to express their ideas and to ease them into 
a political role with which they had little experience. This was especially crucial for 
individuals who were not members of social organizations. Another key aspect of the 
program was the training of facilitators, volunteers who answered questions about the 
process. These individuals went through three separate training sessions, which focused on 
ensuring that facilitators would only give necessary procedural advice, without interjecting 
their own ideas into the process. Finally, the municipality attempted to promote the 
program to the broadest possible audience, for example by advertising at large concerts 
where many individuals not affiliated with social organizations were likely to attend (Bica, 
2013). These attempts to encourage participation seemed to work. In an evaluation of the 
program, 75 respondents out of 79 who attended at least one cabildo reported that they 
were able to express their opinions at the meetings (Rhodes-Purdy, 2014). 
Although the program’s architects were concerned about the natural passivity many 
Chileans have developed over years of dictatorship and protective democracy, these 
attempts to ensure broad participation were equally intended to prevent another problem: 
the domination of the process by social organizations. This concern was particularly acute 
in Bellavista, where social organizations were more accustomed to using contention and 
protest than collaboration when dealing with the municipal government. That these 
organizations might attempt to push their own goals at the expense of unorganized 
individual participants was a very real possibility (Bica, 2013; N. Valenzuela, 2013).  
Nor was this concern unfounded. Another participatory CDP program, this one in 
Santiago, conducted meetings similar to the first cabildos in Providencia; however after 
 165 
proposals were elaborated, instead of the constant open participation enacted in 
Providencia, the neighborhood associations (in consultation with the municipal 
administration) were given responsibility, shutting out citizens who did not belong to such 
organizations. This was precisely the sort of domination by social organizations which the 
architects of PP sought to avoid. 
This did not go over well at first. At the second cabildo in Bellavista, an older man 
took the microphone during the opening meeting to denounce the municipal government 
for shutting his organization out of the process. Over the course of the program, the 
municipality was able to balance admirably the need to include non-organized individuals 
and the demands of social organizations. The administration held separate consultations to 
assuage their concerns that they were being ignored (Bica, 2013). And participation was 
indeed broad; according to statistics collected, over 1000 people attended at least one 
cabildo, and of those, 58 percent were not affiliated with any social organization (Informe 
cabildos abril 2013, etapa 1: sueños, diagnósticos y propuestas, 2013). Even the relatively 
militant organizations in Bellavista seemed to come around, eventually; at the third 
meeting, participants presented municipal staff with flowers and a poem of thanks to 
Errázuriz. The municipal staff also reported that interactions with previously antagonistic 
social movements had improved considerably (Equipo de Planificación, 2013). 
Piensa Providencia and municipality-society relations 
Although the example from Bellavista is a particularly dramatic example of PP’s 
role in thawing relations between the municipality and social organizations, more data are 
needed to conclude that this trend was general. The municipality collected such data in 
January of 2014 at a series of meetings intended to review and evaluate the program as the 
administration prepared to implement further participatory programs. These meetings 
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included a survey, which I helped to design, intended to collect data on the support for the 
program. This survey was entirely self-selected, so no parametric tests can be done and 
caution is warranted on extrapolating the collected data to the municipal population as a 
whole. However as my own observations show, social organizations who were (early in 
the process) dissatisfied with the program used such meetings to make their views known; 
if dissatisfaction were widespread, one might expect they would again take the opportunity 
to express their views. 
No such dissatisfaction is apparent in the data collected. The program evaluation 
survey indicates that participants felt their voices were heard and were supportive of the 
program. Only 5.3 percent of respondents answered “no” when asked if they felt their 
opinions were taken into account during the process. 74.4 percent reported that their 
interactions with técnicos were either “good” or “very good”. 88.8 percent had a positive 
evaluation of participatory spaces offered during the program. Respondents were nearly 
unanimous (94.3 percent) in their belief that the municipality enabled participation through 
PP. Perhaps the best evidence of the program’s support can be seen in respondents’ 
attitudes about future use of similar programs. Nearly all respondents (97.7 percent) agreed 
or strongly agreed that the municipality should make future decisions using participatory 
programs like PP when possible, and 96.7 percent reported that they would probably or 
very probably participate in such programs in the future. Caution should be taken in 
extrapolating from these results to the population of participants, given the self-selection. 
However one would expect that organized social groups would take these evaluation 
meetings as an opportunity to register their displeasure if such antipathy existed, as they 
did in early cabildos. The data collected show no such evidence; indeed the results strongly 
point to a highly successful participatory initiative which bridged a deep chasm between 
civil society and the municipal government. 
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The qualitative evaluation of one program in a single municipality would not, in 
and of itself, be sufficient to conclude that participatory programs improve support for the 
sponsoring entity. However this program, and its clear impact on previously strained 
relationships between social organizations and the municipal administration, provide a 
real-world example of the causal dynamics established experimentally in the previous 
section. The conclusion is clear: participatory programs, when carefully designed to 
include all citizens, can and do improve relations between government and citizens. 
6.4: CONCLUSION 
Despite the economic benefits the Chilean center-left has managed to wrest from 
the liberal economy, the framework I apply here suggests that the exclusivity and elitism 
which the protective features of the Chilean state encourage put a significant damper on 
any enthusiasm for the regime. I have presented statistical, experimental, and qualitative 
evidence, all of which is consistent with this conclusion. The Chilean state, and its party 
system, are loathed by many not because of the policy choices they make but because of 
how those choices are made. In short: procedures matter, no matter how good the policy 
they produce may be. 
In this chapter I have shown that, since the 1930s, the Chilean state took a leading 
role in shaping the economy and society. Mobilization and politicization of society was not 
driven by economic transformation but by political elites seeking to escape the constant 
conflict between reform and conservatism. This, along with some strategic blunders during 
the Allende years, was what goaded the military out of its barracks. This fear, that feckless 
politicians might attempt to mobilize the electorate in dangerous ways, was encoded into 
the 1980 constitution which governs Chile to this day, albeit with significant modifications. 
That document placed Chile’s nascent democracy under military guardianship, yet even 
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when the guardianship was entirely lifted in 2005, the counter-majoritarian elements 
embodied by supermajorities and the binomial system remained. These institutions, along 
with elite preferences for negotiation versus participation, have drastically limited the 
political role of the citizenry. Mobilization of the electorate cannot, as in pre-1973 Chile, 
break political deadlocks or settle policy debates. Negotiation with opponents has become 
the only viable path to reform, a path which the Concertacíon has navigated with admirable 
results. Despite policy successes that are the envy of the region, in the absence of a more 
meaningful political role for ordinary citizens, political malaise is unlikely to abate. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
I conclude this work by discussing some of the major theoretical implications of 
this analysis, pointing out areas for future research, and by analyzing what these findings 
can tell us about normative debates about participation and stability in democracies. 
However before doing so, I will briefly summarize the major findings of this research and 
the evidence used to support them. 
This project sought to test competing predictions made by liberal and participatory 
democratic theory regarding factors that encourage regime support. To do so I created a 
general model of regime support based upon social psychological theories of organizational 
justice, which includes both performance and procedural variables, as well as subjective 
evaluations of same, into its causal framework (see Figure 1.2 for a graphical 
representation). This framework hypothesizes that subjective evaluations of procedural 
justice (operationalized as RBE) impact support in two ways: both directly, and by 
diminishing the influence of poor governance.  
I first evaluated the individual-attitudinal relationships using data from across Latin 
America, collected by LAPOP; data from the ANES in the United States were used to test 
the generalizability of the framework, as well as its robustness when using different 
measures of performance evaluations, evaluations of participatory opportunities, and 
regime support. All analyses, with minor differences, were consistent with the framework 
specified in Figure 1.2 (see Chapter 4). By comparing average levels of RBE in countries 
which have extensive opportunities for direct participation to those that do not, I also 
provided preliminary evidence of the importance of participatory opportunities to regime 
support. 
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However the most important evidence for the proposition that participatory 
opportunities shape support came from the case-focused chapters. The chapter on 
Venezuela (Chapter 5) laid out a theoretical explanation of support in that regime that could 
account for both its participatory and populist-authoritarian features. I argued that Chávez 
practiced a political strategy, which I call participatory populism, wherein the regime’s 
hegemonic politics at the national level were legitimated by participatory self-governance 
at the local level. This stands in contrast to personalistic theories of support (which see no 
role for participatory programs), and participatory democratic theories, which 
underestimate the importance of Chávez in maintaining the legitimacy of the regime he 
founded. Quantitative analysis showing that council participation has a positive effect on 
regime support, but only among those with strong participatory democratic beliefs, ruled 
out personalism; the fact that a positive relationship between council participation and RBE 
only existed among regime supporters was inconsistent with participatory democracy. 
Qualitative analysis of the council’s practices, including discrimination against opposition 
supporters and the use of the councils as a Bolivarian “reserve army” at election time 
further contradicted the assumptions of participatory democratic approaches. Only 
participatory populism made predictions which were consistent with all findings. 
I then turned to the paradox of anemic support in Chile. Using quantitative analysis 
of survey data collected by the Center for Public Studies (CEP), I sought to understand the 
sources of antipathy towards Chile’s least popular political institution: its party system. 
Evidence from these surveys indicated that Chile suffers from a crisis of participation, not 
representation: concerns over parties’ failure to encourage citizen participation were far 
more important than concerns over their representative function in determining party 
system attitudes. 
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Finally, I presented experimental and qualitative evidence that participatory 
opportunities could improve support in Chile, were they available. The experimental 
analysis served two purposes: in addition to offering evidence regarding the roots of weak 
support in Chile, it also provided a test of the general impact participatory governance 
programs have on support, unsullied by concerns over the idiosyncratic details that 
complicate analyses of real-world programs such as the CCs in Venezuela. The fact that 
the impact of participatory programs can be shown by analyses from the real world and the 
laboratory is powerful evidence in favor of H3 (see Figure 1.2). However experimental 
analyses always risk being undermined by external validity issues. To overcome such 
concerns, I conducted a qualitative evaluation of an actual participatory program in Chile: 
the Piensa Providencia program. I found this program to be genuinely participatory, and 
interviews with municipal staff and a survey of participants showed that participants were 
extremely satisfied with the program, and that their engagement with it significantly 
reduced the historic tensions between the municipal administration and social 
organizations. 
To summarize, all of the evidence presented here is consistent with the theoretical 
framework I developed in Chapter 3, and its proposition that participatory opportunities 
are a key source of regime support. Now that the major findings of this thesis are fresh in 
the reader’s mind, I will discuss the broader theoretical and empirical implications of these 
findings.  
7.1: LIBERALISM AND THE PRIMACY OF PERFORMANCE 
The primary purpose of this project was to explain support paradoxes in Chile and 
Venezuela. However this research also has another, arguably more important purpose: to 
put the competing claims of liberal and participatory democratic theory to the test. 
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Normative theories are often thought to be beyond the realm of empirical investigation; the 
conflicts between such philosophies often hinge upon what one values or believes to be 
morally right. Yet it is possible to adjudicate between theories with data when they rest 
upon implicit or explicit assumptions about “human nature”. Such assumptions can, with 
a bit of deduction, imply a myriad of testable hypotheses. And if the premises on which a 
theory rests are found by empirical analysis to be wanting, the theoretical precepts based 
on that foundation are called into question. 
In their original forms, neither body of democratic thought lends itself well to this 
kind of empirical adjudication. Classical liberals never presupposed that most citizens 
would prefer the liberal regime they sought to construct. In fact they assumed the opposite: 
in their minds the greatest threat to the limited government they envisioned was the 
inevitable clamoring for the state to become involved in an ever widening set of policy 
areas. Each such intrusion might well contribute to the interests of some group of citizens, 
but the aggregate result would be a state powerful enough and with broad enough reach to 
violate the rights and liberties such thinkers held dear. To liberal theorists, the popular will 
must be frustrated in the short term in order to preserve the greater good: a government 
which could not destroy the liberty it was designed to protect. In short, the conscious 
preferences of the people are of minimal consequence, and the fact that such preferences 
are unsatisfied has little bearing on the theory’s validity. 
However a new wave of scholarship, inspired most directly by rational choice 
theories but making (if only implicitly) many of the same assumptions as the classical 
liberals, transgressed the bounds of purely normative theory by imputing liberal 
preferences to individuals. Political theorists like Downs (1957) argued that, contrary to 
the assumptions of participatory democrats, citizens prefer less participation, not more. In 
fact, under the doctrine of rational self-interest, we should expect citizens to prefer their 
 173 
regimes to function effectively with the least amount of civic involvement possible; 
essentially Downs presumed that citizens wanted only to periodically select elites through 
voting. When citizens do enter the political arena, it is only because such intervention is 
necessary to protect or advance their private interests; they gain nothing from the 
participatory process itself. 
Thus the overriding concern with performance, with what regimes do, was born. 
The literature on regime support has extremely weak theoretical grounding; the major 
works on the issue (Crozier et al., 1975; Easton, 1975; Norris, 1999b; Pharr et al., 2000) 
make no reference to the vast body of democratic theory. Many of these works are simple 
extensions of earlier theories which sought to explain variation in the quality of 
governance. These works uncritically carried their interest in governance into regime 
support theory. And yet all essentially concede to the primacy of policy outcomes as the 
metric by which citizens evaluate their regimes.  
7.2: THE PARTICIPATORY OBJECTION 
Like liberalism, participatory democratic theory in its original form provides little 
that could be empirically tested. Theorists inspired by Athenian notions of direct 
democracy, from enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau (2002) to more modern scholars 
such as Pateman (1970) and Barber (1984), certainly argued that participatory self-
governance could have immediate positive impacts on citizens; in this respect this body of 
democratic thought is somewhat more amenable to empirical testing, and some scholars 
have done so (Bowler & Donovan, 2002; Donovan, Tolbert, & Smith, 2009). However the 
impacts specified by normative democratic theory are so abstract and diffuse that any 
analytical work based upon them must make some truly heroic deductive leaps. Should the 
educative, developmental impact of participation make citizens happier? More 
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responsible? More harmonious? Perhaps all or some of the preceding, or something else 
entirely? Must citizens actually participate in politics for these effects to manifest, or need 
they only have the opportunity to do so? And this does not even broach the subject of the 
demands placed upon citizens and the modern state by allowing (indeed requiring) such 
constant engagement by the citizenry. I have a great deal of sympathy for Barber’s critique 
of the atomizing influence of political and economic liberalism, but I find his proposition 
for Athenian-style democracy in the modern world to be beyond the bounds of the practical. 
Individuals simply have far too many competing demands on their time and energies to 
form a Greek polity in modern states. Even in Bolivarian Venezuela, where participation 
is a core part of the regime’s claim to legitimacy, less than a quarter of citizens regularly 
avail themselves of such opportunities for self-governance (Briceño, 2012). This would 
seem to contradict the one observable implication of participatory democratic theory: 
namely that citizens will jump at any opportunity to participate. In short, the hypotheses 
that can be deduced from participatory theory terminate in an unsupported proposition and 
an unresolvable (within the bounds of the theory) puzzle: how can participatory access 
matter, when it can only be used sporadically? 
Also like liberalism, a group of scholars from outside the realm of political theory 
provide a solution. Psychology has long had an interest in the question of efficacy, the 
ability of individuals to shape their environments, and its impact on individual well-being. 
As described previously, the principal insight of psychology, which allows us to deduce 
promising hypotheses from participatory theory, is that the act of participation is not what 
increases satisfaction within a given environment, but the mere availability of opportunities 
to do so. Rather than some abstract notion of personal development, the ability to influence 
the course of politics can provide something that psychologists long ago accepted as critical 
for well-being: a sense of control over one’s environment.  
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7.3: ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE AND REGIME SUPPORT: A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYSIS 
As stated earlier, perhaps the largest impediment to a greater understanding of 
regime support is the lack of strong theoretical grounding. Assumptions about what citizens 
want from their regimes are often unclear, or made in an ad-hoc extension of earlier theories 
which had little to do with support or legitimacy (e.g. social capital theory, Huntington’s 
theories of institutionalization).  The greatest contribution of this thesis is the development 
of a unified framework for analyzing questions relating to regime support. Had psychology 
stopped at the question of efficacy, this would not be possible. However applied social 
psychology took up these questions, and theoretical work in that discipline does allow the 
development of such a framework: that of organizational justice. The principal advantage 
of the organizational justice framework on which my own theory of support is based is that 
it incorporates both performance and procedures into its causal narrative, although 
empirical testing has shown the latter to be the more decisive factor. It also provides 
specific guidance about how these factors interact to produce attitudes about a specific 
organization. 
I find it surprising that this framework has not yet been applied to the issue of 
regime support. This literature is not unknown in the political realm; scholars have used it 
to analyze the justice system and voluntary compliance with laws, among other things. And 
its applicability seems clear: it only requires that individuals be embedded in and subject 
to hierarchical organizations. Political regimes would certainly seem to qualify. 
Nevertheless, one cannot simply adopt a theoretical framework developed for one aspect 
of human social life and apply it to another without testing. The findings presented here 
are unambiguous: the organizational justice framework is an appropriate and useful way to 
approach the question of regime support. And given the emphasis on procedural justice 
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and participatory access, validated in the social psychology literature and shown here to be 
equally crucial in the political realm, my research comes firmly down on the side of 
participatory democratic theory and against democratic liberalism. Put simply: procedures 
matter. They matter a great deal, and they dampen the extent to which performance matters. 
In fact future research may well show that, if anything, the findings here actually 
underestimate their influence on political attitudes. 
7.4: FUTURE RESEARCH  
Any long work of research will have a few unanswered questions and a few findings 
that cannot immediately be explained, and the present work is no exception. There are three 
areas of this project which require further study, although none of them seems likely to 
undermine the previously presented findings. However these avenues of investigation do 
have the potential to provide a more thorough understanding of how performance and 
participation interact to shape attitudes towards political regimes. They could also 
contribute to our understanding of how the relationships investigated here shape political 
behavior. 
7.4.1: Justice cognitions and the evaluation of performance 
Perhaps the simplest way to introduce the first of these is with a graph, presented 
below. This graph provides a visualization of the relationship between objective, country-
level performance, and subjective, individual-level perceptions of the same. The y axis 
presents average perceptions of performance39. The data on the x-axis are the composite 
governance scores used by Mainwaring et al. (2010) in their book on democratic 
                                                 
39 These figures are the average predicted score on the performance latent variable specified in the 2012 
reduced LAPOP model from Chapter 4. 
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governance, excluding the measure of democracy, again to ensure congruence between the 
subjective and objective dimensions. 
Figure 7.1: Average subjective evaluations of performance by objective performance 
 
The weakness of the relationship shown in the graph is shocking. Ordinarily this 
might be attributed to poor measures, but this seems extremely unlikely for the current 
problem. The LAPOP questions used to form the dependent variable (evaluations of 
economic management, poverty reduction, and public security) are very close to the more 
objective country-level measures used to form the independent variable. A more promising 
answer lies in an aspect of attitude formation which this thesis has not examined in great 
detail. I have explored the relationship between attitudes, and how the political 
environment (specifically the participatory opportunities that are provided by the political 
regime) shape those attitudes. I have not, however, said much about the process by which 
individuals gather and process information about that environment. This process was 
discussed briefly in Chapter 5, when I hypothesized that chavista rhetoric of participatory 
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democracy and populist struggle against the oligarchy inflated the sense of empowerment 
that supporters developed from participatory governance. However for the most part I have 
assumed that the cognitive processes by which individuals gather and process information 
about their regime’s performance and participatory opportunities are relatively 
straightforward, with high levels of one or the other producing positive subjective 
assessments, with some random variation. 
The data presented in Figure 7.1 suggest that reality is not so neat. A brief look at 
how countries fall on the regression line imply some interesting possibilities. Of the five 
over-performing countries (those above the regression line), three have populist presidents. 
Another, Uruguay, is well known for its extremely robust and deeply-rooted democratic 
system. On this basis, I could engage in some inductively-based speculation about why 
individuals in populist and participatory polities seem to be more forgiving of their 
regime’s failures (or more exuberant about their regime’s successes, in the case of 
Uruguay). 
Fortunately no such guesswork is necessary. The literature on organizational justice 
which inspires my framework has examined the cognitive element of attitude formation, 
and this work provides some very promising explanations for why objective and subjective 
performance do not match in many countries. The cognitive processes relevant to 
organizational justice attitudes are referred to collectively as fairness heuristics (Lind, 
2001). Two factors stand out as important here: the primacy effect and substitutability. 
In organizational justice theory, the primacy effect refers to the tendency to make 
an initial evaluation of the justice and fairness of an organization based on whatever 
information to which one is exposed first; those judgements then influence the evaluation 
of all subsequently obtained information (Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 2001). In other words, 
individuals do not constantly update their attitudes towards an organization as new 
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information rolls in, with all information having roughly equal weight. Instead the first 
piece of information leads to a judgement which anchors evaluation of all subsequent 
information.  
The second factor, substitutability, implies that the two dimensions (outcomes and 
procedures) used here are more dependent upon one another than earlier work in this area 
assumed. In the absence of information about one dimension, individuals will use 
information they possess about the other dimension to make judgements as a substitute 
(van den Bos et al., 2001). In other words, if a person does not have any information with 
which to judge the fairness or justice of an outcome, that person will use information about 
the justice of procedures to make judgements about outcomes.  
In the political realm, new policy outputs are constantly cropping up, while the 
procedures which produce them remain relatively stable. By combining the primacy and 
substitutability effects discussed above, one can make some very reasonable hypotheses to 
account for the discrepancy apparent in Figure 7.1. Specifically, these factors imply that 
the interaction between performance and RBE tested in Chapter 4 may also occur even 
earlier in the process of attitude formation. As individuals usually have information about 
political procedures before they have information about specific policy outcomes, their 
evaluation of those outcomes are likely filtered through their procedural attitudes. High 
levels of RBE may not simply prevent poor performance from eroding regime support. It 
may in fact blind individuals to the severity of governance failures in the first place. A 
modified version of Figure 1.1, including this new hypothesis (labeled as H4), is presented 
in Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2: Theoretical framework, modified with cognitive element 
 
Far from undermining my argument, findings which supported this hypothesis 
would actually provide further support. They would suggest that participatory 
opportunities shape attitudes in multiple ways, all of which improve support by blunting 
the deteriorating impact of poor performance. Such findings would simply introduce 
another point in the process of attitude formation at which participatory opportunities could 
influence support, albeit indirectly through its impact on subjective evaluations of 
performance. Such hypotheses would be very difficult to test with secondary observational 
data. Estimating the impact of participatory opportunities (through RBE) on the cognitive 
process of performance evaluation would require a large number of country-year units, far 
larger than are available in the LAPOP dataset. This is problematic because no other large 
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cross-national survey contains robust measures of RBE. Experimental analyses, similar to 
those presented in Chapter 6 of this thesis, could provide such tests. I plan to conduct such 
experiments in future research. 
7.4.2: Broader applications of the framework 
This project focused on the role played by participatory opportunities in shaping 
regime support primarily because that was the most likely source of the discrepancy 
between performance and support in the two cases of interest. However there is good 
reason to suppose that the kind of participatory self-governance practiced in Venezuela is 
unlikely to explain variation in support in other contexts. Such programs are not typical of 
modern democracies; participatory fora sponsored by a national regime, rather than the 
local governments under which they usually operate, are even more unusual. 
Nevertheless, the focus on an active, meaningful role for citizen does have 
considerable promise for broader investigations of regime support. There are two possible 
analytical strategies here. The first, and by far the least promising for broader analyses, is 
to develop a comprehensive theory of how specific institutions (e.g. electoral systems, 
government structure, and legislation governing internal party democracy) shape RBE. 
Such an endeavor would be incredibly difficult, as institutions can interact with one another 
and with other elements of the political environment to produce wildly differing impacts 
from context to context. For example, the participatory populist framework I employ in 
Chapter 5 shows that participatory institutions interact with the personal charisma and 
populist rhetoric of Hugo Chávez to create unusually strong perceptions of RBE despite 
the limited scope of participatory opportunities and his authoritarian tendencies. Without 
the deep understanding which only single case studies can facilitate, such interactions 
would likely bedevil even the most carefully crafted cross-national institutional analyses. 
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A more promising strategy, one facilitated by recently released data, is to step back 
from analyses of institutions, and to focus instead on the more abstract notion of varieties 
of democracy. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project takes just such an approach. 
Its dataset provides measures of liberalism, participatory democracy, electoral democracy, 
egalitarianism, and deliberative democracy, among other characteristics. These measures 
take institutions into account, but also rely on expert assessments to account for the 
idiosyncrasies of individual political systems. I intend to conduct analyses based on this 
dataset, using both LAPOP and the World Values Survey in future research. 
7.4.3: Implications for political behavior 
Finally, this research has clear implications for theorized relationships between 
support and various kinds of political behavior. The most important of these is that support 
may not have a uniform impact on behavior; a lack of support may produce different types 
of behavior depending on if it is based on perceptions of performance or procedures. The 
most obvious place where this would be relevant is in the most studied behavior impact of 
support: on the decision to engage in contentious politics. Many scholars have argued that 
low regime support tends to lead citizens to forsake institutional mechanisms of 
participation in favor of taking to the streets (Crow, 2007, 2010; Klosko et al., 1987; Muller 
& Opp, 1986; Opp et al., 1981). The framework presented here provides a more nuanced 
set of predictions. For example, we might expect citizens who are critical of their regime’s 
performance but trust its institutions to have relatively weak support, but to continue to 
engage with the formal political system. This could, for example, help to explain why 
protests in Venezuela have been largely confined to the wealthy areas of major cities, while 
the barrios and the countryside have remained mostly silent. Likewise, citizens who are 
relatively satisfied with policy outcomes but critical of institutions may withdraw from 
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politics into apathy. Again, this could explain why Chilean students, who have low 
institutional trust as well as specific and serious economic grievances, continue to protest 
while most Chileans, even those with little faith in the political system, merely grumble 
and go about their day to day lives. Finally, those who are critical of both dimensions will 
be the most likely to engage in contentious politics. 
Although there are interesting implications here, the literature on support and 
contentious politics is already quite extensive. I find the more interesting implication for 
behavior to be in an area which has received less scholarly attention: how regime support 
shapes decisions to support or oppose populist politicians. The theory and evidence 
presented here (especially for the Venezuelan case) strongly suggests that support for 
populist leaders is driven by feelings of political impotence. If populists are able to win 
massive support by promising to empower citizens (as Chávez was), it stands to reason that 
citizens who feel that existing institutions and procedures already grant them the ability to 
influence the political process will be inoculated against such appeals. In other words, 
political systems which provide few participatory opportunities may leave themselves 
vulnerable to anti-system outsiders. Such a finding would have major implications for one 
of democracy’s most intractable dilemmas: the tension between stability and participation. 
7.5: STABILITY, PARTICIPATION, AND REGIME SUPPORT 
A major question is strongly implied by this research, which I have thus far not 
addressed: is the Bolivarian populism of Venezuela really “better” than the liberal 
democracy of Chile? Can regime support be treated as a measure of subjective democratic 
quality? Venezuela’s citizens certainly were more supportive of their regime prior to the 
death of Chávez. One might be tempted to deduce from my argument that participatory 
populism is preferable to the elitist democracy practiced in Chile. This would be a mistake. 
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The actual normative implications of my argument are more complex. As the classical 
liberals argued, what makes large groups of citizens happy in the short term does not 
necessarily imply moral superiority or contribute to long-term sustainability. And events 
in Venezuela, which in the absence of the unifying force of the populist has descended into 
chaos, suggest that the support which the Bolivarian regime enjoyed under its founder was 
bought on credit, the bill for which has come due at last. Meanwhile Chile lumbers along, 
slouching slowly yet steadily towards a more complete democratic system. 
Pitting Bolivarian Venezuela’s chaotic, constantly mobilized political system 
against Chile’s elitist stability echoes longstanding debates which see participation and 
stability as fundamentally at odds with one another. The seminal work by Crozier et al. 
(1975) tied this dilemma explicitly to the decline of support in the trilateral nations 
throughout the 1970s. These scholars built upon Huntington’s theory of institutional decay, 
caused by upswings in citizen engagement with democratic systems, which led to excessive 
demands that even highly developed states could not manage (Huntington, 1965). 
Overburdened states could not help but stumble, and the resulting failures of governance 
led to a frustrated and disenchanted citizenry. Within such a framework, the stability and 
integrity of political institutions should be held sacrosanct; the political role of the citizenry 
must be constrained (even if said citizens grumble about it), lest the entire edifice of the 
state be compromised. At first glance, the cases analyzed here might seem to support this 
argument: participatory Venezuela is in the process of collapse, while the Chilean 
partyarchy marches on. The actual lessons to be gleamed from the cases, in light of my 
findings, are not nearly so simple. 
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7.5.1: Participation and stability in Bolivarian Venezuela 
Although the agreement reached by Venezuelan leaders who met at Punto Fijo 
preceded Huntington by a decade, the arrangement they implemented in the wake of a 
devastating period of military rule was based on a similar logic. Puntofijismo, with its 
oligopolistic competition between parties which controlled their social bases through the 
distribution of rents, effectively prevented the kind of excessive demand making that 
Huntington and his followers would later come to fear.  And for decades, the system 
worked: of the countries of South America which comprise part of Latin America, only 
Venezuela and Colombia40 did not experience a period of military rule in the latter half of 
the 20th century. Huntington’s preference for stability over participation was seemingly 
vindicated. 
However the collapse of puntofijismo and the rise of chavismo have as much to say 
on this topic as the former’s temporary successes. Participation may have a heavy price, 
but stability does not come cheap either. The Punto Fijo system was ultimately shown to 
be a giant with feet of clay. Economic collapse impelled neoliberal reforms, and those 
reforms broke the system of rent distribution that kept the regime from falling to earth. It 
had no other basis on which to rest; in other words, the reservoir of goodwill that Easton 
cited as a source of strength during turbulent times was nonexistent. The people of 
Venezuela did not see a succession of governments making incredibly difficult decisions 
in good faith, but an oligarchy masquerading as a democracy, exposed for what it was. This 
situation was ideal for a would-be populist demagogue like Chávez to rise. 
Nor does the crisis of chavismo provide the compelling evidence of the destructive 
influence of participation that Huntington’s acolytes might see. In Chapter 5, I labeled the 
Bolivarian political strategy as “participatory populism”, a system in which national 
                                                 
40 And Colombia had a similarly negotiated settlement between previously antagonistic political parties. 
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hegemony is legitimized by local participation. If one seeks to identify the source of 
collapse, one should look to the noun, rather than the adjective. Hegemony is what allowed 
Chávez and his closest allies at the highest reaches of the regime to make one devastating 
blunder after another, to sit by as the livelihoods (not to mention the lives) of the people 
whose avatar he claimed to be came under increasing threat. To the extent that the various 
participatory fora sponsored by his regime had a role in this calamitous process, it was an 
indirect one. As I have argued, they lent Chávez’s rhetorical paeans to “participatory 
protagonist democracy” a veneer of plausibility, enough so that his followers kept the faith 
long after his incompetence as head of state and the limits of his will to truly empower his 
subjects should have been clear to all.  
In short, the collapse of the Bolivarian regime cannot be laid at the feet of 
participation’s excesses. Chávez used participatory access in a tightly limited sphere to 
justify his evisceration of all mechanisms for holding his government accountable. It is the 
dearth of accountability that has allowed the Bolivarian elite to escape punishment for their 
foolishness. The citizenry cannot be held entirely innocent here; many Venezuelans, 
entranced by the illusion of “participatory protagonist democracy” that hides a system 
based on limited self-governance locally and hegemony nationally, have willingly allowed 
their citizenship to be diminished. However ultimate responsibility must lie with the man 
who used this obfuscation to his advantage. Had Chávez truly empowered his followers in 
all political spheres, national and local, perhaps they could have punished him for his 
failures and forced a correction of course before things became entirely untenable. Had he 
truly embraced the empowerment to which he paid lip service, perhaps his legacy would 
not be tarnishing so quickly. 
 187 
7.5.2: The Chilean Gamble 
Chile seems like an ideal example of why regimes should prioritize stability and 
institutionalization over participation. The successes of this strategy cannot be denied: the 
political system survived an uncertain transition away from military rule to become a fully 
consolidated democracy and the economic envy of the region. However we should be wary 
about drawing conclusions from these successes, as the Chilean strategy has never faced 
the kind of crisis that might reveal its real stability. My findings show that Chile’s cautious 
approach to democratization had its own risks. 
The Chilean political class essentially gambled the legitimacy of the political 
regime on its ability to steward the economy well enough to fund social improvements. 
This was by no means a sure bet; in an increasingly interconnected world, no one can be 
fully confident of their ability to dodge the slings and arrows thrown by the global 
economy. As it happens, the bet has largely paid off: the following graph shows Chilean 
GDP per capita (PPP) from 1996 to 2016. 
Figure 7.3: Chilean GDP per capita, PPP 
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Aside from very brief dips in 1998 and 2008 (both the result of financial crises 
originating in other countries), the economy’s expansion has been constant and strong. 
Given the undeniable competence of successive Chilean governments, shouldn’t this be 
taken as evidence that stability should be preferred, whatever the cost? 
The problem with such a conclusion is that it underestimates the inherent risk of 
such a strategy. This strategy amounts to putting it all on black: the regime bets that it can 
weather any storm that may come its way. However this ignores a troubling question: what 
happens to such a regime were some economic crisis to arise that it could not manage its 
way out of? My research suggests that such a crisis would have a disastrous impact on 
regime support. First, a regime like Chile’s which excludes citizens from most aspects of 
the political process has no reservoir of goodwill from which to draw when the good times 
cease to roll. Furthermore, the interactive effect described in Chapters 3 and 4 has a 
flipside: just as participatory opportunities can ameliorate the impact of poor performance, 
their absence dramatically amplifies the importance of good governance for maintaining 
legitimacy.  
Concluding that stability (and the economic performance it supposedly facilitates) 
are more important than participation based on Chile’s history ignores the fact that Chile 
has never had to pass through the crucible of a protracted economic crisis since the return 
to democracy. Even the extremely brief and minor correction in 1998 caused a drastic 
decline in support which effectively ended the honeymoon period of Chile’s new 
democracy (Posner, 1999). One shudders to think what might have been if the government 
had been unable to correct course so quickly. Although we of course cannot observe a Chile 
where some greater calamity struck, we do have an historical example of such a process: 
this description conforms quite nicely to Venezuela during the collapse of puntofijismo.  
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7.5.3: Stability or participation: an intractable dilemma? 
None of this provides a direct answer to the question that initiated this discussion: 
is the Bolivarian system “better” than Chile’s limited democracy? While each regime type 
has its costs and risks, taking into account each regime’s historical trajectory heavily favors 
the Chilean approach. The Chilean regime, for all its faults, is clearly moving in the right 
direction (albeit at an agonizingly languid pace). As discussed in Chapter 6, the most 
embarrassingly authoritarian elements of the regime have been excised over time. One of 
the principal pillars of protective democracy, the binomial electoral system, was repealed 
mere weeks before this thesis was completed. This paves the way for pro-reform elements 
to finally build the kind of majorities needed to begin making major reforms, and 
fundamentally alters the incentives of Chilean elites vis-a-vis mobilization of the masses. 
Whatever its faults, the system managed to survive long enough for the dust of military 
rule and transition to democracy to settle, and the gradualist process seems to be on track 
towards a deeper democracy in the future. Chileans seem to recognize this; the same survey 
data which shows citizens are quite critical of the system currently also shows a healthy 
optimism regarding the future (CEP). 
One would have to search far and wide to find an optimistic Venezuelan these days, 
regardless of their political bent. The Bolivarian system is inarguably in a process of 
collapse. The founding myth of participatory protagonist democracy cannot sustain itself 
on a foundation of locally bounded participatory fora without the charisma of the populist 
to imbue those programs with greater meaning. In its death throws, chavismo has largely 
abandoned all pretense of democracy, using increasingly authoritarian and illegal tactics to 
maintain power. The eventual victory of the opposition provides little hope for a better 
tomorrow. The class antagonisms that puntofijimo subsumed and chavismo unleashed and 
amplified are not going away anytime soon. The opposition seems to have little insight into 
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how to move the country forward; instead they seem permanently focused on the past, 
attempting to erase Chávez from memory. This inability to grapple with a new reality 
hardly inspires confidence in their ability to heal their country’s wounds. 
With these competing histories in mind, I see two major implications of this 
research. The first is simple: participation matters. Regimes which sacrifice it for stability, 
or sound economic management, or anything else, should be aware of the risks they take. 
I submit that no government, no matter how competent, can be sure of its ability to avoid 
any and all crises in the modern world. Should such a crisis arrive, the consequences for a 
regime whose citizens feel powerless and excluded are likely to be dire. The great irony of 
the Chilean system is that it was designed to prevent the rise of “populism” after nearly 
two decades of repression. And yet as Venezuela under Punto Fijo shows, that system in 
fact provided the ideal context for populism to develop, and only a combination of 
competence and luck prevented it from doing so. 
The second implication is a cautionary corollary to the first: beware of elites 
bringing empowerment. To paraphrase el comandante, such elites often leave a faint whiff 
of brimstone in their wake. The course of chavismo shows the clear danger posed when an 
elitist system collapses: political outsiders can use promises of empowerment and political 
access to win support, even if the actual power they devolve is minor. A version of this 
process can also be seen in pre-Allende Chile, where greater political rights for ordinary 
citizens were usually granted not as the result of bottom-up demands, but by elites seeking 
to use the people as a bludgeon against their political opponents. In both cases, political 
leaders demonstrated far more concern for their own empowerment than for that of the 
people. That the people suffered as a result is hardly surprising. This research, then, 
supports empowering the people, but only through processes directed by the people 
themselves. Such processes, which require continual challenging of elites, are likely to be 
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slow and gradual. However if the alternative is populist domination or a cycle of heightened 
expectations which the state cannot possibly meet, patience seems a small price to pay. 
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